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of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 mostly	 to	 diplomatic	 and	 military	 actions.	 	 This	 thesis	
provides	 the	 first	 comprehensive	 account	 and	 assessment	 of	 another	 important	
aspect	 of	 this	 expansion:	 the	 British	 state’s	 role	 in	 implementing	 a	 project	 of	
governance	over	British	subjects	at	the	treaty	ports.			The	fact	of	extraterritoriality	
–	 the	 principle	 that	 the	 nationals	 of	 foreign	 powers	 were	 subject	 to	 their	 own	
government’s	law	rather	than	that	of	the	state	within	the	boundaries	of	which	they	
were	 situated	 –	 is	well	 known.	 	 But	 consular	 jurisdiction,	 the	 implementation	 in	
practice	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 extraterritoriality,	 has	 not	 been	 the	 subject	 of	much	
research.	 	This	 thesis	describes	 the	British	 state	 institutions	and	practices	which	
were	created	to	implement	consular	jurisdiction	in	China.		It	shows	the	factors	that	
prompted	and	shaped	the	institutions	and	practices	as	they	developed	at	the	treaty	
ports,	 paying	 particular	 reference	 to	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 need	 to	 manage	
marginal	British	subjects,	viewed	as	problem	populations,	in	that	process.		It	then	
demonstrates	how	the	state’s	response	to	such	groups	shaped	the	development	of	
the	 treaty	 ports,	 especially	 Shanghai,	 both	 by	 means	 of	 the	 formation	 of	
connections	within	the	treaty	ports	and	beyond,	and	also	in	the	way	that	the	state’s	
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FO	 	 	 Foreign	Office	
HChT	 	 	 Hertslet’s	China	Treaties	
HCoT	 	 	 Hertslet’s	Commercial	Treaties	
NCH	 	 	 The	North-China	Herald	
NCDN	 	 	 The	North-China	Daily	News	
OIC	 	 	 Order	in	Council	
SMC	 	 	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council	
SMP	 	 	 Shanghai	Municipal	Police	





Concession	 –	 a	 concession	 was	 an	 area	 of	 land	 leased	 from	 the	 Chinese	
government	to	a	single	foreign	government,	which	adopted	measures	for	the	
administration	of	the	area.		The	foreign	government	sublet	plots	of	land	to	its	
own	 nationals	 (and	 in	 addition,	 in	 some	 cases,	 to	 nationals	 of	 other	
countries).	 	 In	 the	 British	 case,	 concessions	were	 governed	 by	 a	municipal	
council	 of	which	 the	 Chair	was	 usually	 the	 local	 British	 consul.	 	 Important	
examples	were	the	British	concessions	at	Tianjin	and	Hankou.	
	
Settlement	 –	 an	 area	 of	 land	 allocated	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government	 for	 foreign	
residence	at	an	open	port.		In	some	cases,	municipal	councils	were	created	by	
foreigners	to	administer	settlements.		The	land	in	a	settlement	was	not	leased	





opened	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 1842	 Treaty	 of	 Nanjing	 –	 Fuzhou,	 Guangzhou,	
Ningbo,	 Shanghai	 and	 Xiamen	 –	 but	 dozens	 more	 were	 created	 in	 the	










the	 text	are	given	below	 in	 the	Wade-Giles	 format,	used	 in	many	older	academic	
texts,	 as	 are	 common	 forms	 used	 in	 contemporary	 texts	 such	 as	 newspapers,	
where	 the	 latter	 usage	 differs	 (as	 it	 often	 did)	 from	 the	 Wade-Giles.	 	 Common	
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Hankou		 	 Hank’ou	 Hankow	
Hongkou		S	 Hungk’ou	 Hongkew	
Huangpu		\#	 Huangp’u	 Whangpoo	/	Hwangpu	




Qingdao		Z 	 Tsingtao	 	
Shanghai		
>	 Shanghai	 Shanghae		
Shantou		: 	 Shant’ou	 Swatow	
Tianjin		%=	 T’ienchin	 Tientsin	
Xiamen		 	 Hsiamen	 Amoy	
Yangzi		 (	 Yangtzu	 Yangtze	/	Yangtse	
Yantai		A	 Yant’ai	 Chefoo	





I	 am	 not	 the	 first	 who	 has	 been	 compelled	 to	 remark	 that	 it	 is	 more	
difficult	 to	 deal	 with	 our	 own	 countrymen	 at	 Canton,	 than	 with	 the	
Chinese	government.1		 	 	 John	Davis,	1846	
	
John	Francis	Davis	was	Britain’s	 leading	official	 in	China,	 the	plenipotentiary	and	
superintendent	 of	 trade,	 when	 he	 wrote	 these	 lines	 of	 complaint	 to	 Lord	
Palmerston,	 and	 was	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 dispute	 surrounding	 heavy-handed	 and	
violent	 behaviour	 towards	 Chinese	 people	 in	 Guangzhou	 by	 British	 merchants.2		
Later	 superintendents	 and	 subordinate	 British	 officials	 would	 also	 expend	
significant	amounts	of	time	and	energy	on	dealing	with	challenges	that	they	saw	as	
arising	 out	 of	 their	 commitment	 to	 control	 British	 subjects	 in	 China.	 	 Their	
attitudes	 and	 practices,	 and	 the	 policies	 and	 legal	 measures	 they	 adopted	 in	
dealing	with	 these	 issues,	 influenced	 the	 shape	 of	 the	British	 state’s	 presence	 in	




are	 well	 known.	 	 We	 know	 much	 about	 the	 limitations	 placed	 on	 the	 Chinese	





extent	out	of	Chinese	hands,	 and	especially	we	know	 that	under	 the	principle	of	
extraterritoriality,	foreigners	in	China	were	removed	from	Chinese	jurisdiction,	in	
a	clear	degradation	of	Chinese	sovereignty,	as	understood	(both	then	and	now)	in	





2	The	city	of	Guangzhou	was	 referred	 to	as	Canton	by	 foreigners	at	 the	 time.	 	 See	pages	8_9	 for	
more	information	on	the	rendering	of	Chinese	place	names	in	western	languages.	
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with	 the	 institutions,	 practices	 and	 culture	which	 grew	 up	 in	 the	 Chinese	 treaty	
port	world.4		As	others	have	noted,	this	was	a	colonial	world	dominated	by	Britain,	
but	 the	 roles	 played	 by	 British	 officials,	 through	 regulations,	 institutions	 and	








3	See	 especially	 Robert	 Bickers,	 The	 Scramble	 for	 China:	 Foreign	Devils	 in	 the	 Qing	 Empire,	 1832-





4	Others	 have	 described	 aspects	 of	 the	 British	 state’s	 involvement	 in	 China,	 including	 certain	
institutions,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 existing	 work	 which	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 British	 state’s	 project	 of	
governance	 in	 China.	 	 See	 Pär	 Kristoffer	 Cassel,	 Grounds	 of	 Judgment:	 Extraterritoriality	 and	




on	 the	 China	 Coast:	 The	 Opening	 of	 the	 Treaty	 Ports,	 1842-1854	 (Stanford,	 Calif.,	 1953);	 Albert	
Feuerwerker,	The	Foreign	Establishment	in	China	in	the	Early	Twentieth	Century	(Ann	Arbor,	1976).		
Cassel	 and	Whewell	 examine	 extraterritoriality	 and	 the	 courts,	 Coates	 and	 Fairbank	 both	 give	 a	
good	 deal	 of	 information	 about	 consuls,	 and	 Feuerwerker	 provides	 a	 valuable	 overview	 of	 the	
working	of	 the	Shanghai	 International	 Settlement	within	which	Britain	was	dominant.	 	However,	
none	 of	 these	 works	 provides	 a	 survey	 or	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 British	 state’s	 project	 of	
governance	as	effected	 through	 the	 range	of	 institutions	and	practices,	 and	over	 the	 time	period,	
encompassed	by	this	thesis.	
5	Jürgen	Osterhammel,	 ‘Britain	and	China,	1842-1914’,	 in	Andrew	Porter	and	William	Roger	Louis	








these	 processes	 by	 the	 perceived	 need	 to	 manage	 certain	 groups	 of	 British	
subjects,	 viewed	 as	 marginal	 and	 problem	 populations	 by	 British	 officials.	 	 The	
focus	 on	 such	 groups	 is	 important,	 since	 it	 ensures	 that	 everyday	 practices	 are	
given	 due	 weight	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 what	 the	 British	 state,	 through	 its	 agents,	
actually	 did	 in	China.	 	 	 Thus	not	 only	 official	 intentions	 as	 expressed	 in	 law	and	
policy	 and	 overtly	 set	 out	 and	 pursued	 through	 legal	 instruments	 and	
proclamations	 are	 captured	 and	 analysed,	 but	 also	 practices	 involving	 official	





This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China	 which	 was	
undertaken	to	implement	consular	jurisdiction	in	China	following	the	conclusion	of	
the	 Treaty	 of	 Nanjing	 in	 1842.	 	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 British	 state	 engaged	 in	 a	
substantial	project	of	governance	in	China,	and	thus	deployed	resources	towards	a	
settled,	institutional	presence	which	has	hitherto	been	only	weakly	acknowledged	
in	 the	 historical	 writing	 on	 Britain	 in	 China.	 	 It	 describes	 the	 structures	 and	
institutions	developed	to	manage	and	control	British	subjects,	especially	marginal	
groups,	 and	 uncovers	 and	 evaluates	 the	 factors	which	 lay	 behind	 official	 British	
attitudes	and	practices	towards	such	groups,	on	which	the	attention	of	state	actors	
was	intensely	focussed	in	the	course	of	the	British	state’s	project	of	governance	in	
treaty	 port	 China.	 	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 presence	 and	 activities	 of	 British	 subjects	
viewed	by	officials	as	problem	populations	shaped	the	institutions	and	practices	of	







institutions	 for	 their	 control;	 and	 prompting	 changes	 –	 both	 extensions	 and	
alterations	 –	 to	 connections	 and	 collaborations	 with	 other	 state	 and	 non-state	
agents	 and	 institutions	 in	 China	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 British	 empire.	 	 It	
furthermore	argues	that	the	British	state’s	actions	in	response	to	British	problem	
populations	played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	development	 of	 the	 treaty	ports.	 	 An	
analysis	of	the	actions	of	the	state,	and	the	effects	of	those	actions,	explains	aspects	




and	 historians	 continue	 to	 grapple	 with	 the	 best	 way	 to	 understand	 various	
aspects	of	it.		It	was	an	extensive,	influential,	destructive,	creative,	exploitative	and	
profitable	 set	 of	 processes,	 which	 has	 cast	 a	 long	 shadow	 in	 Chinese	 minds,	
especially	 in	 the	 Communist	 Party	 official	 view	 of	 China’s	 modern	 history	 as	
written	 in	 China,	 particularly	 from	 the	 1980s	 onwards,	 in	 which	 the	 ‘unequal	
treaties’	 forced	on	China	by	 foreign	powers	are	very	prominent.7		But	despite	 its	
clear	 and	 obvious	 importance,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 pin	 down	 the	 nature	 of	 foreign	 and	
British	 expansion	 in	 China	 conceptually,	 since	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 situation	 in	
China	 does	 not	 fit	 in	 many	 ways	 alongside	 patterns	 seen	 in	 most	 examples	 of	
nineteenth-century	 European	 colonial	 expansion	 elsewhere	 in	 the	world,	 yet	 on	
the	other	hand	many	 features	of	 the	 foreign	presence,	when	examined	 carefully,	
look	colonial	from	a	historian’s	perspective,	and	have	been	shown	clearly	to	have	
been	 experienced	 as	 colonial	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 both	 foreign	 and	 Chinese	
contemporaries.8			





7	Bickers,	 The	 Scramble	 for	 China,	 pp.	 4-6;	 Feuerwerker,	 The	 Foreign	 Establishment	 in	 China,	 pp.	
110-1.	
8	Jurgen	Osterhammel	provides	a	useful	(and	extensive)	list	of	foreign	phenomena	in	China	which	
could	 be	 classed	 as	 imperial	 in	 his	 ‘Semi-Colonialism	 and	 Informal	 Empire	 in	 China:	 Towards	 a	





is	 still	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 used	 in	 such	 a	 context,	 implying	 a	 connection	 with	 a	
unitary	 empire	 (usually	 the	 British),	whereas	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 term	 semi-
colonial	 fits	 less	 into	 explanatory	 models	 relating	 to	 modes	 of	 expansion,	 and	
instead	moves	the	focus	towards	a	description	of	particular	sites	of	colonialism	in	
a	way	that	may	allow	for	a	comparison	with	other	places	where	similar	conditions	
have	 been	 noted.10		 It	 is	 therefore	 less	 often	 deployed	 in	 works	 dealing	 with	 a	





posits	 two	 broad	 types	 of	 imperial	 expansion,	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 John	
Gallagher	and	Ronald	Robinson,	who	suggested	that	the	British	state’s	approach	to	
empire	could	be	summarised	as	‘trade	with	informal	control	if	possible;	trade	with	
rule	 when	 necessary’.12		 This	 theory	 has	 played	 a	 useful	 role	 in	 drawing	 the	
attention	of	imperial	historians	towards	places	which	fell	under	varying	degrees	of	
external	 control	 without	 becoming	 formally	 politically	 subsumed	 within	 or	
attached	 to	 the	 imperial	 polity,	 including	 China. 13 		 Although	 Robinson	 and	
Gallagher	 themselves	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 difference	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	
empire	 has	 not	 been	 one	 of	 fundamental	 nature	 but	 of	 degree,’	 an	 awareness	 of	
this	latter	insight	has	not	however	always	been	evident	in	some	subsequent	work,	
																																																								
9	John	Darwin	 is	probably	 the	 leading	exponent	of	 the	use	of	 this	 term	 in	 this	way	 today:	 see	 for	
example	his	Unfinished	Empire:	The	Global	Expansion	of	Britain	(London,	2012),	pp.	391-2.	
10	For	 example,	 Bryan	 Goodman,	 ‘Improvisations	 on	 a	 Semicolonial	 Theme,	 or,	 How	 to	 Read	 a	
Celebration	 of	 Transnational	Urban	 Community’,	The	 Journal	of	Asian	Studies,	 59,	 4	 (2000),	 889–
926.	
11	Bryna	 Goodman	 and	 David	 S.G.	 Goodman,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in	 Bryna	 Goodman	 and	 David	 S.G.	






for	 example,	 Robert	 Bickers,	 Britain	 in	 China:	 Community,	 Culture	 and	 Colonialism,	 1900-49	
(Manchester,	 1999);	 Jürgen	 Osterhammel,	 ‘Semi-Colonialism	 and	 Informal	 Empire	 in	 China:	
Towards	 a	 Framework	 of	 Analysis’,	 in	 W.	 Mommsen	 and	 J.Osterhammel	 (eds.),	 Imperialism	 and	
After:	Continuities	and	Discontinuities	(London,	1986),	290–314.	
	 19	
so	 that	 ‘informal’	 and	 ‘formal’	 empire	 can	 appear	 as	 two	 clear	 and	 bounded	
categories,	alternative	modes	of	expansion	with	clear	lines	of	distinction	between	










existed	 in	places	 such	as	China.	 	 For	 example,	 John	Darwin	 sets	 out	 the	 contrast	
between	formal	and	informal	empire	by	describing	the	latter	as	 ‘nearly	invisible’,	
and	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘influence’	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 control.15		 Darwin	
applies	 the	 label	 of	 informal	 empire	 to	 China	 and	 yet	 the	 expansion	 of	 Britain	 –	
including	 the	British	 state	–	 into	China	 in	 the	 treaty	 era	 can	only	have	appeared	
invisible	 when	 viewed	 from	 selected	 points,	 such	 as	 within	 the	 walls	 of	 the	
Colonial	 Office	 in	 London;	 it	 was	 by	 no	 means	 invisible	 to	 the	 foreigners	 and	
Chinese	living	in	or	passing	through	the	treaty	ports.			
	
This	dualism	has	also	appeared	 in	more	 specialist	work	 focussing	 specifically	on	




colonial	 formation.’16		 Clearly,	 differences	 in	 modes	 of	 governance	 should	 be	
recognised	between	kinds	of	colonised	space,	but	the	implication	of	the	use	of	the	





16	Goodman	 and	 Goodman,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in	 Goodman	 and	 Goodman	 (eds.),	 Twentieth	 Century	
Colonialism	and	China:	Localities,	the	Everyday,	and	the	World,	p.	2.	
	 20	
represented	a	 type	of	more	 limited	or	 less	active	colonialism,	a	position	which	 is	
not	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence.17		 To	 take	 the	 most	 stark	 example,	 why	 should	
Weihaiwei,	 in	 which	 under	 British	 rule	 traditional	 village	 hierarchies	 and	 legal	
procedures	 were	 maintained	 more	 or	 less	 intact,	 and	 in	 which	 Britain	 invested	
very	 little	 administrative	 labour	 or	 capital,	 be	 a	 less	 ‘restricted’	 example	 of	
colonialism	 than	 the	 International	 Settlement	 of	 Shanghai,	 in	 which	 officials	 of	
foreign	 governments,	 especially	 Britain,	 together	 with	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	
Council	 (SMC),	 a	 large	 foreign	 administrative	 body,	 instituted	 procedures	 of	
governance	 which	 clearly	 replicated	 asymmetrical	 colonial	 relations	 in	 a	 wide	
range	of	areas	and	in	ways	which	bore	a	close	resemblance	to	sites	of	colonialism	
elsewhere	 in	 the	 world?	 	 If	 the	 crucial	 point	 of	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 Chinese	
residents	 of	Weihaiwei,	 numbering	 around	 160,000	 in	 1918,	were	 placed	 under	





In	 the	existing	 literature	on	 the	 foreign	presence	 in	China,	 the	 role	of	 the	British	
state	has	often	been	examined	in	limited	ways	as	most	historians	have	focused	on	
its	 role	 in	 terms	 of	 actions,	 especially	 diplomatic	 and	 military,	 towards	 the	
governments	 of	 China	 and	 the	other	 treaty	powers,	 from	 the	 forcible	 opening	of	
the	Qing	empire	to	trade	in	the	nineteenth	century,	via	the	various	crises	of	the	last	
decades	of	the	Qing	dynasty,	through	to	the	turbulent	years	of	republican	China.19			
The	existence	of	extraterritoriality	and	consular	 jurisdiction	 in	China	 is	generally	
noted	in	such	writing,	but	the	workings	of	the	system	and	the	administrative	role	
																																																								




Justice	 in	Weihaiwei	 1898-1930	 (London,	 2008).	 	 See	 also	 Pamela	 Atwell,	 British	Mandarins	 and	
Chinese	Reformers:	the	British	Administration	of	Weihaiwei	(1898-1930)	and	the	Territory’s	Return	to	
Chinese	Rule	(Oxford,	1985).	







in	 great	 detail.	 	 Emily	Whewell’s	 2015	 thesis	 is	 a	 recent	 exception,	 although	 by	
making	 criminal	 law	 under	 extraterritoriality	 (rather	 than	 governance	 more	
broadly)	the	focus	of	her	attention,	she	gives	only	a	partial	picture	of	the	project	of	
governance	which	was	effected	by	the	British	state	through	a	range	of	institutions	
and	 collaborations	 with	 other	 bodies	 in	 China.20		 Published	 works	 which	 have	
looked	 in	more	detail	 at	extraterritoriality	 in	China	have	also	 tended	 to	 focus	on	
the	international	relations	aspect	of	this	issue.		So	for	example	both	Pär	Cassel	and	
R.	Randle	Edwards	focus	much	of	their	attention	on	the	process	of	negotiating	the	
contours	 of	 extraterritoriality	 which	 took	 place	 between	 Chinese	 and	 foreign	
officials.21		However,	relatively	little	research	has	been	conducted	which	examines	
consular	jurisdiction	as	it	was	in	fact	practised	following	the	Opium	War,	and	the	
implications	 of	 this	 practice	 for	 the	 treaty	 ports.	 	 This	 thesis	 addresses	 this	




justice	 to	British	 subjects	 and	 corporate	bodies.	 	 It	was	not	only	British	 subjects	
whose	 lives	were	 shaped	 by	 the	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 of	 agents	 of	 the	 British	
state	 in	 China.	 	 Chinese	 living	 in	 the	 Shanghai	 International	 Settlement	 lived	 for	
many	 practical	 purposes	 as	 though	 they	 were	 colonial	 subjects	 under	 foreign	
government,	 and	 I	 argue	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	British	 state	played	 a	 substantial	
role	 in	 the	 ambitious	 and	 elaborate	 project	 of	 governance	 exercised	 over	 them	
there,	albeit	in	concert	with	other	foreign	governments	and	the	SMC.22		This	aspect	
of	 Shanghai’s	 governance	 has	 been	 largely	 overlooked,	 and	 this	 sidelining	 of	 the	
state	in	areas	classified	as	informal	empire	or	semi-colonial,	which	it	is	one	aim	of	
																																																								
20	Emily	 Whewell,	 ‘British	 Extraterritoriality	 in	 China:	 the	 Legal	 System,	 Functions	 of	 Criminal	
Jurisdiction,	and	its	Challenges,	1833-1943’.	
21	Cassel,	Grounds	of	 Judgment:	Extraterritoriality	and	 Imperial	Power	 in	Nineteenth-Century	China	
and	Japan;	 R.	Randle	Edwards,	 ‘Ch’ing	Legal	 Jurisdiction	Over	Foreigners’,	 in	 Jerome	Alan	Cohen,	





this	 thesis	 to	 rectify,	 may	 represent	 a	 further	 side-effect	 of	 assumptions	 based	
around	these	frameworks.			
	
Ann	 Laura	 Stoler	 has	made	 a	 powerful	 critique	 of	 	 terms	 like	 ‘informal	 empire’	
which	she	calls	‘unhelpful	euphemisms’,	and	argues	that	instead	we	should	think	in	
terms	 of	 ‘scaled	 genres	 of	 rule	 that	 produce	 and	 count	 on	 different	 degrees	 of	
sovereignty	 and	 gradations	 of	 rights’.23		 She	 prefers	 the	 expression	 ‘imperial	
formations’	to	encapsulate	all	forms	of	empire,	and	thus	advocates	a	more	flexible	
framework	which	could	help	avoid	the	problems	discussed	above.			Other	scholars,	




but	 which	 would	 in	 fact	 allow	 us	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 colonialism,	 however	
initiated	or	described	 in	 legal	 and	political	 or	 administrative	 terms,	was	never	 a	
completed	 project,	 and	was	 always	 a	 complex	 set	 of	 relations	which	 need	 to	 be	
analysed	as	they	unfolded	in	everyday	life	as	much	as	in	the	lives	of	imperial	and	
local	 leaders.24		 Isabella	 Jackson	 argues	 for	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 Shanghai,	 and	
advocates	the	description	‘transnational	colonialism’	to	fit	the	specific	case	of	the	
Shanghai	 International	 Settlement,	 emphasising	 the	 variety	 of	 nations	 and	
nationalities	 involved	 in	 governance	 of	 the	 Settlement.25		 	 The	 obvious	 counter-
criticism	 to	 such	 moves	 is	 that	 without	 analytical	 tools	 to	 classify	 broader	
categories	 of	 empire	 or	 colonialism,	 the	 ability	 to	 make	 comparisons	 and	 draw	





23	Ann	 Laura	 Stoler,	 ‘On	 Degrees	 of	 Imperial	 Sovereignty’,	 Public	 Culture,	 18,	 1	 (2006),	 125–46,	
pp.136,	128.	
24 	James	 L.	 Hevia,	 English	 Lessons:	 The	 Pedagogy	 of	 Imperialism	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	 China	
(Durham,	N.C.,	2003),	p.	26.	
25	Isabella	Jackson,	Shaping	Modern	Shanghai:	Colonialism	in	China’s	Global	City,	p.	6.	




may	 have	 been	 useful	 in	 metropole-oriented	 studies	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	
various	modes	 of	 expansion	 of	 a	 particular	 empire,	 and	 in	 drawing	 attention	 to	
expansion	 not	 definable	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 specifically	 demarcated	
territory,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 particularly	 assist,	 and	 may	 in	 fact	 be	 unhelpful	 to,	




the	 colonial	 practices	which	 establish	 and	 perpetuate	 them,	 can	 avoid	 the	 blind	
spots	created	by	the	older	models	discussed	above.	
	
There	has	been	an	 increasing	move	over	 recent	years	 towards	 the	production	of	
work	which	 has	 developed	 our	 understanding	 of	 colonial	 relations	 at	 the	 treaty	
ports,	 especially	 Shanghai.	 	A	 focus	on	 the	 culture	of	 the	 colonisers	 at	 the	 treaty	





national,	 local	 and	 individual	 foreign	 priorities	 often	 came	 into	 conflict. 28		
Particular	 attention	 has	 also	 been	 given	 to	 some	 marginal	 groups	 within	 the	
foreign	colonising	population	at	the	treaty	ports,	showing	the	complexity	of	treaty	
port	 society	 and	 its	 connections	 with	 manifestations	 of	 empire	 elsewhere.29		
Robert	Bickers’	work	in	particular	has	shown	how	through	colonial	culture	at	the	
treaty	ports,	even	marginal	Britons	were	socialised	as	colonisers,	a	process	which	
fed	 into	 the	 reproduction	 of	 colonial	 relations	 in	 China	 in	 particular	ways.	 	 This	
current	of	research	on	marginal	colonisers	in	China	has	been	produced	in	dialogue	
																																																								
27 	Alan	 Lester,	 ‘Imperial	 Circuits	 and	 Networks:	 Geographies	 of	 the	 British	 Empire’,	 History	
Compass,	4,	1	(2006),	124–41.	
28 	Bickers,	 Britain	 in	 China;	 Eileen	 P.	 Scully,	 Bargaining	 with	 the	 State	 from	 Afar:	 American	
Citizenship	in	Treaty	Port	China,	1844-1942	(New	York,	2001).	








violent	 planters	 and	 barmaids	 presented	 to	 colonial	 authorities,	 and	 have	 noted	
the	importance	of	the	dilemmas	posed	to	colonial	élites	by	such	people	in	gaining	a	
deep	 understanding	 of	 notions	 and	 practices	 around	 colonial	 taxonomies,	
hierarchies	and	boundaries.	 	This	attention	to	 the	relationship	between	marginal	








in	 China.31		 	 This	 thesis	 therefore	 engages	with	 the	 literature	 on	management	 of	
difference,	 and	 tensions	 surrounding	 the	 boundaries	 between	 colonisers	 and	
colonised,	 themes	which	have	been	central	 to	a	good	deal	of	historical	writing	 in	






(eds.),	 The	 Limits	 of	 British	 Colonial	 Control	 in	 South	Asia:	 Spaces	 of	 Disorder	 in	 the	 Indian	Ocean	
Region,	 (Abingdon,	 2008);	 Harald	 Fischer-Tiné,	 Low	 and	 Licentious	 Europeans:	 Race,	 Class,	 and	
‘White	Subalternity’	in	Colonial	India	(New	Delhi,	2009);	Elizabeth	Kolsky,	Colonial	Justice	in	British	
India	 (Cambridge,	2010);	Will	 Jackson,	Madness	and	Marginality:	The	Lives	of	Kenya’s	White	Insane	
(Manchester,	 2013);	 Ashley	 Wright,	 ‘Maintaining	 the	 Bar:	 Regulating	 European	 Barmaids	 in	
Colonial	 Calcutta	 and	Rangoon’,	The	Journal	of	 Imperial	and	Commonwealth	History,	 45,	 1	 (2017),	
22–45.	
31	Jane	Burbank	and	Frederick	Cooper,	Empires	in	World	History:	Power	and	the	Politics	of	Difference	
(Princeton,	 N.J.,	 2010).	 See	 especially	 pp.	 11-13.	 	 Catherine	 Hall	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘colonial	
governmentality’	 to	 describe	 a	 similar	 phenomenon:	 Catherine	 Hall	 (ed.),	 Cultures	 of	 Empire:	
Colonizers	in	Britain	and	the	Empire	in	the	Nineteenth	Century	(Manchester,	2000),	p.	7.	
32	See	 for	 example	 Partha	 Chatterjee,	 The	 Nation	 and	 Its	 Fragments:	 Colonial	 and	 Postcolonial	
Histories	(Princeton,	N.J.,	1993);	Frederick	Cooper	and	Ann	Laura	Stoler	(eds.),	Tensions	of	Empire:	
Colonial	 Cultures	 in	 a	 Bourgeois	 World	 (Berkeley,	 Calif.,	 1997);	 Nicholas	 Thomas,	 Colonialism’s	
Culture:	 Anthropology,	 Travel	 and	Government	 (Cambridge,	 1994);	 Thomas	 Kuehn,	Empire,	 Islam,	





is	 no	 doubt,	 however,	 that	 states	 (imperial	 or	 otherwise)	 grappled	 with	
incorporation	and	differentiation,	and	distinction	and	hierarchy,	in	particular	ways	






real	 economic,	 social,	 ecological,	 or	 cultural	 conditions	on	 the	ground.		




relate	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 difference,	 can	 help	 to	 explain	 colonial	 practices.	 	 This	
thesis	 complements	 such	 work	 by	 using	 underexplored	 archival	 sources	 to	
examine	 the	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 of	 British	 officials	 in	 China,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 the	 divergences	 and	 similarities	 between	 British	 colonial	 practice	
towards	 a	 variety	 of	 groups,	 especially	 British	 ‘problem	 populations’	 –	marginal	
colonisers	 in	 China	 who	 included	 violent	 Europeans,	 ethnic	 Chinese	 British	
subjects,	Eurasians	and	Indians	–	in	the	Chinese	treaty	ports.	
	
One	 thing	 which	 most	 members	 of	 these	 groups	 had	 in	 common,	 and	 which	
heightened	 official	 anxieties	 surrounding	 them,	 was	 their	 propensity	 towards	
mobility	 across	 and	 between	 imperial	 (and	 non-imperial)	 spaces.	 	 Empire,	
including	British	expansion	 in	China,	depended	on	the	movement	of	people	of	all	
statuses.	 	 But	mobility	 could	 also	 be	 threatening	 and	 destabilizing	 from	 an	 élite	
perspective.35		 The	 degree	 to	 which	 imperial	 governance	 was	 an	 exercise	 in	
managing	 mobility	 has	 been	 increasingly	 recognised	 by	 historians	 of	 empire	 as	
																																																								
33	John	Darwin,	 ‘Empires	 in	World	History:	Power	and	 the	Politics	of	Difference,	by	 Jane	Burbank	
and	Frederick	Cooper,’	(book	review)	The	English	Historical	Review	127,	no.	525	(2012):	515–518.	








group,	 European	 barmaids	 in	 India,	 describes	 a	 population	 which	 drew	 a	
considerable	 degree	 of	 attention	 from	 colonial	 authorities,	 despite	 its	 small	
numbers.		She	shows	how	the	authorities	sought	to	intervene	in	attempts	by	such	
women	 to	 access	 colonial	 opportunities,	 by	 regulating	 the	 kinds	 of	 employment	
open	 to	 them.36		 	 	 Similarly,	 Thomas	Metcalf	 has	 shown	how	colonial	 authorities	
attempted	 to	 restrict	 the	 roles	open	 to	 Indian	migrants	 in	accordance	with	 race-
based	 preconceptions	 about	 the	 suitability	 of	 different	 ‘types’	 of	 Indians	 for	
different	 tasks.37		 This	 thesis	 will	 build	 on	 these	 findings	 and	will	 examine	 how	
both	marginal	British	 subjects	 themselves,	 especially	 ‘martial’	 Indians,	 and	 ideas	
held	 by	 British	 élites	 about	 such	 people,	 circulated	 to	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 and	 how	
these	movements	affected	colonial	relations	in	that	context.		By	showing	also	that	
British	 expansion	 in	 treaty	 port	 China	 was	 influenced	 by	 imperial	 forces	 from	
other	parts	of	British	 imperial	networks,	 this	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 existing	work	
which	 decentres	 the	 British	 empire	 by	 moving	 the	 focus	 away	 from	 a	 dyadic	
metropole/colony	view	of	imperial	connections,	and	which	shows	that	the	British	
empire	 was	 multipolar	 in	 nature	 in	 ways	 which	 affected	 the	 exercise	 of	
governance.38			
	





goods	 or	migrations	 of	 people.39		 Alan	 Lester	 suggests	 that	 a	 broader	 use	 of	 the	
																																																								
36	Ashley	 Wright,	 ‘Maintaining	 the	 Bar:	 Regulating	 European	 Barmaids	 in	 Colonial	 Calcutta	 and	
Rangoon’,	The	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	History,	45,	1	(2017),	22–45.	
37	Thomas	R.	Metcalf,	 Imperial	Connections:	 India	 in	the	Indian	Ocean	Arena,	1860-1920	 (Berkeley,	
Calif.,	2008).	
38	Examples	include:	David	Lambert	and	Alan	Lester	(eds.),	Colonial	Lives	across	the	British	Empire:	
Imperial	 Careering	 in	 the	 Long	Nineteenth	 Century	 (Cambridge,	 2006);	 Tony	 Ballantyne,	Between	
Colonialism	 and	 Diaspora:	 Sikh	 Cultural	 Formations	 in	 an	 Imperial	 World	 (Durham,	 N.C.,	 2006);	
Kevin	Grant,	Philippa	Levine,	and	Frank	Trentmann	(eds.),	Beyond	Sovereignty:	Britain,	Empire,	and	
Transnationalism,	C.	1880-1950	(Basingstoke,	2007).	
39	A	 large	 literature	 has	 emerged	 which	 focusses	 on	 networks	 or	 connectedness	 to	 illuminate	
empire.		In	addition	to	the	references	cited	in	the	preceding	footnotes,	see	for	example,		Alan	Lester,	
Imperial	 Networks:	 Creating	 Identities	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	 South	 Africa	 and	 Britain	 (Abingdon,	
	 27	
concept	 of	 networks	 in	 imperial	 history	 may	 suggest	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	
colonised	spaces	which	can	free	us	from	excessive	attention	to	places	as	‘bounded	
entities’.	 	 Instead,	borrowing	 from	the	discipline	of	geography,	we	might	 think	of	
places	(embedded	in	networks)	as	‘specific	juxtapositions	of	multiple	trajectories’,	
including	 trajectories	 of	 ‘people,	 objects,	 texts,	 ideas’.40		 This	 can	 be	 fruitfully	
linked	 to	 the	 discussion	 above	 about	 forms	 of	 empire,	 and	 the	 way	 that	 our	
understanding	of	places	like	the	Chinese	treaty	ports	is	limited	if	tied	to	the	idea	of	
sovereignty	 over	 demarcated	 territory.	 	 If	 we	 conceptualise	 colonised	 places	
differently,	by	shifting	the	emphasis	from	the	geopolitical	realm	of	territories	with	
boundaries	subject	to	the	sovereignty	of	a	colonial	power	–	which	is	itself	a	way	of	
thinking	 about	 the	world	 rooted	 in	western	 imperial	 expansion	 and	nation	 state	
formation	–	we	can	instead	direct	our	focus	to	the	effects	and	implications	which	
resulted	 as	 people	 and	 things	 interacted	 at	 those	 places.	 	 This	 is	 particularly	
appropriate	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 in	 which	 foreign	 space	 often	 lacked	
precise,	delineated	boundaries.		A	networked	conception	of	imperial	space	–	which	
emphasises	processes	over	legal	definitions	–	creates	more	room	for	a	recognition	
of	 the	 exercise	 of	 colonial	 power	 by	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China	 and	 its	 role	 in	
creating	 colonised	 spaces	 at	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 full	 territorial	
sovereignty.	
	
One	 place	 where	 we	 can	 clearly	 see	 the	 variety	 of	 British	 trajectories	 which	
converged	 at	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 and	 their	 implications	 as	 they	 were	 placed	 in	
juxtaposition,	 is	 in	 the	 extraterritorial	 courtroom.	 	 When	 a	 British	 subject	 was	
accused	of	manslaughter	of	a	Chinese	person	but	acquitted	by	a	white	British	jury,	
or	 when	 Indian	 British	 subjects	 employed	 as	 police	 by	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	
Council	 were	 brought	 before	 the	 court	 for	 going	 on	 strike,	 people,	 ideas	 and	
practices	originating	in	a	variety	of	places	came	together	in	productive	ways.		John	
																																																																																																																																																																		
2005),	 Kerry	 Ward,	 Networks	 of	 Empire:	 Forced	 Migration	 in	 the	 Dutch	 East	 India	 Company	
(Cambridge,	2008),	 and	Simon	 J.	Potter,	 and	 Jonathan	Saha,	 ‘Global	History,	 Imperial	History	and	
Connected	Histories	of	Empire’,	Journal	of	Colonialism	and	Colonial	History,	16,	1	(2015).	
40 	Alan	 Lester,	 ‘Imperial	 Circuits	 and	 Networks:	 Geographies	 of	 the	 British	 Empire’,	 History	
Compass,	 4,	 1	 (2006),	 124–41,	 p.	 135.	 	 A	 similar	 notion	 of	 imperial	 space	 is	 proposed	 in	 Tony	








construed,	 ethnicized,	 and	 racialized,	 their	 relations	 to	 other	 human	
beings,	to	the	earth,	and	to	their	own	cultural	practices	delineated.41		






the	 British	 in	 India	 subscribed	 to	 various	 principles	 of	 clear	 boundaries	 and	 of	
impartial	 justice,	 which	 were	 not	 maintained	 in	 the	 ‘messy	 work	 of	 empire’	 in	
practice.42		An	examination	of	colonial	 law	as	practised	 in	 the	courts	allows	 for	a	
truer	 picture	 of	 the	 state	 to	 emerge	 than	 if	 reliance	 is	 placed	 solely	 on	 official	
archives	and	 legislation.	 	Court	cases	allow	us	to	consider	what	Marie	Muschalek	
calls	 the	 ‘multilateral	 complexity	 of	 colonial	 rule’:	 for	 example,	 the	 handling	 of	
individual	 cases	 can	 show	what	 kinds	 of	 violence	were	 tolerated	 by	 the	 state	 in	













43	Marie	Muschalek,	 ‘Violence	 as	 Usual:	 Everyday	 Police	Work	 and	 the	 Colonial	 State	 in	 German	






thesis	 presents	 findings	 and	 arguments	 which	 complement	 and	 extend	 existing	
historical	work.	 	 It	has	emphasised	the	 lack	of	attention	which	has	hitherto	been	
paid	 to	 important	 aspects	 of	 the	 British	 state’s	 role	 in	 treaty	 port	 China.	 	 It	 has	
suggested	how	an	approach	informed	by	the	work	of	historians	on	other	contexts	
which	 has	 productively	 analysed	 the	 management	 of	 difference	 by	 colonial	
authorities	may	provide	a	clearer	understanding	of	colonial	relations	and	colonial	
practices	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports.	 	 Finally,	 it	 has	 also	 shown	 how	 attention	 to	 state	
management	 of	 problem	 populations	 in	 China	 can	 help	 to	 provide	 a	 history	 of	
foreign	expansion	 there	which	 traces	more	 fully	 the	nature	of	 imperial	networks	
which	 connected,	 and	 indeed	 served	 to	 constitute,	 the	 treaty	 ports	 as	 colonial	
spaces,	especially	through	the	legal	system	created	by	the	British	in	China.	
Britain	in	China	before	1842		





to	 see	 why	 extraterritoriality,	 on	 which	 British	 governance	 in	 China	 was	 based,	
was	provided	for	in	the	treaties	made	after	the	first	Opium	War.		The	commercial	
aspects	 of	 the	 early	 trade	 between	 Britain	 and	 China,	 which	 began	 in	 the	
seventeenth	century,	 including	the	development	of	 the	opium	trade	and	eventual	
war	fought	over	its	conduct,	have	been	well	researched.45		Here	I	will	give	a	brief	
account	of	 this	period	which	 focusses	 instead	on	approaches	 to	governance	over	
British	subjects	and	also	British	institutional	developments.			
	
Until	 1834,	British	 trade	with	China	 took	place	 under	 the	monopoly	 held	 by	 the	
East	 India	Company	 (EIC),	 but	 involved	both	Company-owned	and	private	 ships,	
which	 operated	 	 under	 licence	 from	 the	 Company.46		 At	 first,	 such	 ships	 called	
																																																								
45	A	concise	summary	is	given	in	Robert	Bickers,	The	Scramble	for	China:	Foreign	Devils	in	the	Qing	





hoping	 to	 interest	 Chinese	 buyers	 in	 foreign	 goods	 such	 as	British	woollens	 and	
Indian	cottons,	 and	purchasing	Chinese	goods	 such	as	 tea,	 silk	and	porcelain.	 	 In	
1699	the	EIC	appointed	an	officer	with	the	title	of	president	to	supervise	the	trade.		
The	first	president,	Allen	Catchpoole,	was	also	given	the	title	of	consul	for	China	by	











The	 EIC	 failed	 to	 open	 satisfactory	 channels	 for	 trade	 at	 Ningbo,	 Zhoushan	 or	
Xiamen	 (where	 attempts	 were	 also	 made),	 but	 at	 Guangzhou	 they	 had	 more	
success,	and	trade	there	increased.		From	1757,	following	further	attempts	by	the	
EIC	to	initiate	trade	at	ports	further	north,	the	Chinese	government	stipulated	that	
all	 foreign	 trade	 must	 thenceforth	 be	 done	 at	 Guangzhou.49		 At	 the	 latter	 port	
foreigners	were	subject	to	many	restrictions,	including	the	rule	that	trade	was	only	
to	 be	 done	 through	Chinese	merchants	 there	 accredited	 by	 the	 local	 authorities,	
who	 were	 known	 collectively	 by	 English	 speakers	 as	 the	 ‘cohong’	 (in	 Chinese	
gonghang	 U ). 50 		 The	 Chinese	 official	 attitude	 towards	 foreigners	 can	 be	
summarised	as	a	desire	to	keep	foreigners	at	arms	length,	and	minimise	points	of	






50 	Morse,	 International	 Relations,	 vol.	 1,	 pp.	 63-71.	 	 Most	 English-language	 texts	 use	 the	
contemporary	 rendering	 of	 this	 word,	 cohong	or	 co-hong,	 which	 was	 	 presumably	 based	 on	 an	




Portuguese	territory	at	Macao,	where	most	British	 figures	engaged	 in	 trade	 lived	
for	 part	 of	 the	 year,	made	 it	 possible	 to	 operate	within	 the	 Chinese	 restrictions.		
Although	 the	 British	 were	 frequently	 frustrated	 by	 the	 limitations	 on	 their	
activities,	 a	 very	 valuable	 trade	 took	 place,	 especially	 in	 tea,	 increasingly	 in	
demand	in	Great	Britain,	and	eventually,	from	the	middle	of	the	eighteenth	century,	




The	 functioning	 of	 a	 basic	 system	 of	 control	 over	 British	 subjects	 in	 China	 was	
possible	 at	 this	 time	 because	 the	 EIC	 had	 both	 the	 incentive	 and	 the	 powers	 to	
oversee	 it.	 	 From	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century	 the	 EIC	 appointed	 a	 group	 of	




British	 subjects	 in	 China,	 because	 since	 it	 held	 a	 British	 government-sanctioned	
monopoly,	 all	 those	 engaged	 in	 the	 trade	 were	 either	 its	 employees	 or	 were	
licenced	by	 it.	 	 Employees	 could	 be	disciplined	 or	 dismissed	 and	private	 traders	
could	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 trade	 by	 the	 EIC	 if	 they	 did	 not	 cooperate.52		 There	
were	a	number	of	outbreaks	of	violence	committed	by	British	subjects,	especially	
seamen,	 in	 or	 near	 Guangzhou	 as	 the	 trade	 increased,	 and	 it	 fell	 to	 the	 Select	
Committee	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 respond.	 	 Other	 than	 in	 cases	 of	 homicide	 against	
Chinese,	the	Chinese	authorities	did	not	generally	try	to	assert	Chinese	jurisdiction	
with	regard	to	legal	process	and	punishment	of	crimes	committed	by	foreigners,	so	










responsible	 be	handed	over	 to	 them	 for	 trial	 and	punishment.	 	 A	British	 gunner	
was	eventually	handed	over	to	the	Chinese	authorities	and	was	executed;	following	
this	punishment,	seen	by	the	British	as	unjust,	the	British	refused	from	this	point	
on	 to	 hand	 over	 European	 British	 subjects	 accused	 of	 homicide	 to	 the	 Chinese	














former	 EIC	 supercargoes:	 John	 Francis	 Davis	 (who	 later	 became	 chief	
superintendent	 and	 governor	 of	 Hong	 Kong)	 and	 George	 Robinson.58		 The	 court	
provided	for	by	means	of	the	legislation	of	1833	was	not	established	immediately,	
under	instructions	from	Lord	Palmertson	to	postpone	taking	any	steps	to	bring	it	




and	 probably	 therefore	 a	 British	 subject)	 was	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 in	 1833	





‘Order	 in	 Council,	 Transferring	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 from	 Canton	 to	 Hong-Kong,	 for	 the	 Trial	 of	
Offences	 Committed	 by	 British	 Subjects	 in	 China,’	 9	 December	 1833;	 Great	 Britain.	 ‘Order	 in	
Council,	Relative	to	the	Government	and	Trade	of	British	Subjects,	at	Canton,	in	China’,	9	December	
1833.	 	 All	 printed	 in	 Great	 Britain.	 Foreign	 Office,	 British	 and	 Foreign	 State	 Papers	 (hereafter	
BaFSP),	1832-1833,	vol.	20,	(London,	1836),	pp.	256-9;	260-1;	262-3.	
58	Intially,	William	Plowden,	former	president	of	the	EIC	Select	Committee	was	appointed	one	of	the	





a	 time	 when	 the	 dispute	 between	 Britain	 and	 China	 over	 the	 opium	 trade	 was	








Elliot	 had	 between	 1836	 and	 1838	 attempted	 to	 stop	 armed	 British	 smuggling	
boats	 landing	 near	 the	 custom	 house	 at	 Guangzhou,	 and	 created	 ‘police	
regulations’	as	a	step	to	prevent	this	activity.		When	he	reported	his	actions	to	the	
FO,	he	was	told	that	he	had	no	power	to	create	such	regulations	under	the	British	
legislation. 62 		 The	 removal	 of	 the	 monopoly	 of	 the	 EIC	 may	 have	 inserted	
professional	 British	 state	 officials	 into	 China	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 but	 it	 seems	 that	
owing	 to	 the	 faulty	 legislation	 created	 to	 endow	 them	with	 authority,	 they	were	
less	able	 to	effect	order	and	control	over	British	subjects	 than	had	been	possible	
under	the	EIC’s	Select	Committee	prior	to	1834.		Reporting	his	inability	to	prevent	
a	 British	 subject	 absconding	 from	 China,	 having	 defrauded	 British	 and	 Chinese	
subjects	of	goods	worth	large	sums	of	money,	Elliot	made	the	case	to	Palmerston	in	
1837	that	greater	powers	were	needed:		
This	may	be	 a	 convenient	occasion	 respectfully	 to	press	 the	necessity	
for	 the	 early	 establishment	 of	 some	 formal	 and	 efficacious	 means	 of	
maintaining	a	state	of	good	order	amongst	His	Majesty’s	subjects	in	this	





Wei-hi	 or	 Lin	 Weihe.	 	 The	 killing	 of	 Lin	 Weixi	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 escalating	 tensions	




63	Elliot	 to	 Palmerston,	 2	 June	 1837.	 BPP,	 HC,	 Papers	 relative	 to	 the	 Establishment	 of	 a	 Court	 of	




significant	 provisions	 of	 the	 treaty	 were	 that	 five	 ports	 (the	 first	 ‘treaty	 ports’)	
would	 be	 opened	 to	 British	 subjects	 for	 residence	 and	 trade,	 Hong	 Kong	 island	
would	be	 ceded	 to	Britain	and	British	 consuls	would	be	posted	at	 each	port	 and	
would	have	jurisdiction	over	British	subjects	in	China.64		One	lesson	clearly	learned	
by	British	officials	locally	and	in	London,	from	their	experiences	prior	to	the	Opium	






Control	 over	 the	 Proceedings	 of	 British	 Subjects,	 in	 their	 Intercourse	with	 each	 other	 and	with	 the	
Chinese,	vol.	41,	[c.128],	(1838),	p.	7.	
64	Bickers,	Scramble	for	China,	p.	84.		The	five	ports	were	(as	viewed	on	the	map	from	south	to	north	















The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 above	 all	 to	 incorporate	 the	 British	 state	 into	 the	
internationalised	 history	 of	 China,	 and	 this	 thesis	 therefore	will	 focus	 on	British	
subjects,	officials	and	institutions,	but	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	British	
were	not	the	only	foreign	actors	in	China.		Other	foreign	states	and	their	nationals	
also	 entered	 into	 trading	 and	 other	 relations	 in	 China,	 on	 similar	 terms	 to	 the	
British.		Prior	to	the	Opium	War	other	countries	whose	nationals	engaged	in	trade	
in	a	 substantial	way	 included	Portugal	 (especially	 important	owing	 to	 its	 control	
over	 the	 territory	 of	 Macao	 near	 Guangzhou),	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 the	 United	
States.66		 Following	 the	 Opium	 War,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 France	 also	 made	
treaties	with	 China,	 giving	 them	 the	 same	privileges	 as	 the	British.	 	 The	 treaties	
included	 ‘most	 favoured	 nation’	 clauses,	 so	 that	when	 one	 foreign	 states	 gained	
increased	 rights	 through	 a	 treaty,	 the	 other	 treaty	 powers	 also	 benefitted	 in	 the	
same	 way.67		 In	 this	 way	 the	 foreign	 expansion	 into	 China	 which	 Britain	 had	
spearheaded	 through	 its	 actions	 in	 the	 Opium	 War	 became	 a	 multinational	
phenomenon.	 	 Foreign	 countries	 which	 made	 treaties	 with	 China	 all	 gained	
extraterritorial	 rights	 for	 their	 nationals	 and	 were	 thus	 responsible	 for	 the	
administration	of	justice	in	relation	to	them.		Two	latecomers	to	foreign	expansion	
into	China,	Germany	and	then	Japan,	made	up	for	lost	time	towards	the	end	of	the	




In	 Shanghai	 and	 in	 Beijing,	 representatives	 of	 the	 foreign	 powers	 at	 each	 city	
formed	 in	 the	 1860s	 a	 ‘consular	 body’	 and	 a	 ‘diplomatic	 body’	 respectively,	 in	
order	 to	 coordinate	 their	 position	 in	 a	 number	 of	 matters	 relating	 to	 foreign	
relations,	 trade,	 and	 administration	 in	 China.	 	 These	 bodies	 were	 especially	
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67 	Osterhammel,	 ‘Semi-Colonialism	 and	 Informal	 Empire	 in	 China:	 Towards	 a	 Framework	 of	
Analysis’,	 in	 Mommsen	 and	 Osterhammel	 (eds.),	 Imperialism	 and	 After:	 Continuities	 and	
Discontinuities,	p.	300.	








were	 a	 disappointment	 to	 the	 British.	 	 Shanghai	 was	 the	 exception	 and	 soon	
became	 an	 important	 centre	 for	 shipping,	 being	 strategically	 located	 near	 to	 the	
mouth	of	 the	Yangzi,	and	eventually	 it	was	also	an	 important	 location	for	 foreign	
investment	 in	 land,	 manufacturing,	 and	 services.	 	 None	 of	 the	 other	 five	 ports	
became	important	as	large	centres	of	foreign	residence	or	investment.		Fuzhou	was	
dominated	 by	 the	 tea	 trade	 and	 when	 this	 declined	 from	 the	 late	 nineteenth	
century,	it	lost	its	importance	as	a	treaty	port.		Xiamen	was	most	important	for	its	
connections	 with	 southeast	 Asia,	 and	 much	 of	 the	 trade	 conducted	 through	 the	
port	 involved	 ethnic	 Chinese	 from	 southeast	 Asia,	 some	 of	 whom	 were	 British	
subjects	 through	 birth	 or	 naturalization	 in	 the	 Straits	 Settlements.	 	 It	 was	 an	
important	centre	for	the	‘coolie’	trade,	from	which	British	and	other	firms	profited,	
transporting	 large	 numbers	 of	 Chinese	 labourers,	 not	 all	 of	 whom	 had	 been	
recruited	 voluntarily,	 to	 plantations	 and	mines	 in	 southeast	Asia,	 South	America	
and	the	Caribbean	where	they	worked	under	harsh	conditions.		Ningbo	was	never	
an	important	port	for	foreign	trade,	but	attracted	foreign	convoyers,	little	different	
from	 pirates,	 who	 engaged	 in	 dubious	 maritime	 activities	 in	 the	 1850s	 and	
1860s.70		 Guangzhou	 was	 a	 busy	 port,	 with	 important	 trade	 connected	 with	 its	
relatively	prosperous	hinterland,	but	 lost	out	 to	 Shanghai	 as	 the	main	 centre	 for	
foreign	 trade,	 residence	 and	 investment	 from	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century	
onwards.			
	
The	 physical	 space	 occupied	 by	 foreign	 residents	 and	 businesses	 at	 the	 treaty	
ports	was	established	on	terms	which	varied,	often	according	to	the	way	the	first	
foreign	officials	negotiated	the	institutional	and	physical	environments	which	they	
encountered	 at	 the	 different	 places	where	 they	were	posted.	 	 The	 actions	 of	 the	





development	 of	 some	 of	 the	 ports.71		 Chinese	 officials	were	 in	 general	 hostile	 to	
foreigners	 taking	up	 residence	within	 the	 existing	Chinese	 towns	or	 cities	 at	 the	
treaty	 ports.	 	 At	 Fuzhou	 and	 Guangzhou,	 confrontations	 over	 this	 issue	 led	 to	






Land	was	apportioned	 for	 this	purpose,	 lots	were	acquired	by	 foreign	merchants	
(not	all	British	subjects)	and	their	 titles	were	registered	at	 the	British	Consulate.		
This	 area	was	usually	 called	 the	English	Settlement	by	 contemporaries,	 although	
sometimes	 the	word	 concession	was	 confusingly	used	 in	place	 of	 settlement.	 	 In	
Chinese	 only	 one	 term	 was	 used:	 zujie	 (KE)	 meaning	 ‘leased	 area’.73		 	 In	 the	
following	years	the	United	States	and	French	consuls	also	made	agreements	for	the	
setting	 aside	 of	 areas,	 neighbouring	 the	 English	 Settlement,	 for	 the	 residence	 of	
their	 nationals.	 	 In	 1845	 the	 British	 consul	 agreed	 with	 the	 daotai	 a	 set	 of	
regulations,	known	as	the	Land	Regulations,	 	which	provided	for	residents	of	 the	
English	 Settlement	 to	 set	 up	 an	 institution	 to	 manage	 basic	 functions	 of	 local	
government,	called	the	Committee	of	Roads	and	Jetties.		This	was	made	up	of	three	
land	renters	(the	land	acquired	in	the	settlement	was	technically	leased,	though	it	
was	 effectively	 owned	 as	 the	 leases	 were	 perpetual,	 and	 the	 leaseholders	 were	
called	land	renters).			The	committee	was	held	to	account	at	an	annual	meeting	of	
ratepayers	 chaired	 by	 the	 British	 consul.74		 This	 body	 eventually	 developed	 into	
the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	 (SMC)	 in	 the	mid-1850s,	 following	 the	making	of	
new	 Land	 Regulations,	 prompted	 by	 the	 influx	 of	 Chinese	 into	 the	 foreign	
settlements	who	 came	 seeking	 refuge	 from	 the	 upheaval	 of	 the	 great	 rebellions	
taking	 place	 at	 the	 time	 in	 eastern	 China.	 	 This	 rapid	 population	 growth	 posed	
																																																								
71	Morse,	International	Relations,	vol.	1,	pp.	346-66.	
72	On	 the	 office	 of	 daotai,	 see	 Leung	 Yuen-sang,	The	Shanghai	Taotai:	Linkage	Man	 in	a	Changing	
Society,	1843-90	(Honolulu,	1990).	
73	Robert	 Bickers,	 ‘British	 Concessions	 and	 Chinese	 Cities,	 1910s-1930s’,	 in	 Billy	 K.L.	 So	 and	







French	 Concession,	 remained	 a	 separate	 entity	 with	 different	 forms	 of	
governance.75 		 Once	 it	 became	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 the	 SMC	 annual	
meeting	of	ratepayers	was	usually	chaired	by	the	senior	consul,	and	the	Shanghai	





these	by	 treaty	powers	 for	 their	 residents	under	different	 terms	 than	 the	earlier	
settlements	at	Shanghai	and	elsewhere.	 	Parcels	of	 land	described	as	concessions	
were	 rented	 on	 long	 leases	 from	 the	 Chinese	 government	 by	 individual	 treaty	
power	 governments,	 who	 then	 sublet	 plots	 of	 land	 to	 foreigners.	 Some	 of	 the	
foreign	concessions	established	at	this	time	grew	to	become	fairly	substantial,	for	




Although	 the	 treaties	 with	 China	 provided	 for	 favourable	 tariffs,	 rights	 of	
residence,	 extraterritoriality	 and	 other	 advantages	 for	 foreigners	 in	 China,	 trade	
never	matched	 the	extravagant	hopes	of	British	and	other	 foreigners	 in	 the	mid-
nineteenth	 century.	 	British	business	dominated	 foreign	 trade	and	 investment	 in	
China	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	but	exports	of	goods	other	
than	opium	were	disappointing.78		Britain	also	dominated	the	shipping	industry	in	








78	Jürgen	Osterhammel,	 ‘British	Business	 in	 China,	 1860s-1950s’,	 in	 R.P.T.	Davenport-Hines	 (ed.),	
British	Business	in	Asia	since	1860	(Cambridge,	1989),	189–216,	p.	192.	
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favourable	 conditions	 forced	 out	 of	 China	 and	written	 into	 the	 treaties,	 and	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports	 as	 micro-colonies.	 	 Foreign	 power	 embedded	
itself	 in	China	in	various	other	ways	which	taken	together	combined	to	make	the	
Chinese	 experience	 of	 imperial	 expansion	 a	 peculiar	 case.	 	 The	 Chinese	 customs	
service	is	the	most	obvious	example,	a	body	which	was	led	by	foreigners	–	usually	
a	British	subject,	and	most	notably	Ulsterman	Robert	Hart	–	and	which	meant	that	
the	 Chinese	 central	 government’s	 largest	 and	most	 consistent	 source	 of	 revenue	
was	 administered	 by	 foreign	 staff	 under	 Qing	 control.79		 In	 the	 late	 nineteenth	
century	new	encroachments	multiplied,	both	 in	number	and	 form	and	 there	was	
also	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 foreign	 states	which	 joined	 the	 rush	 to	wring	






for	 businesses	 controlled	 by	 their	 nationals	 to	 be	 the	 providers	 of	 loans	 to	 the	
government	(often	partly	needed	to	pay	for	 indemnities	 incurred	after	China	lost	
wars	 against	 foreign	 governments)	 and	 the	 developers	 of	 railway	 building	
schemes	and	mining	concessions.	 	 	The	 rise	of	 Japanese	power	 in	 the	 late	1890s	
had	a	profound	effect:	when	China	lost	the	Sino-Japanese	war	in	1895,	not	only	did	
																																																								
79	A	 range	 of	 work	 has	 been	 published	 on	 the	 Customs	 in	 recent	 years.	 	 See	 especially	 Robert	
Bickers,	 ‘Purloined	 Letters:	 History	 and	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs	 Service’,	 Modern	 Asian	
Studies,	 40,	 3	 (2006),	 691–723,	 Hans	 Van	 de	 Ven,	Breaking	with	 the	Past:	 The	Maritime	Customs	
Service	and	the	Global	Origins	of	Modernity	in	China	(New	York,	2014),	and	Catherine	Ladds,	Empire	
Careers:	Working	for	the	Chinese	Customs	Service,	1854–1949	(Manchester,	2013).	




Japan	 obtain	 further	 concessions	 and	 indemnities,	 but	 Taiwan	 was	 also	 ceded,	
becoming	by	far	China’s	most	important	loss	of	territory	to	a	foreign	power	in	the	
nineteenth	century.	 	After	 the	 fall	of	 the	Qing	 in	1911,	China	became	 fragmented	
and	was	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 regional	 factions	 dominated	by	warlords.		
Only	 once	 the	 Guomindang	 rose	 to	 power	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1920s	 did	 the	
situation	 begin	 to	 change	 with	 regard	 to	 western	 powers,	 although	 Japanese	
expansion	into	China	grew	and	had	a	huge	impact	until	the	defeat	of	Japan	in	the	
Second	World	War.			From	the	late	1920s,	Britain	began	to	give	up	its	concessions,	










of	modern	 China.	 	 These	materials,	 together	with	 (to	 a	more	 limited	 extent)	 the	
India	 Office	 records	 at	 the	 British	 Library	 in	 London,	 have	 made	 up	 the	 key	
primary	 sources	 deployed	 in	 the	 research	 for	 this	 thesis.	 	 	 The	 research	 has	
entailed	an	examination	of	a	wide	range	of	records,	reflecting	the	extensive	range	
of	 state	 actors	 at	 different	 locations	who	 played	 a	 role	 in	 British	 governance	 in	
China,	 and	 my	 aim	 to	 present	 a	 history	 of	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China	 which	
integrates	the	full	range	of	official	agents	who	played	significant	roles	in	the	British	











help	us	 to	determine	what	 actions	were	 taken	by	 the	British	 state	 in	China;	 and	
second,	as	documents	which	contain	evidence	of	the	attitudes,	often	not	explicitly	








Newspaper	 articles	 and	 editorials,	 mostly	 from	 the	 Shanghai-based	 English	
language	 press,	 have	 been	 used	 extensively	 for	 their	 reports	 of	 court	 cases,	 to	
supplement	 the	 details	 of	 cases	 contained	 in	 official	 papers	 held	 in	 the	 archives	
referred	to	above.		As	much	as	possible	I	have	based	analysis	of	court	cases	on	both	
reports	of	proceedings	published	in	the	press	and	documents	circulating	between	
officials,	 which	 often	 reveal	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 practices	 deviated	 from	 legal	










especially	 marginal	 –	 colonial	 life	 in	 China,	 and	 also	 occasionally	 to	 consider	
commentary	 from	 another	 standpoint	 –	 generally	 that	 of	 British	 settler	 and	
mercantile	 interests	 –	 on	 major	 events	 or	 issues	 which	 occurred	 involving	 the	
British	state	and	British	subjects.		The	views	of	members	of	marginal	communities	
																																																								








the	 central	 focus	here	 is	on	 the	attitudes	and	practices	 towards	marginal	British	
subjects	held	by	British	officials	who	viewed	 the	 former	as	problem	populations.		
The	 voices	 and	 preoccupations	 of	 marginal	 British	 subjects	 themselves	 are	
therefore	only	present	in	this	thesis	to	a	very	limited	extent,	but	the	details	of	the	
British	marginal	communities	which	are	given	in	the	chapters	will	be	of	use	in	any	
future	research	which	aims	to	analyse	the	nature	of	 the	 lives	of	 these	sojourners	
and	settlers.	
	
A	 further	 source	 of	 official	 documents	 which	 has	 been	 used	 extensively	 is	
published	collections	of	British	state	papers,	including	laws,	treaty	texts,	OICs,	and	
regulations.	 	 The	 key	 collections	 are	 Hertslet’s	 China	 Treaties	 (two	 volumes),	






The	thesis	 is	made	up	of	 five	substantive	chapters,	 the	 first	of	which	sets	out	the	
organisation	 and	 functions	 of	 British	 state	 institutions	 in	 China	 and	 the	 treaties,	
legislation	 and	 other	 instruments	 on	 which	 their	 existence	 and	 activities	 were	
based	 from	 1842	 to	 1927.	 	 	 This	 period	 covers	 the	 decades	 when	 the	 British	
machinery	of	governance	was	being	established	in	China	and	also	the	years	in	the	
early	twentieth	century	which	can	be	considered	to	have	been	the	‘apogee’	of	the	
foreign	 presence	 in	 China,	 before	 the	 treaty	 system	 began	 to	 be	 dismantled	
beginning	in	the	late	1920s.84		The	chapter	provides	both	a	contextual	basis	within	





and	 nature	 of	 the	 state’s	 presence	 and	 actions	 in	 China,	 and	 the	 way	 that	 the	
British	 state	 presence	was	 located	within	 a	 network	 of	 relationships	with	 other	
bodies,	both	official	and	unofficial.			
	
While	 the	 first	 chapter	 presents	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 British	 state’s	 contours	 in	
treaty	port	China,	a	fuller	representation	of	various	aspects	of	the	state	and	of	the	





chapters	 serve	 the	 additional	 role	 of	 presenting	 and	 evaluating	 a	 good	 deal	 of	
empirical	data	about	these	little-studied	marginal	groups	in	the	treaty	ports.		Each	
of	 these	groups	were	 identified	as	problem	populations	because	of	some	 form	of	
perceived	deviance,	 in	official	eyes,	 from	the	desirable	British	subject	who	would	
serve	a	useful	purpose	in	China,	or	at	least	not	cause	harm	through	their	presence	




said	 to	 be	 arranged,	 to	 some	 extent,	 around	 particular	 themes	 and	 also	
chronologically,	since	while	there	are	some	overlaps	between	the	issues	and	time	
periods	addressed	in	each	of	the	chapters,	different	themes	are	prominent	in	each	
chapter	 and	 the	 key	 events	 and	 processes	 in	 the	 chapters	 emerged	 at	 various	
different	points	between	the	1840s	and	the	1920s.		
	
Chapter	 two,	 dealing	 with	 transgression	 in	 the	 form	 of	 crime,	 especially	 that	
committed	by	low-status	white	British	subjects	in	China,	focusses	on	the	early	part	
of	the	treaty	era,	when	British	officials	were	preoccupied	with	dealing	with	British	
seamen,	 who	 came	 to	 China	 along	 with	 the	 expansion	 of	 trade	 following	 the	
opening	of	the	ports,	and	subsequently	with	a	problem	population	which	emerged,	
partly	from	among	former	seafarers,	in	the	1850s	and	1860s,	amidst	the	upheaval	
of	 Chinese	 rebellions.	 	 The	 chapter	 shows	 how	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 British	
	 45	
Supreme	 Court	 for	 China	 in	 1865	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 need	 to	 control	 such	
groups,	 and	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 analyse	 the	 way	 that	 this	 institution’s	 creation	
influenced	 the	 development	 of	 Shanghai,	 particular	 through	 the	 way	 that	 it	
handled	cases	of	British	violence	against	Chinese.	
	
Chapter	 three	 turns	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 very	 different	marginal	 group,	 ethnic	 Chinese	
British	 subjects	who	 came	 to	 the	 treaty	 ports	 and	who	 claimed	 protection	 from	
British	 consular	 authorities	 there.	 	 The	 chapter	 shows	 the	 complicated,	
inconsistent	 and	 changeable	 nature	 of	 British	 governance	 in	 response	 to	 this	
group.	 	 It	 argues	 that,	 at	 least	 for	 a	 time,	 the	 interests	 of	 British	 colonial	
governments	at	Hong	Kong	and	the	Straits	Settlements	were	allowed	to	influence	
British	policy,	against	the	prevailing	view	among	many	based	in	China	and	London.		








the	 state	 responded	 to	 such	 people	 demonstrates	 the	 attitude	 of	 British	 officials	
towards	treaty	port	society	and	institutions	and	shows	that	officials	played	a	role	




the	groups	 studied,	 ‘martial’	British	 Indians	 in	China.	 	 It	 shows	how	members	of	
this	group,	who	were	largely	drawn	to	China	to	work	in	security	roles,	particularly	
as	employees	of	 the	SMC’s	police	 force,	were	subjected	 to	a	range	of	disciplinary	
measures	by	the	state.	 	British	officials	worked	closely	with	the	SMC	to	deal	with	
these	men,	providing	strong	evidence	of	the	way	that	British	state	and	SMC	agents	










were	 categorised	 and	 differentiated	 by	 officials	 based	 on	 widely-understood	
contemporary	categories.85		Or	it	could	have	examined	other	groups	marginalised	
on	 the	basis	of	gender,	 social	class	or	age.	 	There	 is	evidence	of	officials	at	 times	
raising	concerns	about	issues	connected	with	particular	members	of	a	wide	range	
of	groups	in	China.			For	example,	when	British	women	married	Chinese	men	and	
set	 up	 home	 with	 them,	 this	 caused	 official	 alarm	 and	 prompted	 officials	 to	
question	 how	 they	 should	 respond.	 	 The	 way	 that	 officials	 acted	 in	 such	
circumstances	 may	 certainly	 have	 been	 rooted	 in	 beliefs	 about	 the	 inherent	
natures	of,	in	this	example,	British	women	(and	of	course	Chinese	men),	based	on	
contemporary	 cultural	 constructions,	 and	 there	 may	 have	 been	 some	 value	 in	




wider	 effects.	 	 The	 problems	 raised	 by	 individuals	 belonging	 to	 other	 sub-





85	The	history	of	 jewish	 settlers	 and	 sojourners	 in	 the	 treaty	ports	 is	 comparitively	well	 covered.		
See	for	example,	Chiara	Betta,	‘Marginal	Westerners	in	Shanghai:	The	Baghdadi	Jewish	Community,	
1845-1932’,	 in	 Robert	 A.	 Bickers	 and	 Christian	 Henriot	 (eds.),	New	 Frontiers:	 Imperialism’s	 New	
Communities	 in	 East	 Asia,	 1842-1953	 (Manchester,	 2000),	 pp.	 38–54;	 Maisie	 J.	 Meyer,	 From	 the	
Rivers	 of	 Babylon	 to	 the	Whangpoo:	 A	 Century	 of	 Sephardi	 Jewish	 Life	 in	 Shanghai	 (Lanham,	 MD,	








which	 developed	 without	 fanfare	 and	 could	 otherwise	 be	 easily	 overlooked.		
Before	 presenting	 my	 findings	 regarding	 official	 dealings	 with	 the	 selected	
marginal	 groups,	 the	 thesis	 begins	 with	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 formal	 outlines	 of	 the	
British	 state	 presence	 as	 it	 developed	 in	 China,	 made	 up	 of	 legal	 instruments,	
institutions	and	personnel,	a	task	which	has	not	been	undertaken	in	detailed	form	
in	any	previous	historical	study	of	Britain	in	China.		In	combination,	the	structures	
and	 institutions	 which	 were	 created,	 and	 the	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 of	 officials	





In	 1877	 Sir	 Julian	 Pauncefote	 made	 the	 following	 assertion	 in	 a	 Foreign	 Office	
memorandum:	
The	British	community	in	China	and	Japan,	which	is	the	most	numerous,	
powerful,	 and	 wealthy	 community	 of	 British	 subjects	 to	 be	 found	
anywhere	 out	 of	 Her	 Majesty’s	 dominions,	 and	 who	 represent	 far	
greater	interests	than	are	at	stake	in	any	but	the	largest	colonies,	look	to	
the	Chief	Judge	of	Her	Britannic	Majesty’s	Supreme	Court	for	protection	
against	 any	 illegal	 or	 arbitrary	 action	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Her	 Majesty’s	
Diplomatic	and	Consular	Authorities.1	
	
Pauncefote	 was	 a	 key	 Foreign	 Office	 figure	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	 an	
experienced	lawyer	and	also	a	rare	example	of	a	London	official	with	considerable	
first-hand	experience	of	Britain	in	China.2		His	words	demonstrate	the	importance	
of	 the	British	presence	 in	China	as	viewed	 from	London	at	 the	 time,	 and	also	 its	
complexity.	 	 In	 one	 sentence	we	 are	 introduced	 to	 three	 elements	 of	 the	British	
presence,	 and	 are	 alerted	 to	 the	 sometimes	 inharmonious	 relationships	 which	













2	When	 he	 wrote	 the	 memorandum	 Pauncefote	 was	 Assistant	 Permanent	 Undersecretary	 at	 the	
Foreign	Office.		He	had	a	few	years	earlier	served	in	Hong	Kong	as	Attorney	General.		He	went	on	to	
become	Permanent	Undersecretary	at	the	FO	and	later	Ambassador	to	the	United	States.	
3	The	 full	 official	 title	 of	 the	 court	 at	 the	 time	 when	 Pauncefote	 was	 writing	 was	 ‘Her	 Britannic	
Majesty’s	 Supreme	 Court	 for	 China	 and	 Japan’.	 	 Works	 which	 do	 deal	 with	 the	 SCC	 include	 Pär	
Kristoffer	Cassel,	Grounds	of	Judgment:	Extraterritoriality	and	Imperial	Power	in	Nineteenth-Century	







within	 its	 territory,	 though	 impaired,	 remained,	 in	 theory	at	 least,	 broadly	 intact	
and	the	greater	part	of	China	was	not	under	the	 formal	administrative	control	of	
Britain	or	 any	other	 foreign	power.	 	As	 such,	 imperial	 expansion	 in	China	 in	 the	
treaty	 century,	 as	 explained	 in	 the	 introduction,	 has	 often	 been	 regarded	 as	 an	
example	of	informal	empire,	and	British	state	structures	and	institutions	in	China	
such	 as	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai	 have	 received	 relatively	 little	 attention	 from	
historians.	 	This	chapter	will	argue	for	the	 importance	of	bodies	such	as	the	SCC,	
which	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 settled,	 institutional	 aspect	 of	 the	 state’s	 presence	 in	
China,	and	 the	connections	which	were	 formed	 through	such	 institutions.	 	These	
factors	are	easily	overlooked	when	the	role	of	 the	state	 is	 thought	of	as	a	 largely	
indirect	 force,	or	as	episodic	and	 inconstant	 in	 the	application	of	 its	power,	as	 in	
some	analyses	of	informal	empire.		This	chapter	will	describe	elements	of	Britain’s	
presence	 in	 China	 which	 were	 not	 in	 any	 sense	 informal	 and	 which	 were	
furthermore	 fairly	 stable	 and	 long-lasting	 –	 the	 British	 state	 institutions	 and	
structures,	made	up	of	policymakers	(principally	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	British	
minister	 in	 China),	 legislation,	 courts,	 consuls,	 constables	 and	 gaols	 –	 which	
together	 furthered	 the	 state’s	 project	 of	 governance	 over	 British	 subjects	 and	
British	interests	in	China,	which	underpinned	the	operations	of	British-dominated	
non-state	 institutions	 and	 British	 commerce,	 and	 which	 also	 curtailed	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	Chinese	state	in	important	ways.			
	
In	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 the	 actions	 of	 official	 and	 unofficial	
Britons,	without	doubt	 the	most	 influential	 foreign	community	 in	China,	with	the	
aim	 of	 better	 evaluating	 their	 place	 in	 Chinese	 history,	we	must	 understand	 the	
legal	 and	 regulatory	 regime	 under	 which	 they	 lived,	 and	 which	 offered	 them	
certain	 rights	 but	 also	 constrained	 their	 actions	 in	 various	ways.	 	 Simply	 noting	
that	 they	 were	 under	 British	 jurisdiction	 is	 not	 enough,	 for	 as	 this	 chapter	 will	
show,	the	British	state	created	a	system	of	governance	in	China	which	was	adapted	
specially	 for	 its	 purposes	 there.	 	 It	 was	 based	 on	 English	 domestic	 law,	 and	 on	






will	 also	 consider	 how	 personnel,	 ideas	 and	 practices	 circulated	 throughout	 the	
British	empire	world	to	the	fringes	of	empire	through	what	Alan	Lester	describes	
as	 ‘multiple,	 co-existent	connections’.4		 	Although	connections	 through	commerce	
and	 the	 military,	 especially	 with	 British	 India,	 have	 been	 described	 in	 existing	
work,	 it	will	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 creation	 and	 reform	of	British	 state	 institutions	 in	
China	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 connections	 between	British	 state	 structures	 in	
China	and	British	institutions	in	different	parts	of	the	world,	such	as	the	Ottoman	
Empire.5		Such	linkages,	since	they	were	not	 found	in	other	aspects	of	the	British	
presence	 in	 China,	 such	 as	 the	 commercial	 or	 military	 spheres,	 have	 been	 little	
explored.	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 will	 be	 shown	 that	 institutional	 connections	 were	
sometimes	 absent	 or	were	 severed	 between	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China	 and	 state	
bodies	 and	 officials	 in	 parts	 of	 the	 British	 empire	which	were	 otherwise	 closely	
connected	to	Britain	in	China.			
	
I	 will	 first	 examine	 the	 role	 of	 the	 British	 state’s	 leading	 official	 in	 China,	 the	
superintendent	 of	 trade	 (who	 was	 later	 usually	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 minister,	
although	 technically	 still	 also	 superintendent	 of	 trade)	 who,	 together	 with	 the	
















course	 feed	 their	 views	 into	policy	 and	 thus	helped	 shape	 their	 own	 institutions	
and	others	with	which	they	interacted,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	judges	of	the	
SCC,	 but	 the	 principal	 task	 of	 these	 officials	was	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies,	
laws	 and	 regulations	 emanating	 from	 London,	 Hong	 Kong,	 and	 later,	 when	 the	





After	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 first	 Opium	War	 with	 treaties	 providing	 for	 greater	
freedoms	for	British	subjects	to	trade	in	China,	a	new	act	of	parliament	and	OICs	
were	passed,	which	provided	for	the	transfer	of	the	British	court	(nominally	based	
at	 Guangzhou)	 to	 the	 newly-ceded	 territory	 of	 Hong	 Kong.	 	 The	 chief	





London,	 both	 within	 the	 FO	 and	 outside	 it,	 in	 particular	 the	 law	 officers	 of	 the	
crown,	who	were	frequently	asked	for	their	opinion	on	proposals	to	govern	British	
subjects	 in	 China.6		 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 FO	desired	 at	 the	 outset	 to	 put	 in	 place	 a	
system	which	would	actually	enable	the	superintendent	to	exercise	authority	over	
British	 subjects.	 	 Therefore,	 at	 precisely	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 FO	 instructed	
Superintendent	and	Plenipotentiary	Henry	Pottinger	 to	 secure	 recognition	of	 the	










The	 FO	 and	 law	 officers	 drew	 on	 the	 precedent	 of	 consular	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	
Ottoman	Empire,	and	experience	there	would	also	serve	as	an	important	model	for	
policy	 in	 China	 at	 various	 later	 times,	 especially	 in	 1865	 when	 the	 system	 was	
overhauled	 (the	 1865	 reforms	 are	 dealt	 with	 later	 in	 this	 chapter).	 	 The	 1843	
memo	also	 shows	 that	 foremost	 in	 official	minds	when	 creating	 the	new	 regime	
was	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 superintendents	 under	 the	 1833	Act,	
and	 the	 FO	 was	 determined	 that	 the	 new	 superintendent	 should	 be	 better	
equipped	to	maintain	the	peace	in	China	by	exercising	greater	control	over	British	
subjects.		He	was	therefore	given	the	new	and	important	power	to	create,	with	the	
advice	of	 the	Hong	Kong	Legislative	Council,	 laws	and	ordinances	 ‘for	 the	peace,	
order,	and	good	government	of	Her	Majesty’s	subjects	being	within	the	dominions	
of	 the	Emperor	of	China’.8		This	was	chiefly	 justified	by	the	 inability	to	anticipate	
precisely	what	powers	would	be	needed	and	 the	distance	between	Great	Britain	
and	 China,	 which	made	 it	 impractical	 for	 the	 superintendent	 to	 consult	 London	
before	enacting	new	regulations.9		The	power	meant	that	the	superintendent	could	
issue	 ordinances	 laying	 down	 specific	 rules	 to	 be	 observed	 by	 British	 subjects,	
often	 based	 on	 the	 treaties	 with	 China,	 or	 giving	 special	 powers	 to	 consuls	 in	
certain	 areas.	 	 This	 was	 an	 unusual	 but	 not	 unprecedented	 step	 –	 when	 the	
legislation	was	debated	 in	 the	House	of	Lords	 it	was	pointed	out,	 in	 response	 to	




A	 few	 examples	 of	 early	 ordinances	 will	 give	 a	 flavour	 of	 the	 kinds	 of	














for	 infringement	 –	 a	 fine	 of	 up	 to	 $10,000	 or	 up	 to	 two	 years’	 imprisonment.11		
Samuel	Bonham’s	Ordinance	No.	2	of	1854	gave	consuls	jurisdiction	over	‘lunatics	
and	 persons	 of	 unsound	 mind’	 together	 with	 their	 property.12		 John	 Bowring’s	
Ordinance	No.	1	of	1855	enforced	neutrality	of	British	subjects	in	the	‘civil	war’	in	
China	 (that	 is,	 the	 Taiping	 Rebellion),	 again	 with	 heavy	 penalties	 for	
infringement.13		 When	 from	 1859	 the	 position	 of	 superintendent	 was	 separated	





regulations,	which	 imposed	 various	 rules	 on	British	 subjects	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports.		
These	covered	such	areas	as	formalities	for	British	ships	entering	and	leaving	port,	
prohibitions	 regarding	 the	 firing	 of	 guns	 in	 harbour,	 formalities	 for	 reporting	
deaths	 or	 crimes	 occurring	 on	 board	 ships,	 requirements	 for	 ships	 not	 to	 leave	
behind	 seamen	 at	 port	 without	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	 consul,	 licensing	
requirements	for	British	subjects	establishing	certain	concerns,	such	as	boarding-
houses,	 and	definition	of	 the	distance	 from	 the	port	which	British	 subjects	were	
allowed	to	travel	into	the	interior.14				
	
In	 the	 normal	 course	 of	 events	 the	 superintendent	 consulted	 London	 when	
creating	 ordinances	 or	 regulations.	 	 When	 the	 FO	 received	 a	 draft	 of	 a	 new	
ordinance,	this	was	generally	referred	to	the	law	officers	of	the	crown,	or	later	the	










15	Although	 from	 1876	 the	 FO	 created	 the	 role	 of	 Legal	 Assistant	 Under	 Secretary,	 which	 was	




immediate	 effect	without	 referring	 to	London,	but	 it	 still	 needed	 to	be	 approved	
retrospectively	by	the	FO	to	remain	in	force.			An	example	of	this	situation	occurred	
in	1867	when	Minister	Rutherford	Alcock	issued	an	urgent	notification	authorising	
consuls	 to	 punish	 by	 fine	 or	 imprisonment	 certain	 unspecified	 acts	 which	
represented	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 treaties.	 	 The	 FO	 told	 Alcock,	 	 following	 the	
recommendation	 of	 the	 law	 officers,	 that	 the	 notification	 was	 disapproved	 (its	
stipulations	and	the	penalties	it	set	out	were	held	to	be	insufficiently	clear)	and	so	
it	 was	 necessary	 to	 publish	 its	 withdrawal	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	 Consular	
Gazette	in	1868.16	
	
While	 there	 was,	 unsurprisingly,	 an	 abiding	 concern	 with	 order	 and	 stability	
evident	 in	 the	 kind	 of	 ordinances	 and	 regulations	 issued	 by	 successive	
superintendents,	 their	purposes	 can	be	 seen	 to	have	 changed	 in	 important	ways	
over	the	course	of	the	treaty	century.		In	the	first	decades,	concerns	with	enforcing	
treaties,	creating	stable	trading	conditions,	and	keeping	order	among	sailors	were	
particularly	 evident.17		 Later	 on,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 ever	more	 substantial	
municipal	 authorities	 in	many	 treaty	 ports,	 regulations	were	 created	 to	 support	
and	control	 those	 institutions	and	also	 to	assist	multinational	bodies	 such	as	 the	
Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 and	 even	 foreign	 authorities	 like	 the	 Russian	
Municipality	at	Harbin	–	regulations	were	issued	in	1914	for	the	enforcement	of	its	
municipal	bye-laws	on	British	subjects.18		After	its	creation	in	the	1850s,		a	number	
of	 regulations	were	 created	 to	 assist	 the	work	 of	 the	 Chinese	Maritime	Customs	
Service,	 a	 Chinese	 government	 agency	 dominated	 by	 Britain,	 the	work	 of	which	
clearly	 served	 British	 interests	 and	 objectives	 in	 creating	 orderly	 structures	 to	









councils	 in	China’,	2	 January	1907,	printed	 in	HChT,	vol.	2,	p.	1095;	 for	Shanghai,	see	 for	example	
‘Regulation	for	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Police,	12	October	1906,	printed	in	HChT,	vol.	2,	pp.	1080-1;	
for	Harbin,	see	Eric	Teichman,	Vade-Mecum	(Tientsin,	1920),	p.	68.	




ports’,	 the	 Shanghai	 Harbour	 regulations	 of	 1900,	 the	 Customs	 Kongmoon	
Regulations	of	1904	and	 the	Quarantine	Newchwang	Regulations	of	1906,	 all	 	 of	
which	 made	 Customs-originated	 rules	 legally	 enforceable	 on	 British	 subjects.20			
From	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 threats	was	 reflected	 in	 the	








of	 governor	 of	Hong	Kong.	 	 This	 combination	 of	 roles	 sprang	naturally	 from	 the	




difficulties	 for	 the	British	 state	 in	China	 and	 its	 chief	 official,	 the	 superintendent	
and	 governor.	 	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 crown	 colony	 in	 such	 close	 proximity	 to,	 and	
sharing	apparatus	of	governance	with,	a	domain	where	the	British	state	exercised	
extraterritorial	 jurisdiction	 created	 serious	 complications	 not	 experienced	 in	 the	
Ottoman	 Empire,	 where	 the	 FO	 had	 the	 most	 extensive	 prior	 experience	 of	













Hong	Kong,	but	 also	over	 cases	arising	on	 the	Chinese	mainland	where	a	British	
subject	was	defendant.		It	became	clear	however	from	an	early	stage	that	the	kind	
of	administration	of	justice	which	the	FO	and	superintendent	wanted	to	deliver	to	
British	 subjects	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 principally	 in	 support	 of	 the	 aim	 of	 stable	
relations	with	the	Chinese	government	under	the	treaties,	was	often	of	a	different	
character	 from	 that	 which	 was	 on	 offer	 from	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 Supreme	 Court’s	
juries,	 made	 up	 of	 the	 colony’s	 non-official	 élites,	 and	 its	 judges,	 schooled	 in	
English	legal	traditions	and	uninterested	in	relations	with	the	Chinese	government	
or	people.22		This	is	a	theme	which	will	be	further	developed	in	chapter	two,	since	
the	 need	 to	 deal	 with	 criminal	 behaviour	 in	 China,	 especially	 when	 it	 was	
perceived	 as	 likely	 to	 cause	 disruption	 in	 relations	with	 the	 Chinese	 authorities,	
was	a	major	factor	which	affected	officials’	handling	of	this	dilemma.	
	
British	 officials	 in	 China,	 especially	 successive	 superintendent-governors,	 were	
infuriated	on	a	number	of	occasions	by	the	Hong	Kong	Court’s	reversal	of	judicial	
decisions	made	by	consuls,	who	heard	less	serious	cases	at	first	instance.		This	was	





arising	out	of	 the	actions	of	British	defendants	 in	mainland	China,	 including	civil	
cases,	were	frequently	moved	to	the	Hong	Kong	Supreme	Court,	either	by	appeal,	
or	 through	 a	 process	 of	 judicial	 review	 (the	 legal	 term	 used	 was	 writ	 of	
certiorari).23		Hearings	in	Hong	Kong	had	clear	potential	disadvantages	for	Chinese	
complainants	 in	particular:	a	combination	of	the	court’s	 fairly	strict	adherence	to	
English	 legal	 forms	 (at	 least	 compared	 with	 the	 consular	 courts	 in	 China),	 the	
distance	 which	 complainants	 and	 witnesses	 might	 need	 to	 travel,	 the	 fact	 that	
																																																								
22	For	a	detailed	survey	of	the	contemporary	Hong	Kong	legal	system,	see	Christopher	Munn,	Anglo-
China:	 Chinese	 People	 and	British	 Rule	 in	Hong	Kong,	 1841-1880	 (Richmond,	 2001),	 pp.	 107-254.		
Munn	 shows	 that	 legal	 principles	 were	 however	 readily	 discarded	 by	 Hong	 Kong’s	 magistrates	
when	dealing	with	lower	status	Chinese	accused	of	crime	in	the	colony.			
23	John	Francis	Davis,	 ‘Circular	 respecting	 consular	 jurisdiction’,	 22	November	1844,	 reprinted	 in	






Ordinances	 were	 passed	 by	 the	 superintendent-governor	 which	 modified	 the	
rights	 of	 appeal	 to	 the	Hong	Kong	 court,	 but	 the	 problem	of	 interference	 by	 the	
latter	institution	was	not	fully	resolved,	and	it	was	this	recurring	difficulty	which	
provided	the	initial	 impetus	for	the	creation	of	a	new	OIC	at	the	beginning	of	the	
1850s.	 Superintendent	 and	 Governor	 Bonham	 began	 the	 process	 by	 asking	
Shanghai	 Consul	 Rutherford	 Alcock	 to	 draft	 new	 ordinances	 to	 address	 the	
problem	raised	by	the	1851	Lady	Mary	Wood	case,	 in	which	the	Hong	Kong	court	
had	reversed	Alcock’s	consular	decision	which	found	that	a	British	defendant	had	
committed	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 treaty.25		 Bonham	described	 the	main	 purpose	 of	 the	
draft	ordinances	as	being	to	prevent	 the	Hong	Kong	court	 interfering	 firstly	with	
matters	arising	out	of	treaty	rights	and	obligations,	and	secondly	in	all	cases	where	
Chinese	 subjects	 were	 plaintiffs	 or	 defendants.26		 The	 extent	 of	 the	 rift	 and	
difference	of	viewpoint	already	opened	up	between	Hong	Kong	officials	and	those	
involved	in	governance	of	the	treaty	ports,	including	the	superintendent-governor,	
was	made	 starkly	 apparent	 when	 Bonham	 forwarded	 Alcock’s	 drafts	 to	 London	
and	made	a	point	while	doing	so	of	explaining	that	he	had	not	consulted	the	Hong	





















It	 may	 be	 noted	 here	 that	 the	 novelty	 of	 British	 policies	 towards	 the	 Chinese	
government	of	 the	 ‘cooperative	era’	of	 the	1860s	can	sometimes	be	exaggerated,	
and	the	conciliatory	actions	of	leading	China-based	officials	in	earlier	periods	may	
be	 overlooked.	 	 In	 fact	 in	 the	 1850s	 many	 British	 officials	 wished	 to	 deal	 with	
Chinese	 officials	 in	 ways	 which	 supported	 rather	 than	 undermined	 Chinese	
authority,	 and	 there	was	 a	 strong	desire	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 superintendents	 and	





staffed	 Customs	 Service,	 a	 fair	 chance	 to	 govern	 China.’30		 However,	 as	 shown	
above,	Alcock	was	clear	in	the	early	1850s	that	British	activities	in	China	should	be	





ordinances	proposed	by	Bonham.	 	 In	 the	course	of	 its	preparation,	several	drafts	
were	passed	to	 the	 law	officers	 for	 their	opinions.	 	There	was	an	 internal	debate	






the	 main	 treaty	 powers	 following	 the	 Second	 Opium	 War	 to	 deal	 with	 China	 broadly	 within	 a	














Lady	 Mary	 Wood	 case	 -	 appeals	 in	 treaty	 cases,	 and	 also	 for	 breaches	 of	 the	
superintendent’s	ordinances	or	regulations,	were	thenceforth	to	be	decided	by	the	
superintendent,	 not	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court.	 	 However,	 Hong	 Kong	 remained	 the	
court	 of	 appeal	 in	 civil	 cases	between	British	 subjects	where	 the	 sum	 in	dispute	
exceeded	$1000	and,	more	 importantly,	retained,	concurrently	with	consuls,	civil	
and	 criminal	 jurisdiction,	 with	 the	 effect	 that	 in	 criminal	 cases	 where	 greater	
sentencing	 powers	 were	 required	 than	 were	 available	 to	 the	 consuls	 (i.e.	
imprisonment	 for	 twelve	months),	 defendants	 had	 to	 be	 sent	 to	 Hong	 Kong	 for	
trial.31		Although	 it	 began	as	 a	 collection	of	draft	 ordinances	 intended	 to	 remedy	
the	 specific	 problem	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	 to	 consular	
jurisdiction,	 the	1853	OIC	had	by	 the	 time	of	 its	 promulgation	become	a	 kind	of	
code	for	consular	jurisdiction,	which	consolidated	the	confusingly	large	number	of	
earlier	 ordinances	 made	 by	 successive	 superintendents	 of	 trade	 for	 the	
governance	 of	 British	 subjects	 in	 China	 –	more	 	 than	 twenty	 ordinances	 dealing	
with	British	governance	 in	 the	 treaty	ports	had	been	passed	by	 the	end	of	1852.			
From	 this	 point	 onwards,	 British	 governance	 in	 China	 would	 always	 be	 based	
primarily	on	such	a	 code,	 referred	 to	 from	1904	as	 the	principal	OIC,	which	was	
revised	 and	 reissued	 in	 1865,	 1904	 and	 1925.	 	 When	 amendments	 or	 new	
provisions	 were	 required	 in	 the	 interim,	 supplementary	 orders	 in	 council	 were	
passed.		The	principal	OIC	always	contained	certain	core	sections	providing	for	the	
key	ingredients	of	British	consular	jurisdiction	in	China:	the	operation	generally	of	
all	 English	 laws	 in	 China;	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 a	 body	 of	 law	 applicable	 only	 in	
China,	contained	in	the	treaties	made	between	Britain	and	China,	created	by	OIC,	






regulations,	 later	 called	 king’s	 regulations),	 which	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 limiting,	
modifying	or	adding	to	the	body	of	English	law	applicable	in	China.32				
	
In	 1857	 the	 role	 of	 minister	 was	 given	 to	 Lord	 Elgin	 but	 Hong	 Kong	 Governor	
Bowring	 remained	 superintendent	 until	 1859,	when	 the	 British	 China	 and	Hong	
Kong	 administrations	 (though	 not	 the	 judicial	 systems)	 were	 finally	 fully	
separated,	 with	 the	 minister	 (by	 then	 Frederick	 Bruce)	 becoming	 concurrently	
superintendent.33		British	state	governance	 in	China	would	 thenceforth	be	 led	by	
the	minister	 resident	 at	 Beijing.	 	Hong	Kong’s	 position	 as	 bridgehead	was,	 in	 its	
administrative	 aspect,	 much	 diminished	 by	 the	 move	 of	 Britain’s	 key	 official	 in	
China	 away	 from	 the	 colony,	 but	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	 retained,	 for	 a	 time,	 an	
important	 position	 in	 the	 judicial	 apparatus	 involved	 in	 governance	 of	 British	
subjects	 in	China.	 	 	The	British	Hong	Kong	and	China	 judicial	 systems	were	only	
comprehensively	 separated	 with	 the	 creation	 in	 1865	 of	 the	 SCC,	 based	 at	
Shanghai.34		 From	 1865	 the	 courts	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 Hong	 Kong	 held	 separate,		
parallel	 positions	 in	 the	 British	 judicial	 hierarchy. 35 		 The	 most	 important	
consequences	of	this	reform	are	discussed	later	in	this	chapter	and	also,	in	respect	
of	criminal	cases,	in	chapter	two.		But	for	now	it	may	be	noted	that	this	attempted	
solution	 of	 the	 difficulties	 surrounding	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	 and	 consular	
jurisdiction	immediately	led	to	new	problems,	since	the	Hong	Kong	and	treaty	port	
commercial	 worlds	 were	 so	 closely	 intertwined.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 SCC	 and	 the	












35	With	 a	 few	 minor	 exceptions.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 1877	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	 was	 given	 by	 OIC	
jurisdiction	over	crimes	or	civil	matters	occurring	within	 ten	miles	of	 the	colony,	presumably	 for	
reasons	of	economy.		See	Sir	Richard	Rennie,	Instructions	to	Her	Majesty’s	Consular	Officers	in	China	
and	Japan	(Shanghai,	1885),	p.	19.	 	Also,	a	small	 link	between	the	courts	was	established	 in	1912	
when	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 Full	 Court	 was	 established.	 	 A	 panel	 of	 appeal	 judges	 was	 created	 for	 the	
colony,	one	of	whom	was	the	judge	of	the	SCC	(then	Havilland	de	Sausmarez).			
	 61	
in	 both	 places.36		 Before	 turning	 to	 examine	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai,	 it	 is	 necessary	
first	to	look	more	closely	at	those	officials	who	represented	both	the	executive	and,	
with	 the	 exception	 only	 of	 Shanghai	 after	 1865,	 the	 judicial	 branches	 of	 British	





tasks,	 far	 more	 varied	 and	 complex	 than	 their	 counterparts	 in	 most	 other	
countries,	 largely	because	of	the	existence	of	extraterritoriality	in	China.	 	Consuls	
were	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 policies	 and	 enforcing	 rules	 for	 British	
governance	 created	 by	 the	 FO	 and	 the	 superintendent-minister,	 as	 well	 as	
administering	English	law	and	ensuring	adherence	to	the	treaties	with	the	Chinese	
government.	 	 In	addition,	 consuls	and	 their	 staff	performed	many	administrative	
duties,	including	land	(and	later	also	company)	registration,	formalities	related	to	
shipping,	making	commercial	and	other	reports	for	the	FO	and	the	registration	of	






to	 him	 by	 the	 party	 aggrieved.	 	 This	 could	 be	 another	 British	 subject,	 another	
foreigner,	 a	 Chinese	 person	 or	 indeed,	 as	 was	 frequently	 the	 case	 where	 the	
treaties	were	 alleged	 to	 have	 been	 breached,	 a	 local	 Chinese	 official,	 usually	 the	
daotai	(circuit	intendant).		In	the	larger	ports,	such	as	Shanghai	and	Tianjin,	which	
eventually	 had	 substantial	 municipal	 police	 forces,	 proceedings	 were	 often	
triggered	 by	 the	 arrest	 and	 handing	 over	 of	 the	 detainee	 to	 the	 consulate	 (or	 in	




37	The	 important	 consular	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 shipping,	 and	 in	 particular,	 sailors,	 is	 dealt	 with	 in	
chapter	two.	
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example	when	 British	 subjects	 in	 China	 exploited	 opportunities	 to	make	money	
which	 did	 not	 align	 with	 the	 British	 state’s	 own	 view	 of	 British	 interests.	 	 An	
example	 which	 gives	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 problems	 presented	 by	 the	 mercenary	
approach	 to	 commerce	 often	 taken	 on	 the	 China	 coast	 dates	 from	 1858,	 while	
Britain	was	at	war	with	China.		Shanghai	Consul	D.	B.	Robertson	issued	a	circular	to	
the	 British	 community	 at	 Shanghai	 noting	 that	 Chinese	 soldiers	 had	 been	
transported	 to	 Shantou	 in	 British	 ships	 and	 warning	 that	 British	 subjects	 were	
liable	 to	 prosecution	 for	 doing	 so	 while	 Britain	 and	 China	 were	 engaged	 in	
hostilities.38		
	
Consuls	 faced	 practical	 problems	 when	 trying	 to	 maintain	 order,	 since	 in	 most	
consular	 districts	 there	 was	 just	 one	 poorly-paid	 European	 constable	 to	 arrest	
suspects	and	supervise	the	consular	gaol,	and	consuls	therefore	sometimes	had	to	
rely	 on	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 and,	more	 often,	 the	 police	 forces	 of	 the	 foreign	
municipalities	 which	 developed	 with	 the	 growth	 of	 foreign	 settlements	 and	
concessions	 to	 help	 keep	 order.39		 At	 British	 concessions,	 although	 the	wages	 of	
these	police	forces	were	paid	by	the	municipalities	out	of	their	taxation	revenues,	
the	 authority	 to	 perform	police	 duties	was	 granted	by	 the	 consul,	 sometimes	 by	
appointing	 municipal	 police	 as	 special	 constables.40		 Consular	 approval	 appears	
even	 to	 have	 been	 considered	 necessary	 at	 Shanghai	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	
existence	 of	 the	 SMC,	 showing	 how	 the	British	 state’s	 agents	 in	 China	 played	 an	
essential	role	in	the	expansion	of	the	powers	of	the	Council.41			
	
Police	 discipline	 was	 maintained	 in	 both	 the	 concessions	 and	 settlements,	
including	 the	Shanghai	 International	Settlement,	with	 the	direct	assistance	of	 the	
British	state.	 	 In	1906	urgent	regulations	were	 issued	by	Minister	 J.	N.	 Jordan,	 in	
																																																								
38	TNA	FO	233/4:	Circular	No.	1,	Shanghai,	4	January	1858.	




the	 legal	 basis	 for	 this	 procedure	 is	 not	 clear,	 nor	 is	 it	 clear	 what	 legal	 force	 it	 actually	 had.		
Nevertheless	in	1855,	the	SMC	obtained	‘countersignature	of	the	British	Consul	to	instructions	for	
Police	under	which	instructions	and	power	the	men	in	the	employment	of	the	Municipal	Council	are	





British	subject	 to	disobey	orders,	 to	desert	 the	 force	or	 to	persuade	others	 to	do	
so.42		Further	regulations	were	issued	in	1907	for	discipline	in	British	concession	
police	 forces	 which	 contained	 almost	 identical	 provisions.43		 By	 OIC	 in	 1909	
control	 over	 police	 in	 concessions	 and	 settlements	 was	 tightened	 further	 by	




municipal	 councils,	 including	 the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	despite	 the	 latter’s	
formal	 status	 as	 an	 international	 body.	 	 This	 closeness	 was	 evident	 to	 other	
foreigners	at	the	time	and	could	be	the	cause	of	tensions	–	the	1909	OIC		caused	a	
diplomatic	 row	 with	 the	 German	 and	 American	 consuls,	 who	 interpreted	 the	
regulations	as	a	proclamation	of	British	control	over	 the	SMP.45		The	 interests	of	
the	councils,	especially	the	SMC,	and	the	British	state	were	very	closely	aligned	in	






not	 easy	 to	 find	 suitable	 recruits	 on	 the	 low	wages	 offered.	 	 From	Niuzhuang	 in	
1869	Consul	W.	E.	King	reported	that	‘three	constables	in	the	course	of	four	years	
were	 dismissed	 for	 incompetency	 or	 drunkenness.’47		 Although	 the	 problem	 of	
British	subjects	engaged	in	theft	and	violent	crime	had	apparently	subsided	by	the	
																																																								
















assistance	 from	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 until	 arrangements	 could	 be	 made	 to	
transfer	 the	 prisoner	 to	 Shanghai;	 or,	 since	 seeking	 Chinese	 assistance	 might	
‘weaken	the	foundations	of	extraterritoriality’,	ask	the	Japanese	consul	for	help.49		





in	 no	 way	 constituted	 a	 centrally-coordinated	 ‘force’.	 	 From	 the	 1880s,	 the	
Japanese	 Foreign	 Ministry	 created	 a	 centrally-organised	 and	 well-staffed	 police	
force	 which	 operated	 in	 China	 and	 Korea	 to	 maintain	 order	 among	 Japanese	
subjects,	 and	 also	 played	 a	 particularly	 important	 role	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 anti-
Japanese	Korean	nationalists	based	 in	 the	Chinese	 treaty	ports.51		Britain	 instead	





consuls,	 especially	 in	 the	 first	 few	 decades,	 since	 consuls	 generally	 lacked	 legal	
training;	most	early	consular	officers	were	recruited	on	the	strength	of	their	China	













witnesses.	 Even	 Harry	 Parkes,	 instigator	 of	 the	Arrow	 incident	 which	 led	 to	 the	
Second	 Opium	 War,	 and	 usually	 portrayed	 as	 endowed	 with	 abundant	 self-




Whether	out	of	 legal	 ignorance	or	 in	 the	name	of	expediency,	consuls	sometimes	
viewed	their	ambit	in	maintaining	peace	and	good	order	quite	broadly,	and	did	not	
necessarily	always	base	their	actions	on	firm	legal	grounds.		The	lack	of	sufficient	
or	 effective	 staff,	 especially	 constables,	 also	 forced	 a	 flexible	 approach.	 For	
example,	 at	 Ningbo,	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 constable,	 Consul	 Thom	 admitted	 to	
deciding	 sentences	 in	 criminal	 cases	 based	 on	 his	 judgment	 of	 how	 likely	 a	
prisoner	was	 to	comply,	 so	 that	more	 troublesome	characters	were	 less	severely	
punished,	if	at	all.54		About	a	decade	later	at	Shanghai	British	officials	can	be	found	
to	 have	 sometimes	 leaned	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 strictness	
towards	British	subjects	there.		Baker	and	confectioner	H.	E.	F.	Evans	was	fined	ten	
dollars	 in	1856	merely	 for	 ‘using	disrespectful	 language’	 to	 the	vice	 consul.	 	The	
precise	law	or	ordinance	he	had	allegedly	broken	in	so	doing,	if	indeed	there	was	
any	legal	basis	at	all	for	the	charge,	is	not	clear	from	the	records.		No	other	charge	
against	 the	 man	 is	 recorded,	 so	 it	 would	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 a	 case	 of	
contempt	 of	 court.55		 Later,	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 SCC	 in	 1865,	 staffed	 by	
professional	 judges,	consuls	at	 last	had	a	source	of	guidance	 to	which	 they	could	
turn	for	advice	on	difficult	questions,	and	they	were	also	from	that	time	onwards	
periodically	 issued	with	 fairly	detailed	 instructions	 explaining	 various	 aspects	 of	
their	 legal	 and	 other	 duties.	 	 Judges	 Hornby	 (1867),	 Rennie	 (1885)	 and	 de	
Sausmarez	 (1915)	 all	 issued	 lengthy	 documents	 to	 consuls	 which	 contained	
instructions	to	guide	them	in	their	judicial	duties.	56	
																																																								









Consuls	 could	 deal	 with	 lesser	 criminal	 and	 civil	 cases	 summarily	 under	 their	
magisterial	powers,	but	for	cases	where	a	greater	punishment	was	appropriate	or	
cases	where	money	or	property	of	value	higher	than	a	certain	limit	were	involved,	
they	 were	 required	 to	 hear	 cases	 with	 assessors	 drawn	 from	 British	 subjects	
resident	 in	 their	 districts.	 	 When	 the	 system	 was	 first	 introduced	 by	
Superintendent	 John	 Francis	 Davis	 in	 1844,	 he	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 use	 of	








were	 employed	 and	 greater	 sentencing	 powers	 were	 available.	 	 Unsurprisingly,	
given	the	lack	of	legal	training	and	experience	of	most	consuls	and	the	complexity	




Punishment	was	also	 somewhat	extemporised,	 in	 large	part	owing	 to	 the	 lack	of		
facilities	and	staff	for	the	incarceration	of	convicts.		Consuls	had	the	power	to		fine	
or	 imprison	 those	convicted	of	offences.	 	Under	 the	principal	OICs,	consuls	could	
hand	 down	 sentences	 of	 up	 to	 twelve	 months	 in	 prison	 when	 sitting	 with	
																																																																																																																																																																		
Rennie,	Instructions	to	Her	Majesty’s	Consular	Officers	in	China	and	Japan,	on	the	Mode	of	Conducting	
Judicial	 Business,	 with	 Comments	 on	 the	 China	 and	 Japan	 Order	 in	 Council,	 1865,	 and	 the	 Rules	 of	
Procedure	Framed	under	It	(Shanghai,	1885).		The	instructions	issued	by	de	Sausmarez	in	1915	are	
referred	to	in	TNA	FO	228/3413:	circular	to	consuls	of	12	March	1925.	
57	Davis,	 ‘Circular	 respecting	 consular	 jurisdiction’,	 22	 November	 1844,	 reprinted	 in	 Tuson	 The	
British	Consul’s		Manual,	pp.	229-32,	p.	231.	
58	See	 section	3	of	Ordinance	no.	 7	of	 1844,	 in	HCoT,	 vol.	 7,	 p.	 188;	 section	6	of	 the	1853	OIC,	 in	
BaFSP,	 vol.	 42,	 p.	 260;	 sections	33-4	of	 the	1865	OIC,	 in	BaFSP,	 vol.	 55,	 p.	 145;	 section	33	of	 the	
1904	OIC,	 in	HChT,	 vol	 2,	 (1908),	 p.	 849;	 and	 section	 36(3)	 of	 the	 1925	OIC,	 in	BaFSP,	 vol.	 121,	
p.121.	




assessors.60		 In	 the	 early	 years	British	 subjects	were	 sometimes	held	 in	 the	 local	
Chinese	gaol	when	there	were	no	cells	available	at	the	consulate.61		Consul	Temple	
Layton	at	Xiamen	in	1847	reported	that	he	had	no	gaoler	or	constable;	instead	he	






guilty	 parties	 have	 been	 actually	 punished.’63		 At	 Yantai	 (Chefoo)	 the	 consul	
reported	that	more	than	one	prisoner	had	escaped	the	gaol	because	the	constable	
was	 too	 busy	 to	 oversee	 it	 properly.64		 Although	 probably	 not	 strictly	 justifiable	
under	 any	 treaty,	 Chinese	 were	 also	 arrested	 and	 detained	 in	 consular	 gaols,	
pending	transfer	to	Chinese	authorities	for	trial.		The	British	consuls	at	Shanghai	in	






British	 prisoners	 sometime	 served	 long	 prison	 sentences	 at	 Shanghai,	 where	 a	
substantial	consular	gaol	was	built	between	1869	and	1871,	or	more	often	at	Hong	
Kong,	 but	 this	 entailed	 the	 additional	 costs	 and	 difficulties	 of	 transporting	
prisoners	 to	 the	colony,	 so	was	used	sparingly.67		Consuls	were	advised	by	 Judge	















considered	 as	 equal	 to	 punishment	 of	 three	 times	 the	 same	 length	 in	 England,	
because	 ‘the	 effect	 of	 prompt	 punishment	 following	 on	 crime	 to	 be	 carried	 into	
effect	as	near	to	the	scene	of	the	commission	of	the	crime	as	possible	is	far	greater	
as	a	deterrent	than	conviction	at	a	distant	place.’68			Another,	and	probably	greater	
justification	was	also	given:	 longer	sentences	could	only	be	 inflicted	by	 judges	at	
Shanghai,	so	involved	the	greater	cost	of	sending	the	accused	away	for	trial	or	of	
bringing	a	 judge	to	the	district	where	the	offence	was	committed.	 	Even	after	the	











like	 so	 many	 of	 the	 structural	 arrangements	 for	 governance	 located	 in	 the	
Shanghai	 International	 Settlement,	 as	 part	 of	 attempts	 to	 restore	 order	 in	 the	
1860s	following	the	unrest	caused	by	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	which	had	led	to	the	
suspension	for	a	time	of	Chinese	government	authority	in	Shanghai	and	the	region	
around	 it,	and	had	also	resulted	 in	a	huge	 influx	of	Chinese	 into	the	safety	of	 the	





1867),	 p.	 17;	 and	 revised	 and	 reissued	 in	 1881	 by	 Judge	 Rennie	 -	 Sir	 Edmund	 Hornby	 and	 Sir	
Richard	Rennie,	Instructions	to	Her	Majesty’s	Consular	Officers	in	China	and	Japan	(Shanghai,	1885),	
p.	16.	
69	There	were	mixed	 courts	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	world	where	 Britain	 or	 other	 imperial	 powers	






not	 deemed	 acceptable	 in	 the	 early	 1860s,	 and	 a	 system	 more	 aligned	 to	 the	
contents	of	the	treaties	was	briefly	adopted,	whereby	Chinese	offenders	were	sent	
to	 the	Chinese	City	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 by	Chinese	 officials,	 following	 a	 preliminary	
hearing	 before	 the	 British	 or	 United	 States	 consul.	 	 This	 was	 soon	 found	 to	 be	
unsatisfactory,	since	it	was	said	that	many	Chinese	offenders	were	not	punished	or	





1927	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 government	 of	 the	 International	
Settlement.73			
	
The	degree	 to	which	 the	Shanghai	Mixed	Court	 can	be	 said	 to	have	 involved	 the	
integration	of	treaty	power	governments,	and	the	British	state	in	particular,	into	a	
joint	form	of	governance	in	the	International	Settlement,	has	not	received	enough	
attention	 in	 histories	 dealing	with	 treaty	 era	 Shanghai,	 leading	 to	 an	 insufficient	




the	British	 state,	 in	 the	development	and	operation	of	 the	Shanghai	Mixed	Court	
must	 not	 be	 overlooked.	 	 In	 1864	 British	 consul	 Harry	 Parkes	 prompted	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 court	 in	 the	 form	 in	 which	 it	 was	 ultimately	 realised,	 by	
proposing	 to	 the	 local	 Chinese	 authorities	 and	 the	 Municipal	 Council	 a	 scheme	
whereby	 a	 Chinese	 official	 and	 a	 foreign	 assessor	 would	 sit	 together	 to	 decide	
																																																								
72	Kotenev,	Shanghai:	its	Mixed	Court	and	Council,	p.	46.	
73	The	 Shanghai	 Mixed	 Court	 was	 succeed	 by	 the	 Shanghai	 Provisional	 Court.	 	 See	 Frederic	 E.	
Wakeman,	Policing	Shanghai,	1927-1937	(Berkeley,	Calif.,	1996),	pp.	70-2.	











justification	 for	 his	 stance,	 that	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 viewed	 the	 SMC	 as	
‘politically	 speaking,	 irresponsible.’ 76 		 The	 SMC	 was	 therefore	 placed	 in	 a	
subordinate	position	 to	 consular	 authority	 as	 far	 as	 the	 court’s	 judicial	 decision-
making	was	concerned.		
	
The	 Mixed	 Court	 was	 initially	 located	 in	 a	 building	 in	 the	 British	 consulate	
compound	at	Shanghai,	but	members	of	 the	SMP	were	 tasked	with	arresting	and	
delivering	 Chinese	 accused	 of	 offences	 to	 the	 court	 for	 trial.77		 Later,	 separate	
premises	were	found	for	the	court.		The	development	of	the	court	can	best	be	dealt	
with	in	two	stages,	since	the	court	changed	substantially	after	1911	when	the	Qing	
Dynasty	was	 overthrown.	 	 Before	 1911,	 the	 court	 was	 formally	 a	 branch	 of	 the	
Qing	 government’s	 bureaucracy,	 and	 its	 Chinese	 judges	 were	 appointed	 by	 the	
latter	 government.	 	 After	 1911,	 the	 court	 was	 placed	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	
Consular	 Body,	who	 appointed	 the	 court’s	 Chinese	magistrates.78		 Although	 SMC	
input	 and	 influence	 increased	 considerably	 from	 1911,	 most	 notably	 in	 the	
operational	administration,	 including	 financial	management,	of	 the	court	and	 the	
prison	for	Chinese,	it	 is	important	to	note	that	throughout	both	periods	the	court	
relied	on	 the	participation	of	 foreign	consuls	as	assessors,	who	were	responsible	
for	 deciding	 cases	 with	 the	 Chinese	magistrate,	 and	 could	 decide	 cases	 in	 ways	
which	went	 against	 the	wishes	 of	 the	 SMC.79		 It	 is	 furthermore	 possible	 to	 state	






78 	Teichman,	 Vade-Mecum,	 p.	 5;	 Kotenev,	 Shanghai:	 its	 Mixed	 Court	 and	 Council,	 pp.	 170-6;		
Stephens,	Order	and	Disciple	 in	China,	 p.	 49;	 	 	 Cassel	 says	 the	 SMC	 appointed	 the	 Chinese	 judges	
after	 1911,	 but	 gives	 no	 source	 and	 it	 appears	 that	 this	 must	 be	 an	 error:	 Cassel,	 Grounds	 of	
Judgment,	 p.	 177.	 	 In	 1912,	 the	 senior	 consul	 sent	 a	 note	 to	 the	 Council	 informing	 them	 of	 the	
appointment	of	the	3rd	assistant	magistrate	of	the	Mixed	Court:		Minutes	of	the	SMC,	vol.	18,	meeting	
of	24	July	1912,	p.	297.	
79	For	 example,	 in	 1912,	 the	 German	 assessor	 released	 a	 Chinese	 prisoner	 against	 the	 Council’s	
wishes;	 the	 captain	 superintendent	 reportedly	 described	 the	 action	 as	 ‘a	 	 severe	 blow	 to	 Gaol	
discipline’.		Minutes	of	the	SMC,	vol.	18,	meeting	of	11	December	1912,	p.	346.	
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assessor	 in	 a	 far	 greater	 number	 of	 cases	 than	 that	 of	 any	 other	 foreign	 power,	













the	 governance	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement.	 	 For	 example,	 they	 saw	 that	 the	
court	enforced	municipal	bye-laws	against	nuisances	such	as	noise	and	punished	
Chinese	 government	 employees	 from	 outside	 the	 settlement	 who	 attempted	 to	
extract	 debts	 or	 taxation	 from	 Chinese	 residing	 within	 the	 settlement.81		 British	
officials	 also	 showed	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 they	 were	 able	 to	 import	 British	
practices	into	the	governance	of	the	settlement	through	their	dominant	position	in	
the	court.		From	1865,	this	was	British	policy,	sanctioned	by	London:	when	the	FO	
sent	 Edmund	 Hornby	 to	 China	 as	 the	 first	 British	 judge	 of	 the	 SCC,	 he	 was	





English	 courts,	 and	 furthermore,	 British	 assessors	 were	 prepared	 to	 base	 their	
																																																								











of	everyday	 judicial	and	administrative	practice	built	 the	British	character	of	 the	
International	Settlement	in	a	way	that	must	have	affected	the	perceptions	of	those	
who	 came	 into	 contact	with	 the	 court	 and	which	moreover	dovetailed	with	 SMC	




was	 the	 ability	 to	 order	 that	 a	 British	 subject	 be	 deported	 from	 China. 85	
Deportation	was	initially	viewed	by	Superintendent	Davis	as	an	‘extreme	measure’,	




Guangzhou	 in	1846,	 consuls	were	given	additional	powers	 to	deport	where	 they	
had	reason	to	believe	that	a	British	subject	was	 likely	 to	commit	a	 ‘breach	of	 the	




the	 treaty	 ports	were	 often	made	 to	Hong	 Kong,	 the	 nearest	 British	 territory	 to	
China,	 but	 this	 eventually	 provoked	 a	 protest	 from	 the	Hong	 Kong	 Government.		
Under	the	1904	OIC	it	was	made	more	difficult	for	the	consuls	or	courts	in	China	to	













of	 a	 larger	 project	 with	 common	 aims	 shared	 by	 the	 colony	 and	 agents	 of	 the	
British	presence	at	 the	 treaty	ports.	 	 Instead,	 the	 colony’s	 interests	were	viewed	
more	narrowly	and	given	priority	by	its	government.			
	
Deportation	 remained	 a	 tool	 for	 dealing	 with	 small-scale	 career	 criminals	 and	
vagrants	through	the	nineteenth	century	and	beyond,	but	 it	was	also	adopted	for	
use	against	different	kinds	of	threats	in	the	early	twentieth	century.			In	1904,	the	
Tianjin	 consul	 ordered	 the	 deportation	 of	 the	 British	 proprietor	 of	 The	 China	
Times,	 John	Cowen,	who	had	failed	to	give	security	for	good	behaviour	for	twelve	
months	 for	having	published	an	article	 likely	 to	cause	a	breach	of	 the	peace	(the	
article	 concerned	 the	 alleged	 cruelty	 of	 Russian	 troops	 in	 China).91		 In	 1906	 a	
number	 of	 Indian	 members	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Police	 were	 deported	




was	the	passport	 for	 travel	 in	 the	 interior	of	China.	 	 	From	1842	to	1860,	British	
and	other	foreign	nationals	were	only	allowed	to	travel	a	short	distance	from	the	
open	ports.		In	the	case	of	British	subjects	this	distance	was	defined	in	the	general	
regulations	 published	by	 the	British	 authorities.	 Following	 the	 ratification	 of	 the	
Treaty	 of	 Tianjin,	 consuls	 began	 issuing	 passports	 for	 British	 subjects	 to	 travel	
outside	the	immediate	environs	of	the	treaty	ports	for	the	first	time.		The	passport	















I	 have	 to	 impress	 particularly	 on	 you	 the	 necessity	 of	 not	 issuing	
passports	to	any	British	subjects	who	are	not	persons	whose	character,	
position,	 and	 antecedents	 afford	 reasonable	 guarantees	 for	 their	 good	
conduct.94	
This	approach	left	marginal	British	subjects	wanting	to	exercise	the	new	freedom	
of	 movement	 under	 the	 Tianjin	 Treaty	 in	 a	 difficult	 position.	 	 Consul	 Robert	
Swinhoe	 in	1866	required	Chinese	British	subjects	who	sought	passports	 to	give	
security	for	their	good	behaviour,	which	had	the	effect	of	deterring	such	applicants	
from	 going	 through	 with	 their	 applications.95		 In	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 consuls	
were	issued	with	a	series	of	rules	and	restrictions	regarding	the	issue	of	passports	




with	 the	 requirement	 to	 register	 at	 the	 consulate.	 	 This	 was	 not	 at	 first	 rigidly	
enforced,	 since	 Davis	 gave	 instructions	 that,	 ‘respectable	 parties’	 need	 not	 be	
troubled	 excessively	 by	 demands	 to	 register	 themselves.97		 The	 requirement	 to	
register	 was	 retained	 in	 the	 first	 principal	 OIC	 of	 1853,	 and	 was	 included	 in	
subsequent	principal	orders.	 	Under	 the	1865	OIC,	an	annual	 fee	 for	registration,	
the	level	of	which	varied	according	to	whether	the	registrant	was		a	‘gentleman’	or	
an	 ‘artisan’,	was	 introduced	and	 the	requirement	was	more	generally	enforced.98		
For	 the	 consul,	 having	 an	 accurate	 list	 of	 the	 British	 subjects	 in	 his	 district	was	
useful	for	a	number	of	reasons,	including	monitoring	and	controlling	the	growth	of	





94	TNA	 FO	 228/405:	 Swinhoe	 to	 Hornby,	 15	 June	 1866;	 ‘Consular	 Notification’,	 NCH,	 5	 January	
1861,	p.	2.	
95	TNA	FO	228/405:	Swinhoe	to	Hornby,	15	June	1866.	
96	A.	 G.	Major,	A	Compendium	of	 Instructions	to	H.M.	Consular	Officers	 in	China,	 (London,	 1927),	 p.	
109.	







was	 considerable	 opposition	 vented	 in	 the	 press,	 against	what	was	 regarded	 by	
some	 as	 an	 unjust	 ‘poll	 tax.’99		 Registration	 ‘campaigns,’	 when	 those	 failing	 to	
register	 were	 summoned	 before	 the	 courts,	 were	 undertaken	 periodically	 at	
Shanghai	throughout	the	nineteenth	century	and	into	the	twentieth.		Consuls	were	
also	 informed	 in	 1916	 that	 it	 was	 ‘of	 the	 greatest	 importance	 that	 all	 British	
Indians	should	be	registered’	and	were	told	to	bring	proceedings	against	any	who	
did	not	register.100		As	well	as	ensuring	that	those	who	should	register	did	register,	
the	 consuls	 also	 had	 to	 ensure	 that	 those	 who	 sought	 to	 register	 were	 in	 fact	
entitled	to	do	so,	a	particularly	difficult	question	in	the	case	of	many	Eurasians	and	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 (the	 latter	 mostly	 from	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 Straits	





by	 which	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 consulate	 underpinned	 the	 British	 commercial	











102	This	 is	 Robert	 Bickers’	 useful	 shorthand.	 	 Bickers,	 Britain	 in	 China,	 p.	 9.	 	 There	 were	 legal	
differences	 between	 leases	 in	 concessions	 and	 settlements	 but	 the	 role	 of	 the	 consulate	 in	 land	
transactions	was,	at	least	from	the	point	of	view	of	augmenting	trust	in	the	system,	substantially	the	
same.	 	 For	 a	 clear	 explanation	 of	 the	 detailed	 differences	 between	 concessions,	 settlements	 and	
other	 places	 of	 foreign	 residence,	 see	 Robert	 Bickers,	 ‘British	 Concessions	 and	 Chinese	 Cities,	




title	 to	 property	 which	 gave	 British	 and	 other	 foreign	 businesses	 the	 sense	 of	
stability	and	certainty	they	needed	to	risk	investing	substantial	capital	in	building	
extensive	and	 long-lasting	enterprises,	most	notably	 those	which	were	housed	 in	
the	giant	temples	to	commerce	which	lined	places	like	Shanghai’s	Bund,	buildings	
which	were	held	up	as	symbols	of	foreign,	and	especially	British,	achievements	in	
China.	 	Foreign-held	property	 in	China	was	easily	mortgageable	and	 transferable	
and	indeed	it	became	highly	valuable	–	many	fortunes	 in	Shanghai	were	founded	
on	property	more	 than	 trade.104		All	 this	would	most	 likely	not	have	occurred	 to	




The	 importance	 of	 this	 role	 was	 magnified	 during	 the	 numerous	 periods	 of	






to	 overlook	 the	 role	 of	 state	 administrative	 institutions,	 the	 infrastructure	 they	
created,	and	the	practices	of	officials	within	them	in	creating	the	basis	for	British	
commercial	 expansion	 of	 the	 nature,	 and	 on	 the	 scale,	which	 occurred	 in	 China,	
and	especially	at	Shanghai,	where	 in	1911,	 the	British	Consulate	was	responsible	
for	 more	 than	 three	 quarters	 of	 the	 total	 number	 of	 registrable	 land	
																																																								
103	See	 chapter	 four	 for	 Eurasians.	 	 In	 regard	 to	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 an	 important	 case	was	
successfully	brought	in	the	Supreme	Court	for	China	against	the	Guangzhou	consul	general	by	the	
Bank	 of	 East	 Asia,	 a	 Hong	 Kong	 Chinese	 bank	 controlled	 by	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 seeking	 to	
reverse	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 consul	 who	 had,	 with	 the	 backing	 of	 the	 FO,	 refused	 to	 register	 the	
bank’s	title	to	property	 in	the	British	concession	in	Guangzhou.	 	See	 ‘The	Shameen	Land	Transfer	
Dispute’,	NCH,	13	December	1924,	p.	459.	












and	needed	 to	 try	 to	understand	how	 to	apply	English	 law,	 the	 superintendent’s	
regulations,	 and	 also	 circulars	 and	 directives	 from	 the	 FO	 and	minister	 to	 their	
varied	workload.		There	was	ample	room	for	consuls’	own	prejudices	to	influence	
British	official	practices	in	the	treaty	ports,	and	this	will	be	evident	in	the	chapters	
of	 this	 thesis	which	 deal	with	 the	 particular	 groups	 of	marginal	 British	 subjects	
which	grew	up	at	the	treaty	ports	and	whose	trajectories	intersected	with	British	
officialdom	 in	various	ways.	 	The	other	British	official	 institution	which	engaged	







was	modelled	 on	 a	 formula	 already	 in	 existence	 in	 the	Ottoman	 Empire,	 said	 to	
have	been	prompted	in	that	region	by	a	desire	to	control	 lawless	British	subjects	
or	 protected	 persons	 from	 Malta	 and	 the	 Ionian	 Islands. 108 		 The	 FO	 and	
superintendent	 had	 drawn	 on	 policy	 and	 practice	 in	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	 in	 the	
past	 in	 framing	 ordinances	 for	 China	 and	 now	 the	 FO	 again	 drew	 deeply	 on	
																																																								
106	Minutes	of	the	SMC,	vol.	18,	27	December	1911,	p.	178.	
107	Here	 I	will	 for	 obvious	 reasons	 focus	 on	 the	 court’s	 role	 in	China.	 	 For	 Japan, see Christopher	
Roberts,	The	British	Courts	and	Extra-Territoriality	in	Japan,	1859-1899	 (Leiden,	2013).	 	The	court	
was	 from	 1865	 to	 1899	 officially	 entitled	 Her	 Britannic	 Majesty’s	 Supreme	 Court	 for	 China	 and	
Japan.	 	 After	 the	 abolition	 of	 extraterritoriality	 in	 Japan,	 the	 court	 was	 styled	 Her	 Britannic	









Supreme	 Consular	 Court	 at	 Istanbul,	 the	 principal	 British	 court	 in	 the	 Ottoman	
Empire,	 from	1857	to	1864,	was	appointed	as	 the	 first	 judge	of	 the	new	court	at	
Shanghai.109		 While	 in	 London,	 Hornby	 also	 assisted	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 new	
China	OIC.110		The	choice	of	Hornby	was	made	by	the	FO	precisely	because	of	his	
experience	 in	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 and	 he	 was	 offered	 an	 exceptional	 salary	
(£3500	per	 year),	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 chief	 justice	of	Hong	Kong,	 in	 order	 to	
secure	 his	 services.	 	 In	 the	 correspondence	 between	 Hammond	 of	 the	 FO	 and	
Bruce	 (minister	 for	China)	over	 the	establishment	of	 the	 court	 it	was,	 somewhat	
surprisingly,	Hammond	 in	London	who	pushed	 for	more	 generous	 terms	 for	 the	
judge,	 arguing	 that	 Bruce	 had	 underestimated	 the	 remuneration	 Hornby	 would	




It	 is	 worth	 considering	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 FO	 approached	 the	 creation	 and	
management	 of	 this	 new	 institution	 in	 China	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 existing	
circulation	 of	 ideas	 and	 practices	 to	 and	 from	 China	 across	 British	 imperial	
networks.		In	addition	to	their	naturally	strong	ties	to	Great	Britain,	the	British	in	
the	 Chinese	 treaty	 ports	were	 closely	 linked	 to	 British	 India	 through	 commerce,	
especially	the	opium	trade,	and	also	through	the	circulation	of	personnel,	business	
practices	 and	 certain	 cultural	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 language,	 architecture	 and	
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based	 on	 official	 channels	 clearly	 could,	 through	 policy,	 be	 directed	 or	 changed	
when	it	was	thought	expedient	to	do	so.		In	the	case	of	British	justice	in	China,	the	
FO	very	deliberately	chose	to	drastically	reduce	the	strength	of	links	to	Hong	Kong	
and	 to	 transfer	practices	and	personnel	 from	another	area,	 the	Ottoman	Empire,	
where	Britain	had	operated	a	consular	court	system	with	 its	own	supreme	court	
for	a	number	of	years.	 	Pär	Cassel	has	argued	that	both	the	SCC	and	the	Shanghai	
Mixed	 Court	 were	 ‘products	 of	 a	 peculiar	 institutional	 environment	 that	 owed	
much	 to	 Chinese	 concepts	 of	 law	 and	 legal	 institutions.’113		While	 there	may	 be	
some	truth	in	this	statement	in	the	case	of	the	Mixed	Court,	in	which	Chinese	and	
foreign	 officials	 together	 presided	 over	 cases	 involving	 Chinese	 defendants	 in	
Shanghai,	in	relation	to	the	SCC		it	is	difficult	to	reconcile	this	claim	with	the	lack	of	









After	 Hornby,	 subsequent	 judges	 would	 also	 be	 transferred	 from	 the	 Ottoman	
Empire,	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 where	 the	 FO	 oversaw	 extraterritorial	
courts,	such	as	Siam,	or	indeed	from	British	colonies,	such	as	Sierra	Leone,	but	not	
from	Hong	 Kong.114		 Some	 judges	were	 previously	 lawyers	who	 had	made	 their	
careers	 at	 the	 Shanghai	 bar,	 showing	 that	 there	 was	 no	 consistent	 policy	 of	
bringing	personnel	 in	 from	outside	China,	while	others	had	worked	their	way	up	
through	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	 consular	 service;	 but	 neither	 the	 Shanghai	 bar	 nor	 the	
consular	service	were	workplaces	where	Chinese	concepts	would	realistically	have	
projected	much	 influence	 on	 the	 professional	 lives	 of	 those	who	 became	 judges,	
																																																								
113	Cassel,	Grounds	of	Judgment,	p.	63.	
114	For	 example:	 Judge	 George	 French	 from	 Sierra	 Leone	 (see	NCH,	 20	 Dec	 1877,	 p.	 574),	 Judge	




and	 in	 any	 case	 it	was	more	 common	 for	 judges	 to	 be	 transferred	 from	 outside	
China.115		There	is	evidence	of	the	influence	of	attitudes	and	practices	from	British	
India,	 which	 are	 discussed	 further	 in	 chapter	 five,	 but	 this	 was	 not	 transmitted	
through	 formal	 institutional	 connections.	 	 Britain’s	 China	 and	 India	worlds	were	
not	closely	linked	in	any	formal	sense	through	law,	unlike	in	other	areas,	such	as	
the	military	 and	 policing,	 where	 connections	 were	 stronger.116		Whereas	 British	
India	 had	 its	 own	 distinct	 legal	 system,	 comprising	 various	 unique	 measures	
including	the	Indian	Penal	Code	and	also	various	mechanisms	providing	 for	 legal	
pluralism,	 British	 law	 in	 China	 was,	 at	 least	 on	 paper,	 far	 more	 closely	 tied	 to	
English	 law,	 with	 comparatively	 little	 formal	 modification.117 		 There	 was	 no	
movement	of	judicial	personnel	from	India;	in	addition	to	the	lack	of	institutional	




head,	 would	 endure	 basically	 unaltered	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 treaty	 century.	 	 It	






cases	 could	 now,	 in	 most	 cases,	 be	 tried	 closer	 to	 the	 places	 where	 they	 were	
committed	or	where	 the	parties	 to	 the	proceedings	were	based.	 	 	The	new	court	
exercised	all	 first	 instance	 jurisdiction	 for	 the	port	of	Shanghai	and	 judges	of	 the	



















the	Privy	Council	 in	London.	 	Cases	arising	 in	China	would	only	be	 tried	at	Hong	
Kong	 if	 the	 judge	 of	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai	 decided	 that	 the	 case	 should	 be	
transferred	 to	 the	 colony	 for	 trial;	 otherwise	 it	was	 specifically	 decreed	 that	 ‘all	




in	the	OIC	of	1865.	 	There	was	to	be	an	assistant	 judge	and	a	 law	secretary,	who	
would	both	be	able	to	preside	alone	over	cases.	 	The	law	secretary	was	the	court	
registrar,	 sat	 as	 a	 summary	 judge	 in	 cases	 of	minor	 criminal	 charges,	 and	 could	
also	hear	civil	cases.		The	first	holders	of	these	roles	were	selected	by	Hornby	and	
brought	 to	 Shanghai.	 	 The	 first	 assistant	 judge	was	Charles	Goodwin,	 a	 barrister	
and	a	noted	scholar,	who	had	contributed	to	the	influential	publication	Essays	and	
Reviews,	 but	 had	 no	 prior	 foreign	 official	 experience.122		 The	 law	 secretary,	 John	




as	 jurors	 for	 the	 first	 time	since	 the	opening	of	 the	 treaty	ports.124		The	SCC	was	
required	to	sit	with	 jurors	 in	 important	cases,	whether	proceedings	were	held	at	
Shanghai	or	at	another	port,	but	the	old	rule	whereby	consuls	sat	with	assessors	in	
																																																								
120	Until	1925,	when	 the	Shanghai	Full	Court	was	established	 to	hear	such	appeals,	 for	which	 the	
chief	justice	of	Hong	Kong	was	brought	to	sit	on	a	panel	with	the	Shanghai	judges.	
121	OIC	of	1865,	section	160,	BaFSP,	vol.	55,	p172.	







their	 courts	hearing	 lesser	 cases	was	not	altered.	 	Under	 the	1865	OIC,	only	 five	
jurors	 were	 required	 (it	 was	 usual	 in	 England	 for	 a	 jury	 to	 comprise	 twelve	
members;	 the	 Turkey	 OIC	 of	 1857	 specified	 six).125		 	 Under	 the	 1904	 OIC,	 the	
number	 of	 jurors	was	 increased	 to	 twelve	 in	 cases	where	 the	 case	 concerned	 a	
capital	 offence.126		 To	 qualify	 to	 serve	 on	 a	 jury	 in	 1865	 a	British	 subject	 had	 to	
earn	a	gross	annual	 income	of	$250	or	 	more,	be	able	 to	speak	and	read	English,	




in	 1869	British	 consular	 constables,	who	were	 considered	by	 consuls	 to	be	 very	
poorly	 paid,	 typically	 earned	 about	 $50-70	 per	 month,	 and	 the	 lowest	 class	 of	





responsible	 for	 China,	 and	 so	 made	 possible	 a	 tightening	 of	 British	 governance	
which	 could,	 in	 theory	 at	 least,	 bring	 consular	 jurisdiction	 more	 into	 line	 with	




legal	 advisor	 to	 British	 government	 representatives	 in	 China,	 as	 the	 law	 officers	
did	for	the	British	government	in	London;	he	was	also	to	‘be	guided	by’	the	opinion	




and	 Reform’,	 The	 Journal	 of	 Legal	 History,	 8,	 2	 (1987),	 148–66,	 p.	 157;	 Great	 Britain.	 ‘Order	 in	







suggest	 that	 an	 element	 of	 the	 civilising	 mission	 existed	 alongside	 the	 new	
emphasis	on	cooperation:	as	already	mentioned,	he	was	ordered	to	assist	consuls	
in	 bringing	 the	 Shanghai	 Mixed	 Court’s	 practices	 closer	 to	 those	 practiced	 in	
British	 courts.129		 Hornby	 was	 granted	 the	 privilege	 of	 communicating	 directly	
with	the	Secretary	of	State	whenever	he	felt	necessary,	and	was	told	that	if	at	any	
time	he	 should	believe	 that	 a	new	OIC	were	 required,	 he	 should	prepare	 a	draft	
and	send	 it	 to	 the	FO.130		The	 judge	was	 in	 this	way	placed	 in	a	position	of	some	
autonomy	in	relation	to	the	Legation,	with	a	clear	means	open	to	him,	not	only	to	




of	 the	 Legation	 and	 the	 FO.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 no	major	 reform	 altering	 its	 role	was	
made	 in	 the	 years	 following	 its	 opening,	 right	 up	 to	 the	 abolition	 of	
extraterritoriality	in	1943,	points	to	this	conclusion,	as	well	as	suggesting	that	the	
FO	 recognised	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 court	 over	 the	 longer	 term.	 	 The	 new	
institution	did	put	an	end	to	some	of	the	problems	associated	with	the	Hong	Kong	
court,	 in	 particular	 its	 tendency	 to	 overturn	 consular	 decisions	 on	 legal	
technicalities.		This	mitigated	a	source	of	tension	with	the	Chinese	authorities	and	
the	court	was	also	more	effective	 in	dealing	with	criminal	cases	 involving	British	
problem	 populations,	 especially	 ‘rowdies’	 against	 whom	 Hornby	 launched	 a	
crackdown	 early	 on	 in	 his	 tenure.	 	 However,	 the	 introduction	 of	 another,	
independently-minded,	 power	 holder	 into	 the	British	 system	of	 governance,	 and	
based	at	Shanghai	rather	than	Beijing,	meant	that	there	continued	to	be	scope	for	
disputes	to	emerge	between	the	executive	and	judicial	branches	in	China.		Hornby	











disorder,	 could	 be	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 emphasis	 on	 correctness,	 following	
international	 law	 and	 respecting	 the	 treaties	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 Chinese	
government,	 which	 was	 called	 for	 by	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	 cooperative	 policy	
espoused	by	British	ministers	 in	 the	 1860s.	 	 In	 a	 despatch	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 the	
extension	of	the	Hong	Kong	authorities’	jurisdiction	over	the	waters	and	islands	in	
the	vicinity	of	the	colony,	Hornby	told	Alcock:	
Your	 Excellency	 is	 already	 in	 full	 possession	 of	 my	 views	 of	 the	
inexpediency	 of	 treating	 with	 the	 Chinese	 government,	 as	 if	 that	
government	was	conducted	upon	the	same	principles	as	those	of	civilized	




a	 Chinese	 official	 and	 the	 British	 judge	 in	 civil	 cases	 where	 one	 party	 was	
Chinese.133		 The	 aims	 of	 improved	 relations	 with	 the	 Chinese	 were	 thus	 not	
comprehensively	assisted	by	the	creation	of	the	SCC	at	Shanghai.	
	
The	 establishment	 of	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 the	 embedding	 of	 its	 staff	 in	 the	
Shanghai	 British	 world	 had	 other	 consequences,	 of	 a	 perhaps	 less	 immediately	
obvious	kind,	 for	 the	nature	of	 the	British	state’s	project	of	governance	 in	China.		
Hornby	and	subsequent	judges	were	supportive	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	
(SMC),	 and	 closely	 involved	 with	 it	 in	 various	 ways.	 	 Hornby	 was	 elected	
Commandant	 of	 the	 Council’s	 Shanghai	 Volunteer	 Corps,	 described	 by	 Robert	
Bickers	 as	 ‘a	 key	 element	 in	 the	 theatrical	 colonial	 posturing	 of	 the	







134		 ‘Volunteer	 Meeting’,	 NCH,	 	 29	 July	 1865,	 p.	 118.	 	 Robert	 Bickers,	 ‘Shanghailanders:	 The	
Formation	And	Identity	Of	The	British	Settler	Community	In	Shanghai	1843–1937’,	Past	&	Present,	
159,	1	(1998),	161–211,	p.	197.		Other	aspects	of	the	history	of	the	SVC	also	support	the	argument	





moment	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 International	 Settlement,	when	 the	
new	Land	Regulations	(which	provided	the	legal	basis	for	the	SMC’s	existence	and	
functions)	were	 being	 considered	 in	 1866.	 	 Hornby	 assisted	 in	 drafting	 the	 new	
Regulations,	 and	 urged	 the	 FO	 to	 approve	 them,	warning	 that	 since	 the	 Chinese	
government	 was	 ‘unable,	 as	 well	 as	 under	 the	 circumstances	 utterly	 unfit’	 to	
oversee	 law	 and	 order	 in	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 the	 British	 government	
would	be	required,	at	great	expense,	to	undertake	a	large-scale	policing	role	if	the	
SMC	was	not	given	adequate	support.135		This	highlights	the	fact	that	the	SMC	was	
already	 in	 the	 1860s	 providing	 services	which	 complemented	 the	 British	 state’s	
own	project	 of	 governance	 to	 a	 considerable	 degree.	 	 It	was	 clear	 that	Hornby’s	
sympathies	and	outlook	on	the	issue	of	the	SMC	lay	more	with	the	Shanghai	British	
commercial	community	who	controlled	the	council	than	with	the	consuls	and	the	
Legation.	 	 Hornby	 went	 as	 far	 as	 to	 write	 privately	 in	 April	 1866	 to	 Reilly	 and	
Hammond	 at	 the	 FO	 in	 London,	 introducing	 James	 Hogg,	 recently-retired	 Vice-
Chairman	 of	 the	 SMC,	 in	 a	 clear	 attempt	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 SMC	 viewpoint	 was	
heard	by	the	FO	when	considering	the	new	regulations.		Hornby	told	Reilly	he	had	
given	 Hogg	 a	 note	 to	 Hammond,	 ‘as	 I	 am	 most	 desirous	 that	 both	 he	 and	 you	
should	get	a	non-official	view	of	the	questions	here’.136		Hornby’s	note	was	written	
at	a	 time	of	great	 tension	between	 the	Shanghai	 consul,	Charles	Winchester,	 and	
the	SMC.		In	April	1866,	only	a	few	weeks	before	Hornby’s	supportive	letter	about	
Hogg,	 Winchester	 was	 so	 outraged	 by	 the	 SMC	 seeking	 to	 prevent	 the	 Chinese	
























abilities,	 so	 evident	 in	 his	 autobiography,	 no	 doubt	 contributed	 to	 this.	 	 In	 the	
longer	 term	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 court	 and	 judge’s	 place	 in	 the	 British	 state	
hierarchy	 in	China	was	a	 little	more	 firmly	 situated	beneath	 that	of	 the	Legation	
and	 minister,	 but	 relations	 between	 the	 judges	 and	 the	 Shanghai	 commercial	
community	and	the	SMC	were	often	still	very	close.		Judges	Rennie	and	Hannen	had	
practised	at	the	Shanghai	bar	before	obtaining	judicial	appointments,	so	were	fully	
embedded	 in	 the	 Shanghai	 commercial	 world	 before	 becoming	 British	 officials.		






the	 judge	and	 the	court’s	 role.	 	Contrary	 to	 the	 intentions	of	British	policy	 in	 the	
1860s	 under	 Ministers	 Bruce	 and	 Alcock,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 establishment	 and	
development	 of	 the	 court	 as	 a	 state	 institution	 at	 Shanghai	 contributed	 to	 the	
emergence	of	the	International	Settlement	as	a	colonial	space	governed	through	a	







140	The	 other	 noteworthy	 example	 is	 Japan.	 	 See	 Barbara Brooks,	 Japan’s	 Imperial	 Diplomacy:	
Consuls,	Treaty	Ports,	and	War	in	China,	1895-1938	(Honolulu,	2000).	
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and	 local	 British	 commercial	 interests,	 the	 US	 interests	 in	 China	 which	 were	
targeted	by	the	court	were	sometimes	influential	ones,	and	they	counter-attacked,	
and	made	 considerable	 trouble	 for	 Judge	Wilfley,	 resulting	 in	 his	 resignation	 in	
1909.141		Because	of	the	later	development	of	the	structures	of	other	major	foreign	
powers,	and	because	the	dominant	culture	of	the	SMC	was	British	(following	from	
the	nationality	of	most	of	 its	 senior-	 and	middle-ranking	 staff),	 and	also	because	
British	interests	in	Shanghai	were	much	greater	–	whether	measured	financially	or	
in	terms	of	population	size	–	no	other	foreign	power’s	court	or	officials	were	bound	
up	 so	 closely	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 SMC	 and	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 Shanghai	
International	Settlement	as	the	SCC	and	British	officials	were.	
Conclusion	
Complex,	 costly	 and	 long	 lasting	 British	 state	 institutions	 were	 built	 in	 China,	
within	a	context	often	characterised	as	‘informal	empire’,	which	were	comparable	
in	many	ways	 to	 those	 created	 in	 parts	 of	 the	world	 governed	directly	 from	 the	









142	There	 is	 in	 fact	 plentiful	 evidence	 of	 the	minimal	 colonial	 state	 which	 existed	 under	 ‘formal’	





proliferation	 of	 geopolitical	 ambiguities’	 and	 this	 can	 certainly	 be	 seen	 to	 have	
been	the	case	in	the	Chinese	treaty	ports.143		British	state	agents	gradually	created	
a	 large	 and	 complex	 structure	 of	 laws	 and	 institutions	 aimed	 at	 regulating,	
surveilling	and	punishing	British	 subjects	 in	China	and	which	also	 served	 the	no	
less	important	role	of	supporting	British	commercial	undertakings	as	well	as	other	
institutions	of	empire	in	China,	such	as	the	British	municipal	councils	and	the	SMC.		




British	 state,	 and	 the	 important	 implications	 of	 that	 role,	 even	 at	 the	margins	 of	
empire.	 	 The	 case	 of	 treaty	 port	 China,	 and	 perhaps	 also	 that	 of	 other	 countries	











on	 imperial	networks	and	 the	circulation	of	 ideas	and	practices.	 	 In	doing	so,	we	










communications,	 but	 in	 uneven	 and	 sometimes	 unexpected	 ways.	 	 Giving	 the	








requirements.	 For	 example,	 the	 respective	 administrative	 requirements	 of	 Hong	
Kong	and	the	 treaty	ports	were	not	always	attuned	 from	quite	early	on,	and	 this	




A	 more	 specific	 finding	 of	 this	 chapter	 relates	 to	 the	 SMC	 and	 the	 Shanghai	
International	Settlement.	 	The	existence	of	many	of	 the	connections	between	 the	
British	 state	 and	 the	 SMC	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 underappreciated,	
which	can	lead	to	the	impression	that	the	British	state	had	only	limited	interest	or	
involvement	 in	 the	 running	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 tolerating	 it	 but	
neglecting	 it,	 at	 least	 until	 the	 moment	 of	 retrenchment	 and	 modernisation	 of	
Britain’s	China	policy	beginning	in	the	later	1920s,	when	steps	were	taken	to	reign	
in	the	activities	of	British	settlers.144		The	British	state	provided	the	legality	relied	
upon	 by	 the	 SMC	 and	 the	 International	 Settlement	 in	 many	 areas:	 in	 land	
registration,	through	the	creation	and	operation	of	the	Mixed	Court,	through	port	
regulations	and	by	providing	the	means	to	control	the	SMC’s	police	force.		This	was	
a	 deep	 engagement,	 through	 institutional	 connections	 which	 developed	 in	 their	
extent	 and	 importance	 at	 least	 into	 the	 first	 decade	 or	 two	 of	 the	 twentieth	
centuries,	 and	 which	 could	 be	 described	 as	 constituting	 a	 hybrid	 colonial	 state,	
since	 these	 connections	 went	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 foreign	 power	 at	




founding	of	 the	 key	British	 institution	 located	 at	 the	 latter	 place,	 the	 SCC,	which	










into	 China	 from	1842	 onwards.	 	 	My	 principal	 argument	was	 that	 the	 state	was	
present	in	China,	by	virtue	of	various	institutions,	personnel	and	practices,	in	a	far	
more	 complex	 and	 extensive	 form	 than	 is	 suggested	 by	 a	 focus	 on	 China	 as	 an	





crime	 and	 criminals,	 particularly	 those	 responsible	 for	 violent	 crime	 inflicted	 on	
the	 Chinese,	will	 be	 shown	 to	 not	 only	 have	 shaped	 the	 initial	 state	 institutions	
which	were	created	following	the	opening	of	the	treaty	ports	in	1842,	but	also	to	
have	prompted	the	expansion	and	development	of	state	structures	in	various	ways	








of	 the	 British	 state’s	 expansion	 into	 China,	 but	 remains	 understudied.	 	 Although	








consular	 jurisdiction,	 and	 which	 assesses	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 structures	 which	
were	 put	 into	 place	 for	 that	 purpose.2		 As	 already	 indicated	 in	 chapter	 one,	 the	
state	did	not	 just	 force	China	open	 through	violence	and	 then	withdraw	 to	 leave	
expansion	in	China	as	a	private	enterprise	venture.		Both	Eileen	Scully	and	Robert	
Bickers	have	shown	how	tensions	between	metropolitan	governments	and	settlers	
in	 China	 emerged	 and	 prompted	 state	 actions,	 focussing	 largely	 on	 the	 early	
twentieth	 century.3		 This	 chapter	 will	 develop	 similar	 themes,	 but	 focus	 on	 an	
earlier	 time	 period,	 and	 in	 addition	will	 point	 out	 that	 tensions	 and	 conflicts	 of	
interest	 emerged	 also	 between	 different	 agents	 of	 the	 British	 state	 involved	 in	




of	 this	 chapter	 is	 not	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 British	 state’s	 presence	 in	 China	 was	
therefore	 somehow	 less	 ‘imperial’.	 	 In	 expanding	 its	 institutions	 in	 China,	 albeit	
often	with	 the	 principal	 aim	of	 controlling	British	 violence	 and	 other	 crime,	 and	
mitigating	the	effect	this	had	on	relations	with	China,	the	institutions	and	practices	
of	 the	 British	 state	 will	 nevertheless	 be	 seen	 to	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	
development	of	 colonialism	 in	 the	particular	 form	which	 it	 took,	 and	 in	which	 it	
was	 experienced,	 in	 China	 in	 the	 treaty	 port	 era.4		 This	 chapter	 is	 therefore	
positioned	 in	 close	 relationship	 to	work	which	 views	 the	 British	 involvement	 in	
China	as	a	part	of	the	wider	phenomenon	of	British	colonial	expansion	elsewhere	
in	 the	nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries,	 by	 addressing	 colonial	 relations	
and	 the	 way	 they	 shaped	 the	 places	 where	 they	 were	 enacted.5		 Many	 scholars	

























earned	them	the	status	of	problem	population,	and	 labels	such	as	 ‘rowdy’,	 ‘scum’,	
‘blackguard’	or	‘bad	character’,	were	non-élite	‘white’	Britons	from	the	British	Isles,	
often	with	a	seafaring	or	military	background.7		There	were	of	course	also	cases	of	
violence	 and	 other	 crime	 perpetrated	 by	 Britons	who	were	more	 prosperous	 or	
socially	 less	marginal	 in	relation	 to	official	élites.	 	 Individual	cases	 involving	such	













6	For	 China,	 see	 Bickers,	 Empire	 Made	 Me;	 more	 generally,	 see	 Cooper	 and	 Stoler,	 Tensions	 of	








all,	 they	 did	 so	 because	 they	 held	 mental	 conceptions	 of	 a	 category	 of	 shared	
ethnicity	 which	 corresponds	 fairly	 closely	 to	 the	 present-day	 category	 usually	
designated	by	the	word	‘white’.	 	Ideas	of	race	were	clearly	relevant	in	court	cases	




chronologically.	 	 It	begins	with	an	examination	of	 the	basic	 framework	deployed	
from	 early	 on	 to	 maintain	 order	 over	 the	 population	 of	 lower	 class	 Britons	 in	
China,	especially	 seamen,	who	were	 the	group	most	often	subjected	 to	measures	
designed	 to	deal	with	violence	or	other	crime.	 	 I	 then	go	on	 to	show	how,	 in	 the	
midst	 of	 disorder	 and	 upheaval	 in	 China	 caused	 by	 war	 and	 rebellions,	 major	
changes	were	made	in	the	1850s	and	1860s	to	the	means	of	dealing	with	criminal		
behaviour	 of	 British	 subjects.	 	 This	 took	 place	 under	 Minister	 and	 Chief	
Superintendent	 of	 Trade	 Frederick	 Bruce,	 and	 culminated	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
new	 institution	of	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai	 in	 1865.	 	Here	 I	will	 show	how	 concerns	
about	 controlling	 groups	 of	 ‘rowdy’	 British	 subjects,	 who	 at	 this	 point	 became	
identified	 more	 clearly	 as	 a	 distinct	 problem	 population	 situated	 in	 local	
conditions,	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 this	 crucial	 moment	 for	 the	 expansion	 and	
reorganisation	of	British	state	structures	in	China.		I	then	examine	the	work	of	the	
SCC	in	connection	with	controlling	the	problem	population	of	violent	criminals	and	
destitutes,	 and	 consider	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	
(SMC),	since	collaboration	with	that	body	over	crime	and	policing	developed	into	a	
key	 relationship	 for	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China,	 in	 particular	 from	 the	 1860s	
onwards	through	the	attitude	and	practices	of	its	first	judge,	Sir	Edmund	Hornby.		
This	 shows	 that	ultimately	 the	 aims	of	 improving	British	 relations	with	China	 in	
accordance	with	the	policy	of	the	FO	and	ministers	in	the	1860s	were	not	fully	met	





crime	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 means	 of	 transactions	 involving	 unequal	 power	
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for	 the	 newly	 opened	 treaty	 ports,	 were	 clearly	 concerned	 by	 the	 crime	 and	
disorder	 which	 had	 caused	 friction	 under	 the	 previous	 regime	 when	 trade	 was	
conducted	at	Guangzhou	prior	to	1842.8		They	anticipated	that	increased	numbers	
of	British	subjects,	especially	seafarers,	would	need	a	more	substantial	apparatus	
of	 control	 than	 had	 previously	 existed,	 as	 a	 Foreign	 Office	 memorandum	 on	
proposed	legislation	in	1843	makes	vividly	apparent:	
It	can	hardly	be	doubted	that	the	utmost	care	will	be	required	at	all	places	
in	 China	 opened	 to	 British	 Trade,	 to	 maintain	 the	 intercourse	 on	 a	
friendly	 footing.	 	 It	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 consult,	 and	 as	 far	 as	 possible	
defer	to,	the	wishes	and	prejudices	of	the	Chinese	authorities	and	People,	






chapter,	 but	 here	 I	 provide	 details	 of	 specific	 provisions	 aimed	 at	 suppressing	
crime	and	disorder	perpetrated	by	British	subjects	in	China.	
	
In	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 seamen	 on	 British	 ships	 throughout	 the	 world	 were	
subject	 to	a	strict	regime	of	discipline	and	control	at	 the	hands	of	 the	masters	of	
vessels	which	was	sanctioned	by	British	law.10		State	intervention	in	regulating	and	
disciplining	 seamen	 and	 in	 particular	 preventing	 desertion	 has	 generally	 been	








state	 expenditure	 on	 repatriation	 if	 seamen	 were	 left	 behind	 at	 ports.11		 When	
British	 ships	 came	 into	 port,	 British	 consuls	 in	 places	 where	 there	 were	 no	
extraterritorial	rights	played	a	key	part	in	upholding	this	system.12		In	China,	as	in	
the	Ottoman	Empire	and	other	places	where	there	was	extraterritoriality,	consuls’	




After	 the	ratification	of	 the	1842	Treaty	of	Nanjing,	a	set	of	controls	 to	deal	with	
British	seafarers	in	the	particular	context	of	the	China	coast	was	laid	down	through	
a	 number	 of	 different	 provisions.	 	 The	 importance	 of	 such	 measures	 to	 Anglo-
Chinese	relations	is	indicated	by	the	fact	that	specific	details	were	included	in	the	
treaties	made	between	 the	British	 and	Chinese	 governments.	 	 In	Article	6	of	 the	
Supplementary	Treaty	of	Humenzhai	of	1843	(also	called	the	Treaty	of	the	Bogue),	
which	 set	 out	 the	 key	 framework	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 trade	 at	 the	 ports,	 it	was	
stated	 that	 ‘seamen	 and	persons	 belonging	 to	 the	 ships	 shall	 only	 be	 allowed	 to	
land	 under	 authority	 and	 rules	 which	 will	 be	 fixed	 by	 the	 Consul,	 in	
communication	 with	 the	 local	 officers.’13 		 Consuls	 issued	 their	 own	 rules	 to	
implement	 this	 provision,	 and	 Robert	 Thom	 demonstrated	 the	 ambitious	 aims	





than	 what	 are	 absolutely	 necessary	 for	 the	 carrying	 on	 of	 the	 lawful	
business	of	the	ship,	without	being	first	duly	reported	at	this	Consulate	
and	 getting	 a	 special	 licence:	 and	 such	 special	 licences	 can	 only	 be	
granted	when	the	men	are	under	the	care	of	an	officer.14	
	
By	 Article	 10	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Humenzhai	 it	 was	 agreed	 that	 a	 British	 warship	
would	be	stationed	at	each	of	the	open	ports	‘to	enforce	good	order	and	discipline	
																																																								








the	 consul	 over	 British	 subjects.’15 		 The	 ultimate	 symbol	 of	 British	 imperial	
domination	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 the	 gunboat,	 was	 therefore	 in	 fact	 also	 a	 vital	







China’	without	 the	consul’s	permission.	 	This	 required	masters	 to	give	a	bond	 to	
consuls,	 declaring	 that	 they	would	 not	 leave	 behind	 any	 crew	members	without	
permission,	and	also	that	they	would	agree	to	receive	any	distressed	seamen	(not	
just	members	of	their	own	crew)	at	the	ports	if	sent	on	board	by	the	consul	to	be	




returned	 on	 completion	 of	 formalities	 before	 departure.	 	 Under	 Article	 13,	 the	
permission	 of	 the	 consul	 was	 required	 in	 order	 to	 leave	 behind	 any	 person	
belonging	to	a	British	ship	at	the	port,	and	even	if	permission	were	given,	security	
was	 demanded	 ‘for	 his	 maintenance	 and	 good	 behaviour	 while	 remaining	 on	
shore.’	 	 If	 British	 seamen	who	had	been	 left	 behind	were	 subsequently	 found	 to	
require	 ‘public	 relief’	 the	 vessel	would	 be	 ‘held	 responsible	 for	 the	maintenance	
and	removal	of	such	British	subject.’		Article	16	dealt	with	facilities	at	the	ports	for	
sailors,	 and	 required	 any	 British	 subject	 wishing	 to	 open	 ‘a	 boarding	 or	 eating-
house’	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 consul’s	 permission,	 and	 give	 security	 ‘that	 he	 will	 not	
harbour	 any	 seaman	 who	 is	 a	 runaway,	 or	 who	 cannot	 produce	 his	 discharge	
accompanied	by	a	written	sanction	from	the	Consul	to	reside	on	shore.’18			Similar	








their	 crews	 in	 particular.19		 However,	 it	was	 not	 always	 possible	 or	 desirable	 to	
keep	 the	 ports	 completely	 free	 of	 unemployed	 seamen	 through	 such	 means	 of	
control,	particularly	at	Shanghai,	where	shipping	grew	rapidly	(see	table	1	below),	
as	 did	 a	 demand	 for	 European	 labour	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 the	 customs,	 municipal	
works	 and	 commercial	 undertakings,	 which	 hired	 lower	 class	 British	 men,	 in	
particular	in	policing,	security	and	other	lower	level	supervisory	roles	at	the	front	
line	of	 the	colonial	 interface	with	 local	people.	 	 In	1867	Shanghai	Consul	Charles	
Winchester	reported	that	 it	would	be	 inadvisable	to	prevent	all	discharges	at	the	
port	because	ships	needed	to	be	able	to	form	new	crews	there,	and	he	added	that	











ports	 were	 therefore	 both	 detailed	 and	 exacting,	 but	 the	 approach	 which	
developed	 to	 consular	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 over	 British	 subjects	more	 generally	
was	by	contrast	rather	less	well-defined.		To	accompany	the	OIC	and	ordinance	of	
1844	 which	 gave	 consuls	 jurisdiction	 over	 British	 subjects	 in	 China,	
Superintendent	 of	Trade	 John	Davis	 sent	 out	 to	 consuls	what	were	probably	 the	
earliest	general	 instructions	relating	 to	 their	role	 in	British	governance,	 in	which	
he	 explained	 that	 it	 was	 the	 duty	 of	 consuls	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 grant	 of	







territorial	 Sovereign’,	 in	 particular	 by	maintaining	 order	 and	 punishing	 crime.22		
Davis	stressed	that	a	practical	approach	to	consuls’	judicial	duties	was	called	for:	it	








whom	 complaint	 is	made,	 to	 promote	 reconciliation	 and	 to	 suffer	 compensation	
and	 amends	 to	 be	 made,	 and	 the	 proceedings	 thereby	 to	 be	 stopped.’24		 This	
provision	 continued	 in	 force	 for	 some	 time,	 and	 it	 was	 included	 in	 the	 first	
principal	OIC,	of	1853,	so	clearly	had	the	approval	of	officials	at	the	FO,	who	were	
closely	 involved	 in	 drafting	 that	 instrument.25		 This	 flexible	 system	was	 perhaps	
viewed	 as	 being	 the	 only	 way	 to	 create	 a	 system	 under	 conditions	 of	 limited	
resources	 which	 would	 enable	 consuls	 to	 balance	 the	 interests	 of	 shipping	 and	
trade	with	smoothing	relations.		As	seamen	were	most	likely	to	be	responsible	for	




also	 evidence	 that	 the	 practice	 was	 amenable	 to	 Chinese	 officials	 and	 Chinese	
victims	 and	 their	 families.26		 For	 example,	 in	 1859	 at	 Fuzhou,	 Consul	 Walter	
Medhurst	 settled	 the	 case	 of	 a	 Chinese	 girl	 who	 drowned	 following	 a	 violent	
incident	by	arranging	the	payment	of	compensation	between	the	girl’s	family	and	
																																																								
22	‘Order	 in	 Council	 relating	 to	 the	 trial	 and	 punishment	 at	 Hong-Kong,	 or	 in	 China,	 of	 Offences	
committed	by	British	subjects’,	printed	in	BaFSP	vol.	32,	p.	895-7;	Ordinance	No.	7	of	1844	‘for	the	
better	administration	of	 justice	 in	 the	Consular	Courts’,	 20	November	1844,	HCT,	 vol.	7	 (London,	
1850),	 pp.	 185-191;	 John	 Francis	 Davis,	 ‘Circular	 respecting	 consular	 jurisdiction’,	 22	November	
1844,	reprinted	in	Tuson,	The	British	Consul’s	Manual,	p.	230.	




26	Morse,	 International	 Relations,	 vol.	 1,	 p.	 101.	 	 Also	 see	 the	 case	 at	 Fuzhou	 referred	 to	 below,	
where	Medhurst	claimed	that	compensation	was	proposed	as	a	solution	by	Chinese	officials.	
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the	 British	 subject	 accused	 of	 causing	 her	 death,	 instead	 of	 overseeing	 criminal	
proceedings	against	 the	man.	 	Medhurst	 reported	 that	 the	settlement	of	 the	case	
through	compensation	had	been	‘hinted	at’	as	an	appropriate	response	by	the	local	
Chinese	 authorities,	 and	 justified	 his	 action	 by	 declaring	 that	 the	 settling	 of	 the	
case	had	avoided	the	likely	acts	of	‘blind	and	angry	revenge’	which	an	allegation	of	
the	 murder	 of	 a	 Chinese	 by	 a	 foreigner	 would	 provoke.27		 In	 some	 ways,	 these	
practices	 represented	 a	 continuation	 of	 a	 long-standing	 approach	 to	 settling	
disputes	between	Chinese	and	foreigners	on	the	China	coast;	in	the	years	prior	to	






case	 to	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 Supreme	 Court.29		 Consuls’	 powers	 of	 punishment	 were	
limited	to	sentences	of	imprisonment	of	12	months	or	a	200	dollar	fine,	but	Davis	
informed	 consuls	 that	 it	was	 intended	 that	 only	when	British	 subjects	 had	 been	
charged	with	murder	that	they	should	be	sent	to	Hong	Kong	for	trial.		Other	than	in	
this	 respect,	 Davis’	 circular	 and	Ordinance	 did	 not	 address	 the	 role	 of	 the	Hong	
Kong	 Supreme	 Court,	 and	 he	 appears	 to	 have	 envisaged	 its	 role	 in	 consular	
jurisdiction	 as	 being	 extremely	 limited.	 	 However,	 by	 an	 earlier	 Ordinance,	 the	
Hong	 Kong	 Supreme	 Court	 had	 been	 given	 very	 extensive	 supervisory	 powers,	
should	it	choose	to	exercise	them:	consuls	were	to	report	details	of	all	decisions	to	
the	 court;	 the	 court	 could	 decide	 to	 alter	 any	 decision	 ‘as	 shall	 seem	 just	 and	
expedient’;	and	the	OIC	of	1844	also	made	clear	that	the	chief	justice	of	the	Hong	






29	Davis,	 ‘Circular	 respecting	 consular	 jurisdiction’,	 22	 November	 1844,	 reprinted	 in	 Tuson,	 The	
British	Consul’s	Manual,	p.	231.	
30	Pottinger’s	Ordinance	No.	2	of	1844	–	in	HcoT,	vol.	7	(1850),	p.	168;	‘Order	in	Council	relating	to	
the	 trial	 and	 punishment	 at	 Hong-Kong,	 or	 in	 China,	 of	 Offences	 committed	 by	 British	 subjects’,	
printed	in	BaFSP	vol.	32,	pp.	895-7.	
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Overall,	 this	 was	 not	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 early	 superintendents	 to	 establish	 an	
apparatus	 which	 would	 in	 practice	 conform	 closely	 to	 the	 system	 of	 criminal	
justice	 delivered	 in	 the	 courts	 in	 Great	 Britain.	 	 It	 was,	 however,	 a	 serious	 and	
pragmatic	attempt	to	create	a	system	which	would	allow	the	consuls,	given	their	
limited	resources,	 to	do	the	minimum	necessary	–	 in	accordance	with	the	wishes	
the	 FO	 had	 expressed	 in	 1843	 –	 to	 ‘maintain	 the	 intercourse	 on	 a	 friendly	
footing’.31		 Resources	 were	 targeted	 at	 seafarers,	 who	 were	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	
group	 most	 likely	 to	 commit	 crime,	 especially	 crimes	 of	 violence,	 and	 the	
superintendents	 appear	 to	 have	 intended	 to	 allow	 consuls	 flexibility	 to	 handle	
most	 cases	 speedily	 and	 economically,	 without	 recourse	 to	 the	 Hong	 Kong	
Supreme	 Court.	 	 However,	 despite	 these	 intentions,	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	




in	 particular	 where	 British	 subjects	 were	 accused	 of	 violent	 behaviour	 towards	
Chinese.			
	
In	 1846	 for	 example,	 Charles	 Compton	was	 convicted	 by	 the	 Guangzhou	 consul	




decision	 of	 the	 consul	 was	 overturned	 by	 Hong	 Kong	 Chief	 Justice	 Hulme,	 who	
described	 the	 sentence	 as	 ‘unjust,	 excessive	 and	 illegal’.	 	 This	 triggered	 a	 set	 of	






in	 China,	 vol.	 1,	 p.	 222;	 	 for	 Davis’	 attempt	 to	 discredit	 Hulme	 see	 Keeton,	 The	 Development	 of	




anger	 over	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court,	 and	 explained	 the	 difficulties	 it	
caused	him,	when	reporting	to	Palmerston:	
I	hold	the	highly	responsible	office	of	preserving	peace	between	the	two	
countries,	and	 therefore	 look	 to	Your	Lordship	 for	a	 fair	estimate	of	my	
motives	 in	 desiring	 to	 restrain	 the	 excesses	 of	 the	 English	 within	 the	







Davis	also	 took	steps	 to	 try	 to	prevent	a	 recurrence	of	 this	problem	by	 issuing	a	
new	ordinance.	 	In	1847	he	removed	the	right	of	British	subjects	to	appeal	to	the	
Hong	Kong	 court	 from	decisions	 in	 the	 consular	 courts.35		However,	 because	 the	
consuls	were	not	empowered	to	inflict	heavy	punishments,	the	problem	caused	by	
the	need	to	make	use	of	the	Hong	Kong	court	in	cases	of	serious	crimes	committed	




captain	was	 prosecuted	 in	Hong	Kong,	 but	was	 acquitted	 amidst	 suspicions	 that	
Chief	Justice	Hulme	had	behaved	improperly	in	his	directions	to	the	jury,	and	also	
that	 the	Chinese	witness	had	been	bribed	or	 intimidated	by	 the	British	 captain’s	
supporters	in	Hong	Kong.36			
	
Both	Davis	and	Bonham	wished	 to	 reform	 the	system	of	 consular	 jurisdiction	by	
removing	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 court	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 handling	 of	
consular	 court	 cases,	 but	 were	 only	 partially	 successful	 in	 doing	 so.	 	 The	 most	
significant	 cases	 which	 prompted	 them	 to	 push	 for	 this	 outcome	 were	 not,	
however,	 ones	 involving	 the	 most	 marginal	 of	 British	 subjects:	 Compton	 was	 a	
merchant	 well	 able	 to	 afford	 the	 $200	 fine	 initially	 imposed	 by	 the	 Guangzhou	











taken	 seriously	 enough	 in	 London	 to	 prompt	major	 reform	 of	 the	 procedure	 in	




Frederick	 Bruce	 became	 superintendent	 of	 trade	 in	 1859,	 when	 the	 British	
government	 was	 still	 engaged	 in	 the	 conflict	 with	 the	 Chinese	 government	
triggered	by	 the	1856	Arrow	War.	 	His	assumption	of	 the	position	represented	a	
new	start	for	Britain	in	China	in	terms	of	practical	issues	of	governance	in	one	key	
way:	 he	 was	 the	 first	 British	 superintendent	 of	 trade	 based	 permanently	 on	
Chinese	 soil,	 rather	 than	 at	 the	 colony	 of	 Hong	 Kong,	 and	 thus	 was	 not	 only	
engaged	 more	 closely	 and	 directly	 with	 Chinese	 officials,	 but	 was	 also	 more	
intimately	 aware	 of	 the	 proceedings	 of	 British	 subjects	 in	 China,	 especially	 the	
growing	 presence	 at	 Shanghai.	 	 Bruce’s	 role	 in	 China’s	 foreign	 relations	 has	
generally	been	explored	in	relation	to	the	‘co-operative’	policy	which	he	is	said	to	
have	 initiated,	 in	 collaboration	with	US	Minister	Burlingame,	 at	Beijing	 from	 the	
1860s.37		It	will	be	shown	here	that	his	impact	on	British	governance	in	China	was	
significant,	 and	 that	 Bruce	was	 clearly	 already	 thinking	 ‘co-operatively’	 while	 at	





While	 there	 he	 was	 able	 to	 witness	 at	 first	 hand	 some	 of	 the	 misbehaviour	
perpetrated	by	violent	British	subjects,	and	see	the	effect	it	had	on	relations	with	
the	Chinese	at	Shanghai.		He	was	clearly	horrified	by	British	behaviour	in	a	number	







increased,	 in	 particular	 at	 Shanghai,	 and	 so	 too	 naturally	 had	 the	 work	 of	 the	
consuls	 in	 attempting	 to	 exercise	 the	 supervision	 outlined	 above.	 	 Furthermore,	
the	trade	in	China	had	unique	complicating	features	 in	that	the	technically-illegal	




but	 also	 at	 receiving	 stations,	 or	 opium	 ‘hulks’,	 which	 were	 moored	 semi-
permanently	at	 locations	along	the	coast.	 	These	were	really	 floating	warehouses	
which	made	 it	 possible	 to	 conduct	 the	opium	 trade	outside	 large	ports	 and	 thus	
allow	 British	 consuls	 to	 officially	 feign	 ignorance	 of	 its	 existence	 much	 of	 the	
time.40 		 From	 the	 early	 days	 officials	 blamed	 the	 opium	 trade	 for	 fostering	
lawlessness	among	both	foreigners	and	Chinese	involved	in	the	trade.	 	The	crews	





location	 for	 longer	 periods	 of	 time	 than	 was	 usual	 with	 ordinary	 shipping.		
Following	a	trial	for	a	robbery	committed	at	Xiamen	in	1846	Consul	Temple	Layton	
reported	 that	 British	 opium	 ships	 in	 the	 area	 employed	 a	 ‘reckless,	 lawless	 and	














interrelated	 activities	 of	 piracy	 and	 convoying,	 the	 latter	 a	 practice	 whereby	
foreigners	were	paid	by	Chinese	ship-owners,	and	sometimes	Chinese	officials,	to	
accompany	 their	 vessels	 to	 guard	 against	 attacks	 by	 pirates.42		 Rival	 groups	 of	
foreigners	 emerged	who	 fought	 each	 other	 over	 supremacy	 in	 this	 activity,	 and	
also	 themselves	 engaged	 in	 acts	 of	 piracy,	 destruction	 or	 reckless	 violence.	 	 In	
1859,	Minister	Bruce	blamed	convoying	for	drawing	large	numbers	of	British	‘bad	
characters’	 to	 certain	 places	 on	 the	 coast.	 	 He	 described	 the	 crew	 of	 the	 typical	






disorder.44		 Similar	 activities	 took	 place	 on	 the	 rivers,	 especially	 near	 Shanghai,	
where	 foreigners	were	 hired	 to	 sail	 on	 Chinese	 boats	 and	 bully	 Chinese	 officials	
into	letting	contraband	pass	through.		In	1862,		Consul	Adkins	at	Zhenjiang	(about	





The	 number	 of	 unemployed	 British	 ‘blackguards’	 also	 grew	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
Second	Opium	War	and	the	Taiping	rebellion	 in	China	(1850	to	1864).	 	By	1862,	
the	SMC	was	reporting	that	the	‘increase	of	the	foreign	population,	more	especially	
in	 the	 lower	 orders,	 within	 the	 last	 12	months,	 has	 defied	 all	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	
Council	to	keep	pace	with	it	in	police	organisation.'46		This	growth	occurred	at	least	


















the	 same	 time,	 but	many	were	 dismissed	 after	 serving	 for	 only	 a	 short	 time	 for	
offences	including	drunkenness.48			
	
In	 1864	 it	 was	 reported	 by	 the	 Municipal	 Council	 that	 at	 Shanghai	 there	 were	
about	45	‘white	men’	some	of	whom	were	said	to	‘eke	out	a	precarious	existence	as	
watchmen	at	Gambling	Houses’,	while	others	had	no	fixed	abode	and	moved	from	
Shanghai	 by	 boat	 for	 short	 periods	 inland	 from	 time	 to	 time.49		 The	 latter	were	
probably	engaging	in	‘creek	piracy’,	which	meant	sailing	up	the	smaller	waterways	
in	 search	 of	 vulnerable	 Chinese	 targets	 to	 plunder	 and	 was	 another	 activity	
facilitated	 by	 the	 breakdown	 of	 government	 authority.	 	 Creek	 piracy	 and	 other	
crimes	committed	by	gangs,	often	composed	of	both	foreigners	and	Chinese,	were	
a	 particular	 feature	 of	 the	 period	 of	 the	 early-	 and	 mid-1860s,	 when	 the	 areas	
neighbouring	Shanghai	were	subject	to	the	greatest	degree	of	unrest	caused	by	the	








September	1863,	 p.	 1.	 	 See	 also	Robert	Bickers,	 ‘Ordering	 Shanghai:	 Policing	 a	Treaty	Port,	 1854-










By	 the	 late	 1850s,	 as	 Britain’s	 relationship	 with	 China	 was	 being	 re-evaluated	
amidst	 the	 crisis	 of	 the	 Second	 Opium	War,	 it	 was	 therefore	 already	 clear	 that	
consular	 criminal	 jurisdiction	was	 fraught	with	difficulties,	 and	 the	pressures	on	
the	system	were	increasing.	 	A	set	of	structures	which	had	been	designed	to	deal	
with	 violence	 and	disorder	on	 the	part	 of	 seamen,	 focussed	on	keeping	 them	on	
their	 ships	 as	 much	 as	 possible,	 and	 removing	 those	 who	 were	 left	 behind	
economically	and	quickly,	was	not	workable	in	the	context	of	the	China	coast	as	it	
had	 developed,	 amidst	 the	 expansion	 of	 commerce	 (especially	 trade	 in	 opium),	
dubious	 maritime	 activities	 and	 a	 general	 breakdown	 of	 Chinese	 government	
authority.	 	 The	 reasons	 outlined	 above	 had	 led	 to	 a	 fairly	 rapid	 growth	 in	 the	
population	 of	 British	 sojourners	 or	 settlers	 at	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 and	 especially	
Shanghai.52		Resources	were	therefore	strained.		In	1857,	the	Shanghai	consular	jail	
was	 so	 crowded	 that	 men	 were	 released	 early	 after	 an	 outbreak	 of	 sickness.53		
Consuls	asked	for	more	resources	in	response	to	the	increase	in	crime:	Meadows	at	
Shanghai	in	1859	requested	an	additional	constable	and	reported	that	the	consular	
jail	often	had	40	prisoners	 in	 it.54		Consul	Robertson	at	Guangzhou	reported	 that	
‘owing	to	various	causes,	a	considerable	number	of	unemployed	Europeans,	chiefly	
British	subjects,	find	their	way	up	here’		and	requested	a	European	constable	so	he	
could	 ‘keep	 something	 like	 order	 among	 a	 class	 whose	 proper	 residence	 is	 a	
prison’.55		Consul	Harry	Parkes,	at	Shanghai	 in	 the	1860s,	also	complained	of	 the	
increasing	 workload	 imposed	 on	 him	 by	 dealing	 with	 judicial	 matters,	 and	 the	





and	reached	894	by	1871.	 	Source	 for	1847	 figure	–	Morse,	 International	Relations,	vol.	1,	p.	355;	






who	 asked	 the	 foreign	 consuls	 in	 1864	 to	 assent	 to	 the	 Council	 establishing	 a	
‘system	of	 incarceration	and	enforced	 labour	 in	 the	case	of	all	persons,	native	or	









dealing	 with	 this	 group,	 who	 they	 viewed	 as	 a	 clear	 threat	 to	 British	 interests.		
Superintendent	 of	 Trade	 Bruce	 attempted	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 securing	 greater	
powers	for	himself	and	the	consuls	in	1859.		In	a	lengthy	despatch	addressing	both	
the	 issues	 of	 the	 convoying	 system	 and	 British	 ‘bad	 characters’	 more	 generally,	
Bruce	 argued	 that	 there	were	many	 failures	 in	 British	 justice	 in	 China	 as	 it	was	
then	 practised,	 and	 that	 to	 solve	 them	 required	 that	 the	 powers	 of	 the	
superintendent	 and	 consuls	 be	 increased	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 act	 preventively,	 by	
deporting	 those	with	no	visible	means	of	subsistence	and	unable	 to	 find	security	
for	 their	 good	 behaviour,	 without	 the	 need	 first	 to	 prove	 the	 commission	 of	 an	
illegal	act.		This	he	asserted	was	necessary	for	‘justice	to	the	Chinese,	and	not	less	a	
regard	for	our	own	interests	and	reputation.’58		The	FO	referred	Bruce’s	request	to	
the	 law	 officers	 of	 the	 crown,	who	 criticised	 the	 proposal,	 calling	 it	 an	 ‘extreme	
measure’,	 and	 the	 FO	 informed	 Bruce	 that	 they	 would	 not	 grant	 the	 additional	











Bruce’s	 focus	 at	 this	 time	 was	 very	 clearly	 fixed	 on	 removing	 factors	 which	
provoked	Chinese	hostility	towards	foreigners.		In	doing	so,	he	espoused	a	point	of	
view	which	 was	 not	 in	 itself	 novel:	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 Superintendent	 Davis	 had	




cases	 of	 violence	 should	 be	 abandoned.	 	He	 reported	 to	 the	 FO	 that	 the	 existing	
practices	 required	 reform	 because	 they	 neither	 discouraged	 abuse,	 nor	 satisfied	
the	 obligations	 in	 the	 treaties,	 and	moreover	 they	 created	 ‘prejudicial	 results	 on	
the	 disposition	 of	 the	 native	 inhabitants’	 towards	 foreigners.	60		 Bruce	 wrote	 to	
Consul	Walter	Medhurst	at	Fuzhou,	who	had	brokered	compensation	 in	 the	 case	
where	 a	 Chinese	 woman	 drowned	 following	 a	 violent	 incident	 perpetrated	 by	
British	subjects,	and	wrote	also	to	Consul	William	Gingell	at	Xiamen,	where	he	had	
learned	 of	 similar	 practices,	 reminding	 the	 latter	 that	 ‘the	 lives	 and	 property	 of	
Chinese	 are	under	 treaty	 as	 sacred,	 as	 those	of	 an	Englishman	 in	England’.61		He	
ordered	Medhurst	and	Gingell	to	ensure	in	future	that	crimes	against	Chinese	were	
punished	in	such	a	way	as	to	ensure	that	British	subjects	would	be	deterred	from	
committing	 such	 acts.	 	 As	 well	 as	 expressing	 a	 difference	 of	 opinion	 with	 past	
approaches	 over	 the	 practical	 means	 to	 maintain	 good	 order,	 Bruce	 was	 also	





Bruce	 continued	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 reform	of	 consular	 jurisdiction,	 pushing	 for	 the	
power	to	remove	‘notorious	characters’	from	the	treaty	ports,	and	also	raising	the	
problems	arising	 from	 the	need	 to	 send	serious	 criminal	 cases	 to	Hong	Kong	 for	
trial,	 since	 consuls	 still	 could	not	 inflict	heavy	 sentences.	 	 In	1860	a	man	named	






but	 they	 once	more	 stopped	 short	 of	 accepting	 that	 serious	 reform	was	 needed,	
















Hong	 Kong	 court	 had	 removed	 the	 problems	 surrounding	 cases	 involving	 the	
treaties	(see	chapter	one),	 the	different	arms	of	British	governance	charged	with	
dealing	with	British	criminals	in	China	did	not	work	well	together	and	produced	a	
dysfunctional	 apparatus	 of	 control.	 	 The	 NCH	 called	 for	 reforms	 to	 the	 system	
following	the	case	of	a	seaman	who	had	shot	a	Chinese	woman	and	had	been	given	
a	sentence	of	only	three	months’	imprisonment	and	deportation:		
In	 Shanghai,	 where	 the	 number	 of	 low	 class	 foreigners	 is	 every	 day	
increasing	 we	 want	 either	 a	 magistrate	 entrusted	 with	 far	 higher	
powers	than	those	wielded	by	our	present	energetic	Consul,	or	a	judge	
of	 assize	who	 should	 at	 stated	 intervals	 go	 a	 circuit	 of	 the	 ports,	 and	
enjoy	 the	 same	 authority	 as	 is	 vested	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Hong	
Kong.65	
	













new	chapter	 in	 relations	with	China,	 and	 to	pushing	 the	Qing	state	 to	expand	 its	
governance	 in	 a	 form	 more	 alike	 that	 exercised	 by	 European	 states.66		 Bruce	
explicitly	 connected	 this	 project	 with	 the	 requirement	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 control	
British	 crime	 and	 violence	 when	 writing	 to	 Consul	 Parkes	 about	 municipal	
government	at	Shanghai:	
I	 look	forward	to	increased	confusion	and	difficulty	if	we	cannot	make	
the	 Chinese	 exert	 themselves	 to	 do	 their	 duty,	 and	 if	we	 cannot	 keep	
our	own	blackguards	in	order.		We	must	work	with	the	Chinese	officials,	














at	 Shanghai.	 	 Hornby	 continued	 Bruce’s	 work	 in	 an	 important	 respect	 by	
immediately	 turning	 his	 attention	 to	 the	 question	 of	 violent	 British	 subjects.	 	 In	
February	1866	he	made	a	lengthy	report	to	the	FO	reviewing	the	work	of	the	new	
judicial	 system	since	 its	 commencement,	 in	which	he	 reported	 in	 some	detail	 on	
the	 question	 of	 violence	 towards	 Chinese	 at	 the	 treaty	 ports.	 	 From	 Hornby’s	





moralising	progressive,	 influenced	by	either	 religious	views	or	egalitarian	 ideals,	
and	he	clearly	believed	in	British	superiority	over	‘Asiatics’	and	the	naturalness	of	
colonial	 hierarchies.68		 	 Nevertheless,	 Hornby	 found	 the	 level	 of	 violence	 at	 the	
treaty	ports	unacceptable.		He	explained	that	‘Chinese	servants,	labourers	and	even	
small	 native	merchants	were	 constantly	 assaulted	 and	 severely	 beaten	 upon	 the	
slightest	 provocation	 or	 suspicion’	 by	 British	 subjects,	 whose	 behaviour	
‘exasperated	the	natives	against	foreigners’.69		One	way	he	addressed	the	problem	
was	 by	making	 an	 example	 of	 a	 British	master	 of	 a	 ship	who	 had	 flogged	 some	









Both	 Hornby’s	 actions	 in	 the	 Bennet	 case,	 and	 Bruce’s	 earlier	 move	 to	 stop	
compensation	 in	 lieu	 of	 punishment,	were	 said	 to	 be	 taken	 to	 improve	 relations	
with	 the	 Chinese.	 	 And	 yet	 both	measures	 involved	 overturning	 practices	which	
were	said	to	have	existed	at	the	treaty	ports	for	some	time	with	the	complicity	of	
Chinese	officials,	suggesting	 the	complicated	nature	of	 this	 issue.	 	 It	was	perhaps	















arose:	 it	 involved	 a	 moralistic	 or	 even	 a	 pedagogical	 aspect	 too,	 a	 point	 which	
James	 Hevia	 has	 made	 when	 analysing	 Anglo-Chinese	 interactions	 in	 the	 same	
period	at	the	diplomatic	level.73		Hornby	claimed	that	this	aspect	was	made	clear	to	
him	by	the	FO	in	advance	of	both	his	extraterritorial	judicial	appointments:	














The	advent	of	 the	SCC	under	Hornby	 in	 this	way	 represented,	 at	 least	 initially,	 a	
continuation	of	the	course	Bruce	had	set.		Hornby	was	also	early	on	able	to	further	
another	 of	 Bruce’s	 goals,	 when	 he	 took	 a	 tough	 stance	 against	 members	 of	 the	
problem	population	he	 identified	as	 the	 ‘rowdy	class’	of	British	subjects,	a	group	
which	Bruce	had	in	1859/60	tried	but	failed	to	obtain	extra	deportation	powers	to	
deal	 with.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 in	 the	 mid-1860s,	 when	 the	 SCC	 was	 established	 at	
Shanghai,	 foreign	criminals	as	a	problem	population	continued	 to	be	high	on	 the	
agenda	of	British	officials.		As	already	described	above,	the	problem	of	Chinese	and	
foreign	criminals,	particularly	gangs,	was	an	area	of	great	concern	to	the	Shanghai	
Municipal	 Council	 too.	 	 It	 also	 troubled	 the	 local	 Chinese	 authorities,	 who	
expressed	their	concerns	to	the	SMC	in	1864,	and	were	reported	to	have	urged	the	
need	to	rid	the	International	Settlement	and	the	Chinese	city	of	both	Chinese	‘bad	
characters’	 and	 the	 ‘numerous	 foreign	 rowdies	 who	 infested	 the	 port.’75		 Such	






1864,	 described	 in	 chapter	 one.	 	 In	 February	 1866,	 	 British	 Consul	 Charles	
Winchester	 sought	 to	 strengthen	 co-operation	 with	 local	 Chinese	 officials,	
requesting	 that	 the	 SMC	 supply	 weekly	 reports	 with	 descriptions	 of	 all	
unemployed	 foreigners	 to	him	 in	order	 that	he	could	pass	 them	to	 the	daotai,	 so	
that	 such	 men	 could	 be	 more	 easily	 arrested	 if	 they	 were	 found	 in	 the	 area	
surrounding	 Shanghai.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 British	 consular	 officials	 of	 the	
time	were	more	enthusiastic	about	collaboration	with	 the	Chinese	 than	were	 the	
Council.	 	 The	 SMC	 expressed	 the	 concern	 that	 the	 Chinese	 might	 apprehend	
‘respectable	people’,	either	by	mistake	or	‘using	the	descriptions	as	a	lever	against	
Foreigners’,	but	reluctantly	agreed,	at	the	consul’s	insistence,	and	passed	on	details	










for	 the	 judge	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 SMC	 and	 its	 police	 force	 to	make	 arrests,	 as	 indeed	
consuls	 at	 Shanghai	 had	 already	 done	 for	 some	 time,	 but	 collaboration	 under	
Hornby	quickly	became	closer	 than	 it	had	been	 in	 the	past,	 as	Hornby	became	a	
strong	advocate	for	the	SMC	and	for	British	state	support	of	it.		As	already	noted	in	
chapter	one,	earlier	 in	1866	Hornby	wrote	 to	 the	FO,	at	a	 time	when	 there	were	
doubts	about	the	future	status	of	the	International	Settlement,	to	push	for	the	SMC	









the	 Settlement	 instead,	 the	 Chinese	 being	 ‘utterly	 unfit’	 to	 keep	 order.78		 The	
problem	of	control	of	criminality	at	Shanghai	was	thus	used	as	a	justification	of	the	
SMC’s	 anomalous	 position	 and	 for	 deepening	 engagement	 between	 British	 state	
structures,	especially	judicial	bodies,	and	the	SMC	at	Shanghai.			
	
In	1866,	Hornby	took	further	steps	against	 the	activities	of	 the	 ‘rowdy	class’.	 	He	
wrote	 to	 Minister	 Alcock	 proposing	 a	 new	 regulation	 to	 tackle	 the	 problem	 of	
foreigners	living	from	crime	against	Chinese,	by	attempting	to	make	it	impossible	
for	them	to	engage	in	‘creek	piracy’	outside	the	treaty	ports.	 	He	explained	that	it	
was	well	 known	 that	 British	 subjects	 frequently	 left	 the	 ports	 in	 order	 to	 travel	
into	 the	 surrounding	 country,	 where	 ‘native	 boats	 are	 constantly	 pillaged	 and	
villages	 are	 placed	 under	 contribution’,	 rendering	 ‘all	 foreigners	 hateful	 to	 the	
masses	of	the	people’,	but	that	the	court	was	unable	to	convict	them	since	evidence	
was	unobtainable.		He	explained	furthermore	that	it	was	impossible	to	deport	such	
men	 as	 vagabonds,	 since	 ‘their	 crimes	 enable	 them	 to	 maintain	 a	 decent	
appearance	and	to	live	at	ease.’79		Hornby	presented	a	draft	to	Minister	Alcock	of	a	
scheme	designed,	by	preventing	them	leaving	the	ports	 for	any	 length	of	 time,	 to	
put	a	stop	to	their	activities.		His	proposal	would	give	the	judge	and	the	consuls	the	





and	 sought	 the	 FO’s	 retrospective	 assent	 to	 them,	 which	 was	 given.81		 In	 1867,	
Hornby	 maintained	 his	 stance	 against	 criminal	 and	 destitute	 Britons,	 urging	
consuls	in	his	Instructions	on	Consular	Jurisdiction,	that	it	was	essential	that	‘what	










It	 is	 clear	 that	 Hornby’s	 actions	 against	 ‘the	 rowdy	 class’	 matched	 both	 the	
Legation’s	 and	 the	 SMC’s	 priorities	 in	 ridding	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 and	 especially	
Shanghai,	 of	 violent	 and	 criminal	 gangs	 comprising	 British	 subjects,	 as	 well	 as	
destitutes	with	no	 livelihood	other	 than	begging	or	petty	 theft.	 	Hornby’s	actions	
against	Captain	Bennet	and	others	who	committed	acts	of	violence	against	Chinese	
were	also	clearly	well	aligned	with	the	policy	of	Ministers	Bruce	and	Alcock,	who	
spearheaded	 the	 ‘co-operative	 policy’	 in	 the	 1860s.	 	 As	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 SMC	
towards	sharing	information	with	the	Chinese	authorities	showed,	however,	there	
were	differences	between	the	minister	and	consuls’	desire	to	assist	the	Chinese	to	
play	 their	part	 in	policing	 their	 territory,	and	the	attitude	of	 the	SMC,	which	was	
generally	 suspicious	 of	 Chinese	 officials.	 	 As	 already	 noted,	 in	 the	 longer	 term,	
despite	his	early	moves,	Hornby	showed	a	marked	tendency	to	favour	the	stance	of	
the	Council,	and	his	influence	and	the	mere	fact	of	the	court’s	location	at	Shanghai,	
increased	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 British	 state	 became	 enmeshed,	 through	 its	
project	 of	 governance	 over	 British	 subjects	 in	 Shanghai,	 in	 the	work	 of	 the	 SMC	
over	 the	 longer	 term.	 	This	 theme	 is	 further	 explored	 in	 chapter	 five,	 relating	 to	
Indian	British	subjects.			
	




overturned	 the	decision	of	 the	consul	at	Taiwan	 in	a	 case	where	British	subjects	
had	been	 robbed	of	 some	 camphor,	 and	had	 subsequently	 taken	direct	 action	 in	
response,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 consul	 decided	 to	 prosecute	 them.	 	 Hornby’s	










thinking	 that	 on	 the	whole	 and	 in	 course	 of	 time	 it	 is	 better	 for	 our	 interests	 to	
treat	them,	as	really	civilized	officials.’84		The	law	officers	declined	to	intervene	and	
did	not	 criticise	Hornby,	 sending	 a	 rather	 equivocal	 response	 in	 reply	 to	 the	FO.		
One	side	effect	of	the	establishment	of	a	centre	of	judicial	authority	in	China,	was	a	
reduction	 in	 the	 influence	of	 the	 law	officers	over	 legal	 issues,	and	Hornby	made	
use	of	the	flexibility	given	to	him	to	resist	moves	by	British	ministers	which	would	
place	 greater	 reliance	 on	Chinese	 officials.	 A	 further	 example,	 from	 the	 previous	
year,	 saw	 Hornby	 clashing	 with	 Minister	 Alcock	 over	 the	 latter’s	 attempt	 to	
establish	a	joint	tribunal	to	settle	all	civil	claims	between	Chinese	and	foreigners,	
which	Hornby	strenuously	resisted.85		The	contrast	between	Hornby’s	approach	to	




Since	 the	 problem	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 most	 serious	 crimes,	 especially	 those	
inflicted	against	Chinese,	was	said	to	be	the	greatest	deficiency	 in	the	old	system	
which	 the	 new	 SCC	 was	 intended	 to	 address,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 how	
effective	this	reform	was	 in	achieving	that	aim.	 	Although	the	evidence	discussed	










treaty	ports:	 the	 creation	of	 the	 court	brought	 the	 full	 ‘experience’	 of	 the	British	







consular	 courts,	 there	 was	 more	 time	 spent	 by	 counsel	 making	 extensive	 and	
complex	 legal	 arguments,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 application	 of	
British	 law	 in	 Chinese	 surroundings	were	 raised	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 	 Cases	which	
dealt	 with	 the	 death	 of	 a	 Chinese	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 foreigner	 were	 naturally	
particularly	closely	watched	and	well-publicised.		They	were	widely	reported	on	in	
both	the	foreign	and	Chinese	press,	and	thus	highly	influential.		Moreover,	Chinese	
people	 –	 ordinary	 residents	 of	 Shanghai	 and	 Chinese	 officials	 –	 played	 a	 part	 in	
proceedings		as	either	injured	parties,	witnesses	or	observers.		The	role	played	by	






of	 cases	are	sufficiently	 similar	 for	us	 safely	 to	do	so,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 tentatively	
draw	 the	 conclusion	 that,	 under	 the	 new	 court,	 more	 severe	 sentences	 were	
passed	 against	 British	 subjects	 convicted	 of	 manslaughter	 for	 such	 crimes.	 	 For	
example,	 in	 1864	 and	 1865,	 there	were	 two	 cases	 handled	 by	 the	 local	 consuls,	
before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai,	 where	 British	 subjects	 were	 found	
guilty	of	manslaughter	for	shooting	and	killing	Chinese	and	were	given	very	light	




other	 case,	 involving	 a	 former	 ship’s	 steward	 named	 Dodds	 who	 fired	 what	 he	
claimed	 was	 a	 warning	 shot	 at	 a	 boat	 near	 Shanghai,	 the	 sentence	 was	 slightly	
																																																								
86	Although	juries	were	already	used	in	Hong	Kong,	I	stress	here	the	importance	of	the	trial	taking	
place	 in	China,	with	 juries	made	up	of	members	of	 the	 resident	British	community,	witnessed	by	
Chinese	people,	especially	officials	and	also	residents	of	Shanghai.	





heavier	 –	 three	 months’	 imprisonment	 plus	 deportation	 –	 and	 quite	 possibly	
reflected	 the	 defendant’s	 lower	 status.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 these	 sentences	were	 very	
light	 for	 the	 crimes	 committed,	 even	 by	 the	 standards	 of	 the	 place	 and	 time,	 is	







Ford	outside	his	house	over	 the	payment	owed	 for	work	done	by	 them.	 	Despite	
expressing	 considerable	 sympathy	with	 the	 defendant	 in	 his	 summing	 up	 of	 the	
case,	Hornby	 sentenced	him	 to	 two	 years’	 imprisonment,	 a	 considerably	 heavier	
sentence	 than	 the	 one	 given	 to	 the	 doctor	 or	 the	 ship’s	 steward	 by	 consuls	 less	
than	ten	years	earlier.90				
	
The	 zhixian	 (Chinese	 district	 magistrate)	 was	 reported	 to	 have	 been	 present	 in	
court	 at	 the	 hearing	 in	 the	 Ford	 case,	 and	 it	 appears	 that	 this	 was	 not	 an	
uncommon	practice	in	cases	of	serious	violent	crime	against	Chinese.91		The	court	
was	therefore	an	important	point	of	contact	between	British	and	Chinese	officials,	
outside	 their	usual	 interaction	 through	administrative	dealings.	 	A	case	 involving	
British	violence	 leading	 to	 the	death	of	 a	Chinese,	which	was	viewed	by	Chinese	
officials	 as	 of	 particular	 importance,	 was	 that	 of	 R.	 v	 George.92		 This	 case,	 from	
1869,	 may	 appear	 unusual	 alongside	 those	 already	 discussed	 in	 that	 a	 British	
subject,	Robert	George,	was	 found	guilty	of	murder	by	a	British	 treaty	port	 jury,	
and	was	 executed	 at	 Shanghai	 as	 a	 result.	 	However,	 a	 closer	 reading	 of	 reports	
regarding	 the	 case	 reveals	 that	 George	 was	 described	 at	 one	 point	 as	 an	 ‘East-
Indian’;	given	his	European	name,	he	was	presumably	 therefore	a	Eurasian	 from	












on	 essential	 racial	 differences,	 widely	 aired	 in	 colonial	 courts	 elsewhere	 in	 the	
world,	show	the	continuities	between	the	practice	of	the	British	court	in	Shanghai	
and	 courts	 across	 the	British	 empire.94		 Judge	Hornby	 clearly	 subscribed	 to	 such	
racial	thinking,	and	made	the	explicit	comment	in	his	autobiography,	again	akin	to	
common	assertions	about	the	weakness	of	Indian	bodies	familiar	from	the	Indian	
legal	 context,	 that	 'Chinamen	 have	 very	 thin	 skins,	 and	 what	 an	 English	 sailor	
would	hardly	feel	cuts	into	their	flesh.'95		
	
Essentialist	 assumptions	 about	 Chinese	 characteristics,	 sometimes	 implicitly	 but	
often	 overtly	 racist,	 were	 also	 clearly	 visible	 in	 the	 detail	 of	 some	 of	 the	 cases	
discussed	above.		The	validity	of	Chinese	oaths	was	questioned	and	considered	in	
some	 depth	 in	 both	 the	 Ford	 and	 George	 cases.	 	 As	 the	 nature	 of	 Chinese	
metaphysical	 beliefs	 was	 discussed	 before	 them	 in	 the	 court	 room,	 the	 Chinese	
observers	 present,	 including	 officials,	 might	 well	 have	 been	 bemused	 by	 the	
spectacle	 of	 British	 ‘experts’	 on	 things	 Chinese	 (in	 the	 Ford	 case,	 by	missionary	
William	 Muirhead,	 who	 acted	 as	 interpreter)	 putting	 forth	 their	 views	 on	 the	
subject.		The	truthfulness	of	Chinese	witnesses	was	questioned	too,	in	ways	which	
must	have	seemed	insulting	to	those	Chinese	present.		No	challenge	was	made	by	
the	 judge	or	prosecution	 to	assertions	by	 the	defence	 in	 the	Ford	case	regarding	
‘the	mendacity	of	Chinese	witnesses’.	 	 Judge	Hornby	however	 suggested	 that	 the	
low	intelligence	of	 ‘Asiatics’	meant	that	they	were	unlikely	to	be	lying	if	the	story	
told	 was	 long	 or	 complex:	 ‘After	 an	 experience	 of	 nearly	 20	 years	 with	 Asiatic	
witnesses,	 I	may	give	you	the	benefit	of	my	own	observation	upon	the	subject.	 	 I	








answers	 to	 a	 long	 story.’	96		 The	 crude	 way	 in	 which	 diverse	 populations	 were	




The	 need	 to	 rely	 on	 juries	 to	 decide	 the	 verdict	 in	 serious	 criminal	 cases	 was	
another	way	 in	which	Chinese	at	 the	treaty	ports	witnessed	the	nature	of	British	
colonial	 justice,	along	with	the	assumptions	and	prejudices	of	British	residents	of	
China.	 	 British	 subjects	 who	 killed	 Chinese	 people	 were	 on	 several	 occasions	
acquitted	by	juries,	even	of	the	lesser	charge	of	manslaughter,	in	the	face	of	strong	
evidence	 of	 guilt.	 	 In	 1874,	 one	 Thomas	 Fawcett,	 who	 had	 been	 responsible	 for	
overseeing	works	on	a	lighthouse	being	constructed	in	Shandong,	shot	and	killed	a	
Chinese	man	who	he	 suspected	of	 stealing	 from	 the	building	 site.	 	 Judge	Hornby	
went	on	circuit	to	Yantai	to	try	the	case,	and	very	plainly	made	it	clear	to	the	jury	
that	 a	 verdict	 of	 manslaughter	 was	 appropriate.	 	 He	 was	 reported	 to	 have	
reminded	the	jury	that	–	and	it	is	surely	telling	that	he	felt	the	need	to	do	so	–	 ‘A	
Chinaman’s	life	is	as	precious	as	that	of	one	of	our	own	countrymen.’97		 	The	jury,	
however,	 acquitted	 Fawcett,	 which	 caused	 an	 angry	 reaction	 from	 Chinese	
observers	 at	 the	 court,	 as	 well	 as	 Minister	 Thomas	Wade,	 and	 also	 prompted	 a	
lengthy	discussion	in	the	widely-read	Chinese	newspaper	Shenbao	(D ).98			
	
The	 clearly	 prejudiced	 jury	 at	 Yantai	 was	 not	 an	 isolated	 occurrence,	 and	
successive	 judges	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 problem	 of	 juries.	 	 In	 1877,	








98	Hornby,	Autobiography,	 p.	 243.	 	 	 Shenbao	 –	 ‘Communications	 to	 the	 “Shun-Pao”	 Regarding	 the	
Fawcett	Case’,	NCH,	29	October	1874,	pp.	428-9.		For	an	examination	of	Shenbao	and	its	significance	
for	 Chinese	 society,	 see	 Barbara	Mittler,	 A	Newspaper	 for	 China?:	 Power,	 Identity,	 and	 Change	 in	
Shanghai’s	News	Media,	1872-1912	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	2004).	
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Wilkinson	 (then	Law	Secretary,	based	at	Kanagawa	 in	 Japan,	 later	 to	be	 judge	of	
the	SCC	at	 Shanghai),	who	was	 reported	 to	argue	 that	 ‘if	 there	 is	 a	 reluctance	 in	
British	 juries	 to	 convict	 where	 the	 case	 rests	 wholly	 on	 native	 testimony,	 it	 is	
founded	 on	 a	 very	 justifiable	 scepticism.’99		 The	 use	 of	 the	 jury	 for	 all	 serious	
criminal	trials	was	retained,	and	concerns	about	the	biased	nature	of	British	juries	
arose	 again	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 	 Judge	 de	 Sausmarez	 proposed	 an	














Shanghai	 and	 beyond,	 especially	 through	 press	 reports	 in	 Chinese	 newspapers	
such	as	Shenbao	(D ),	which	had	a	wide	circulation	 throughout	China	 from	the	
1870s.101		 Both	Shenbao	 and	 its	 rival	Shanghai	Xinbao	(
>4 	 took	 a	 regular	
interest	in	judicial	matters,	featuring	reports	of	cases	heard	in	the	SCC	and	also	the	
Shanghai	Mixed	Court.	 	The	1874	correspondence	over	the	Fawcett	case	referred	
to	 above,	which	was	 printed	 in	 both	Shenbao	and	 the	NCH,	was	 dominated	 by	 a	
debate	 about	 the	 jury	 system.	 	 The	 Chinese	 correspondents	 in	 Shenbao	
demonstrated	a	fairly	detailed	understanding	of	the	British	system,	and	made	the	
case	 against	 the	 use	 of	 juries	 in	 China,	 arguing	 that	 there	 were	 so	 few	 British	





101	Rudolf	 G.	 Wagner,	 ‘The	 Shenbao	 in	 Crisis:	 the	 International	 Environment	 and	 the	 Conflict	
between	Guo	Songtao	and	the	Shenbao’,	Late	Imperial	China,	20,	1	(1999),	107–43.	
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system	of	 justice	which	 treated	Chinese	 and	 foreigners	 equally,	 a	 call	which	had	
already	 been	 made	 in	 Shenbao	 in	 earlier	 years. 102 		 Perceived	 injustices	 in	
individual	 cases,	 and	 also	 dissatisfaction	 with	 institutional	 inequalities,	 could	
therefore	 have	 effects	 far	 beyond	 those	 felt	 by	 people	 in	 the	 courtroom	 who	
witnessed	 the	 way	 that	 the	 trials	 were	 conducted.	 	 Another	manslaughter	 case,	




interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 curry	 favour	 with	 the	 Chinese	 ‘rabble’	 in	 order	 to	
extort	 compensation	 from	 the	 accused.103		 The	 NCH’s	 interpretation	 as	 to	 the	
motivation	for	Chinese	actions	in	the	case	cannot	of	course	be	taken	at	face	value,	
but	 the	 apparent	 fact	 of	 the	 provocation	 to	 anger	 of	 the	 Chinese	 present	 at	 the	
inquest,	demonstrates	the	power	of	court	cases	involving	violence	against	Chinese	




a	 space	where	British	 colonial	practice	affected	 the	 lived	experience	of	 residents	
and	 visitors.	 	 Although	 the	 new	 court	may	 have	 tended	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 issuing	 of	
slightly	more	 severe	 sentences	 for	 British	 subjects	 in	 cases	 of	 extreme	 violence	
towards	Chinese,	asymmetrical	power	relations	founded	on	racial	difference	were	
clearly	 still	 strong	 factors	 which	 determined	 the	 way	 that	 perpetrators,	 victims	
and	 witnesses	 were	 dealt	 with	 by	 the	 Court,	 and	 influenced	 the	 way	 that	 the	
court’s	 processes	 were	 experienced.	 	 Following	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SCC	 at	
Shanghai	 this	 effect	 could	 be	 felt	 in	 a	more	 direct	manner	 than	 under	 the	Hong	
Kong	Supreme	Court,	by	Chinese	and	foreigners	at	the	treaty	ports	alike.			
																																																								
102	‘Communications	 to	 the	 “Shun-Pao”	 Regarding	 the	 Fawcett	 Case’,	 NCH,	 29	 October	 1874,	 pp.	
428-9.		In	1872,			Shenbao	carrried	an	article	which	complained	of	the	lack	of	reciprocity	in	judicial	
arrangements	at	Shanghai,	since	British	consular	officials	sat	 in	a	 judical	capacity	 in	the	Shanghai	






‘rowdy’	 British	 subjects	 and	 especially	 violence	 against	 Chinese,	 seems	 to	 have	
subsided	somewhat	 from	the	end	of	 the	1860s.	 	A	number	of	 factors	can	explain	
this.	 	First,	the	end	of	the	rebellions	in	China	returned	peace	to	the	hinterlands	of	
the	 treaty	 ports	 and	 allowed	 the	 Qing	 authorities	 to	 regain	 control	 over	 the	
Chinese	 population	 there.	 	 Thus	 the	 opportunities	 for	 Anglo-Chinese	 criminal	
gangs	 to	 engage	 in	 creek	 piracy	 and	 other	 similar	 activities	 were	 reduced.	 	 In	
addition,	over	 time	there	appear	 to	have	been	 fewer	white	British	seamen	at	 the	
ports;	according	to	a	British	official	commenting	on	the	reduced	need	for	consular	
prison	accommodation	at	Shanghai	in	1883,	this	could	be	attributed	to	the	opening	
of	 the	 Suez	 canal	 and	 the	 consequent	 employment	 of	 greater	 numbers	 of	 Asian	
sailors	 (‘so-called	 ‘lascars’),	 who	 were	 said	 to	 be	 far	 less	 troublesome. 104		
Furthermore,	 as	 shown	 above,	 those	 officials	 most	 concerned	 with	 controlling	
British	 crime	 and	 violence	 were	 often	 motivated	 by	 their	 task	 of	 overseeing	




a	 lower	 priority	 for	 British	 diplomats.	 	 No	 major	 reforms	 were	 made	 to	 the	
structures	or	practices	charged	with	controlling	white	British	crime	and	criminals	
after	 the	 1860s.	 	 The	 next	 serious	 official	 panic	 over	 control	 of	 a	 population	





White	 violence	 in	 the	 late	 1850s	 and	 1860s	 prompted	 a	 significant	 institutional	
response	–	most	 importantly	 the	 founding	of	 the	 SCC	 in	1865	–	but	 it	 is	notable	
that	 the	 heightened	 concerns	 were	 fairly	 short	 lived	 and	 focussed	 only	 on	 the	
																																																								
104	TNA	 FO	 656/58:	 Office	 of	Works	 to	 Treasury,	 13	 February	 1883.	 	 The	 Suez	 Canal	 opened	 in	
1869.		Martin	Wiener	also	suggests	that	lascar	crews	were	better	behaved	on	board	ship	than	their	
European	 counterparts:	 Martin	 J.	 Wiener,	 An	 Empire	 on	 Trial:	 Race,	 Murder,	 and	 Justice	 Under	
British	Rule,	1870-1935	(Cambridge,	2009),	p.	23.	
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extreme	misbehaviour	 represented	 by	 the	 ‘rowdy	 class’.	 	 A	 significant	 degree	 of	
violent	 behaviour	 on	 the	 part	 of	 seamen	 was	 expected	 and	 did	 not	 provoke	
significant	 concern.	 	 However,	 later	 chapters	 will	 show	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 official	
unease	 over	 comparatively	 smaller	 populations	 who	 represented	 a	 challenge	 in	
different	 ways.	 	 There	 was	 a	 reluctance	 to	 suspend	 the	 rights	 of	 white	 British	
subjects,	 and	severe	 sentences,	 especially	 capital	punishment,	were	 rare.	 	Harald	
Fischer-Tiné	has	described	similar	circumstances	 in	India,	and	argues	that	 ‘white	










committed	 crime	 in	 China.	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 SCC	 was	 established	 at	 Shanghai	
during	 a	 period	 of	 heightened	 official	 alarm	 over	 violent	 crime	 committed	 in	
particular	 by	 the	 problem	population	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘rowdy	 class’.	 	 The	 new	
institution	was	created	to	address	this	problem	in	the	context	of	the	new	policy	of	
cooperation	 then	 being	 pursued	 by	 the	 British	 minister	 and	 the	 FO.	 	 However,	
although	British	officials	 in	China,	 including	Hornby,	 first	 judge	of	 the	SCC,	made	
strenuous	 efforts	 to	 control	 British	 violence	 and	 crime,	 they	 did	 so	 in	 different	
ways,	with	different	motivations	and	with	different	consequences	for	the	shape	of	
British	 expansion	 in	 China.	 	Mary	 C.	Wright	 has	 suggested	 that	 Edmund	Hornby	
and	the	SCC	can	be	viewed	as	part	of	the	apparatus	for	British	cooperation,	on	the	
basis	 of	 an	 1865	 judgment	 in	 which	 Hornby	 allowed	 the	 British	 Crown	 to	
prosecute	a	British	subject	on	behalf	of	the	Chinese	government.106		This	chapter,	
together	with	 chapter	 one,	 has	 offered	 a	more	 nuanced	 view	 of	 the	 court’s	 role,	
																																																								






creation	of	 the	court	was	 the	establishment	of	a	 fairly	 independent	 institution	at	
Shanghai,	 frequently	 in	 conflict	 with	 British	 officials	 based	 at	 the	 Legation	 in	
Beijing,	and	able	to	undermine	significant	elements	of	the	cooperative	policy	and	
promote	 the	 colonial	 expansion	 being	 pursued	 by	 the	 SMC.	 	 Again,	 as	 already	
argued	in	chapter	one,	the	establishment	of	the	SCC	at	Shanghai	bolstered	the	SMC,	
a	 body	 which	 generally	 pushed	 against	 Chinese	 government	 authority	 and	





The	 junior	British	 clerk	was	a	 sahib,	 the	wealthy,	 respectable	Chinese	
merchant	 or	 comprador	 was	 not.	 	 Power,	 status,	 and	 colour	 (the	
Chinese	had	not	been	considered	 'yellow'	until	early	 in	the	nineteenth	
century)	 correlated	 in	 ways	 characteristic	 of	 colonialism	 all	 over	 the	
world.107	
Such	asymmetrical	power	relations	clearly	existed	 in	 the	courtroom,	where	even	
low	 status	 white	 Britons	 could	 be	 assured	 that	 British	 juries	 would	 treat	 them	
leniently.	 	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 chapter	 of	 the	 way	 that	 British	 violence	 against	
Chinese	 was	 handled	 by	 the	 SCC	 therefore	 shows	 one	way	 in	 which	 the	 British	
state’s	 institutions	played	a	significant	role	 in	the	making	of	 the	treaty	ports	 into	
colonial	spaces.		Once	the	institution	of	the	SCC	was	established	in	China,	Chinese	
people	were	forced	into	a	greater	degree	of	engagement	with	British	law	generally	
and	 court	procedures	 in	particular,	 and	Chinese	officials	were	allowed	only	very	
minimal	 involvement	 beyond	 watching	 the	 trials.108		 This	 all	 entailed	 a	 very	
different	kind	of	pedagogical	project	 from	that	which	was	envisaged	by	Bruce	or	
Alcock,	who	as	ministers	in	the	1860s	favoured	working	together	with	the	Chinese,	
albeit	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 they	 could	 influence	 the	 development	 of	 Chinese	
																																																								
107	Jürgen	Osterhammel,	‘Britain	and	China,	1842-1914’,	in	Andrew	Porter	and	William	Roger	Louis,	









governance,	 including	 law,	 through	 what	 were	 conceptualised	 as	 co-operative	
actions.	 	 In	 this	way	 they	were	working	within	 a	mode	of	 thought	which	 can	be	
classed	as	the	‘civilising	mission’,	one	kind	of	British	approach	to	colonial	relations.		
Despite	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 ministers,	 however,	 the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai	 offered	
Chinese	 –	 both	 in	 person	 and	 through	 reading	 about	 cases	 in	 the	 increasingly	
important	 Shanghai	 Chinese	 press	 –	 a	 sharp	 lesson	 in	 the	 ‘rule	 of	 colonial	
difference’,	rooted	in	a	view	towards	China	and	the	Chinese	involving	much	starker	
inequality.109		There	was	no	single	official	British	view	on	the	correct	approach	to	









In	 1905	 the	 North-China	 Herald’s	 correspondent	 in	 Jinan	 reported	 a	 minor	
diplomatic	 upset	 involving	 German	 officials	 in	 Shandong,	 who	 had	 complained	
about	 the	 appointment	 by	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 of	William	Quincey,	 an	 ethnic	
Chinese	‘who	they	supposed	to	be	an	Englishman,’	as	head	of	the	Jinan	police.		This	
would	have	contravened	Germany’s	claim	to	be	the	preeminent	 foreign	power	 in	
Shandong,	 where	 Jinan	 is	 located.	 	 The	 Chinese	 governor	 responded	 to	 the	
Germans,	the	report	stated,	with	the	information	that	‘though	Mr	Quincey	might	be	




was	 taken	 to	 England	 by	 General	 Gordon,	 after	 the	 Taiping	 rebellion,	
and	 educated	 there,	 becoming	 while	 abroad	 a	 naturalised	 British	
subject.	 	He	 dresses	 in	 European	 clothes,	wears	 no	 queue	 and	 speaks	
excellent	English.1	






state	 to	establish	clearly	who	 it	should	register	and	protect	as	British	subjects	 in	
China,	 elements	 including:	 international	 relations,	 legal	 questions	 of	 dual	
nationality	 and	 the	 status	 of	 naturalised	 British	 subjects,	 and	 also	 moral	 and	
philosophical	 questions	 such	 as	 essentialised	 versus	 performative	 notions	 of	
belonging	 –	 the	 relative	 importance	 of	 such	 criteria	 as	 descent-based	 ethnicity,	
cultural	orientation	(including	style	of	dress),	education	or	 linguistic	competence	
in	determining	national	 status	 and	access	 to	British	protection.	 	However,	 at	 the	
same	 time	 as	 it	 highlighted	 common	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 national	 status	 of	
ethnic	 Chinese	 with	 British	 nationality,	 the	 case	 of	 William	 Quincey	 was	
																																																								
1	‘Chinanfu:	a	wise	appointment,’	NCH,	12	May	1905,	p.	315.	
2	TNA	FO	228/2156:	 duplicate	 foil	 of	 certificate	 of	 registration	 for	William	Quincey,	 21	February	
1906.	
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were,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 anticipated	 by	 the	 British	 state	 before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	
treaty	ports,	this	chapter	turns	to	a	problem	population	for	which	officials	were	at	
first	 unprepared	 and	which	 only	 gradually	 began	 to	 trigger	 a	 considered	 official	
response:	ethnic	Chinese	with	British	nationality	(referred	to	hereafter	as	Chinese	
British	subjects).	 	Chinese	British	subjects,	whose	British	status	generally	derived	
from	 a	 connection	with	 British	 colonies	 such	 as	 the	 Straits	 Settlements	 or	Hong	
Kong,	 were	 a	 small	 but	 prominent	 group	 who	 sought	 registration	 at	 British	
consulates	and	the	protection	of	the	British	state	in	China	under	the	treaty	system.		







created	 for	British	officials	 in	 their	 relations	with	the	Chinese	government	which	
prompted	their	identification	as	a	problem	population	which	called	for	an	official	
response.		However,	whereas	the	last	chapter	dealt	with	a	group	who	the	state	was	
determined	 to	 supervise	 and	 place	 under	 its	 control,	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
represented	a	problem	population	 in	most	cases	 through	 their	attempts	 to	 insist	
that	 the	 British	 state	 should	 intervene	 in	 their	 affairs,	 by	 recognising	 them	 and	
interceding	on	their	behalf	in	disputes	with	individuals,	companies	and	especially	









of	 discipline	 through	 the	 courts;	 rather	 it	 was	 a	 question	 of	 the	 British	 state	
determining	 its	approach	 towards	 this	group,	a	process	which	had	consequences	
for	the	nature	and	extent	of	British	expansion	in	China.			
	
Before	 the	 treaty	 system	 began	 to	 decline	 in	 the	 late	 1920s,	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports	 operated	 within	 a	 context	 where	 the	 notion	 had	
increasingly	 taken	 root	 that	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 of	 British	 settlers	 in	 China	
were	 part	 of	 their	 ‘birthright.’4		 One	 contemporary	 view	 of	 this	 concept	 can	 be	
understood	as	based	on	racial	thinking	in	Britain	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	
twentieth	 centuries.	 	 Rights	 and	 freedoms	 guaranteed	 by	 British	 law	 and	
government	 were	 sometimes	 associated	with	 ideas	 of	 ‘Anglo-Saxon’	 superiority,	
and	 empire	 could	 be	 justified	 by	 the	 notion	 that	 ‘Anglo-Saxon’	 Britons	 were	
spreading	 enlightened	 government	 through	 imperial	 expansion;	 but	 the	 people	
encountered	 overseas	were	 far	 from	 ready	 to	 enjoy	 all	 ‘Anglo-Saxon’	 rights	 and	
liberties.5		So	 in	nineteenth-century	Hong	Kong,	despite	 the	 institutions	of	 justice	
in	 the	 colony	 closely	 resembling	 those	 in	 Great	 Britain,	 draconian	 measures	
specifically	 to	 control	 the	 Chinese	 population	 were	 put	 in	 place.6		 In	 mainland	
China	 a	 differentiation	 which	 in	 practice	 corresponded	 in	 some	ways	 to	 that	 in	
Hong	Kong	existed	through	the	system	of	extraterritoriality,	which	addressed	the	
perceived	 inadequacy	 of	 Chinese	 justice	 by	 removing	 British	 subjects,	 and	
nationals	 of	 other	 foreign	 treaty	 powers,	 from	 Chinese	 jurisdiction.	 	 This	
guaranteed	 for	 British	 subjects	 enjoyment	 of	 what	 were	 seen	 as	 the	 rights	 and	
safeguards	of	British	justice,	together	with	other	benefits	(as	well	as	restrictions)	
under	 the	 treaties.	 	 British	 officials	were	 however	 then	 faced	with	 the	 prospect	
that	what	many	saw	as	this	‘birthright’	of	‘Anglo-Saxon’	Britons	in	China	could	be	
acquired	 by	 ordinary	 ethnic	 Chinese,	 even	 without	 Quincey’s	 influential	
connections,	simply	by	virtue	of	their	having	been	born	in	a	British	colony	–	all	that	
was	 necessary	 to	 be	 a	 British	 subject	 under	 the	 common	 law.	 	 There	 was	 an	




6 	Christopher	 Munn,	 Anglo-China:	 Chinese	 People	 and	 British	 Rule	 in	 Hong	 Kong,	 1841-1880	
(Richmond,	2001).	
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citizenship	 bringing	 benefits	which	were	 the	 ‘birthright’	 of	 all	 who	were	 British	




and	 brought	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 China	 under	 the	 treaty	 system	 which	 had	 not	 been	
designed	 to	 differentiate	 among	 British	 subjects,	 laying	 bare	 intercolonial	
variations	in	attitudes,	practices	and	policies.7		George	Steinmetz	has	argued,	in	the	
case	 of	 German	 colonialism,	 that	 officials	 based	 at	 different	 locations	 adopted	
practices	 towards	 the	 colonised	 informed	by	an	ethnographic-like	 reading	of	 the	
culture	and	character	of	 the	colonised.8		 I	make	use	of	his	 insight	here	and	argue	
that	 British	 officials	 took	 positions	 based	 on	 both	 assumed	 ethnocultural	 and	
contextual	understandings	of	groups	such	as	Chinese	British	subjects,	so	that	 the	
same	populations	of	colonial	subjects	were	treated	differently	by	British	officials	in	
different	 places.	 	 Thus	 the	multipolar	 nature	 of	 empire	 in	 the	 British	 case	 could	




community	 in	 China	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 three	 quarters	 of	 the	 treaty	
century.	 	 I	 then	discuss	British	nationality	 law,	dual	nationality	and	 international	
law	as	they	–	at	least	in	theory	–	related	to	Chinese	British	subjects	in	China.		In	the	
subsequent	 section	of	 this	 chapter	 I	 describe	 the	 actions	 and	attitudes	of	British	
officials	towards	Chinese	British	subjects	in	the	early	decades	of	the	treaty	system,	
then	 I	 focus	 in	 more	 detail	 on	 two	 points	 in	 time	 when	 key	 policies	 affecting	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	were	 put	 into	 place	 by	 the	 British	 authorities:	 the	mid-
1860s	and	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century.		Officials	situated	in	a	range	of	
																																																								
7	A	 similar	 debate	 took	 place	 over	 intra-imperial	 immigration,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century,	between	two	sides	holding	broadly	the	same	opposing	views	as	were	visible	in	the	debate	







centres	of	British	power,	 including	 the	Foreign	Office	 in	London,	 the	Legation	 in	
Beijing,	 the	SCC	at	Shanghai	and	the	colonial	governments	of	Hong	Kong	and	the	
Straits	 Settlements	 engaged	with	 the	 issue	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 and	 often	
held	 contradictory	views.	 	 In	particular,	 I	will	 be	 looking	 at	 the	 tension	between	





When	 people	 in	 Britain	 today	 think	 of	 ethnic	 Chinese	 British	 nationals,	 they	
generally	 think	 first	of	Hong	Kong,	but	 in	 fact	 for	much	of	 the	 treaty	century	 the	
Straits	 Settlements	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 the	 largest	 single	 source	 of	 Chinese	
British	subjects	who	registered	themselves	at	British	consulates	in	China.	 	British	
consular	 records	 from	 1903	 show	 that	 the	 largest	 numbers	 of	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	 were	 registered	 in	 the	 consulates	 at	 Xiamen	 in	 Fujian	 and	 Shantou	 in	
Guangdong. 9 		 Of	 the	 50	 registered	 at	 Xiamen,	 32	 were	 born	 in	 the	 Straits	
Settlements,	and	only	one	was	born	in	Hong	Kong.10		Up	to	the	early	years	of	 the	
twentieth	 century,	 the	 only	 other	 port	 where	 significant	 numbers	 of	 Chinese	
British	 subjects	were	 registered	was	 Shanghai.	 	 The	 figures	 given	 by	 the	 consul	
there	in	1903	also	show	that	the	majority	were	from	the	Straits	Settlements:	of	22	


















any	 significant	 size	 (from	 two	 registered	 in	1903	 the	 figure	had	 grown	 to	49	by	
1908).12 		 The	 pattern	 of	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
registered	 at	Guangzhou	presumably	 reflected	 the	 fact	 that	most	who	 registered	
there	came	from	Hong	Kong,	which	became	a	more	significant	source	of	registered	




entitled	 in	 China	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 British	 subjects	 ‘as	 against	 the	 authorities	 of	
China.’13		 From	 1904	 this	was	 altered	 so	 that	 British	 recognition	 and	 protection	
was	extended	to	include	Chinese	born	in	a	British	possession	whose	parents	were	
not	 British	 subjects	 (i.e.	 not	 born	 or	 naturalised	 in	 British	 territory),	 subject	 to	
certain	 conditions.14		 The	 change	 of	 policy	 dramatically	 increased	 the	 number	 of	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 eligible	 for	 protection	 in	 China,	 especially	 from	 Hong	
Kong,	 since	more	 recent	 Chinese	migrants’	 children	 born	 in	 the	 colony	 of	 Hong	
Kong,	 or	 other	 British	 colonies	 or	 possessions,	 could	 now	 qualify	 for	 British	
protection	 in	 China,	 and	many	 of	 them	 no	 doubt	 registered	 at	 Guangzhou.	 	 The	
1867	rule	had	worked	to	preclude	registration	of	Chinese	 from	Hong	Kong	more	
than	 it	 did	 those	 from	 the	 longer-established	Chinese	 communities	 in	 the	 Straits	
Settlements,	 where	 there	 was	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 Chinese	 who	 were	 born	 on	














They	 mingle	 so	 completely	 with	 the	 natives	 as	 to	 be	 in	 no	 way	
distinguishable	 from	 them	 and	 sink	 the	 character	 of	 British	 subjects	
entirely	 until	 the	 consequences	 of	 some	 scrape	 or	 family	 feud	 compel	
them	 to	 claim	 protection,	 or	 unless	 it	 suits	 them	 to	 assume	 it	 for	
purposes	of	menace	and	extortion.15			
However,	 it	 was	 also	 reported	 in	 1866	 that	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 advertised	
their	businesses	as	Yingshang	 (Q),	 ‘British	 firms’,	 at	Xiamen.16		 It	 seems	 likely	




from	 the	 Straits,	were	 embedded	 to	 an	 extent	 in	wider	British	 treaty	port	 social	
and	 economic	 life	 –	 their	 connection	 with	 Britain	 in	 China	 was	 not	 always,	 as	
Sullivan	suggested,	purely	a	question	of	registration	as	British	 in	order	 to	secure	
protection	when	their	social	or	economic	engagements	with	other	Chinese	or	the	
Chinese	authorities	went	wrong.	 	 In	 the	early	years,	 they	appear	 to	have	 formed	
another	strand	alongside	the	Cantonese	described	by	Fairbank	as	Britain’s	 ‘shock	
troops’,	so	essential	to	the	British	during	the	Opium	War	and	afterwards	when	the	
first	 five	ports	were	opened.17		 It	was	not	uncommon	 for	Straits	Chinese,	 able	 to	
speak	English	through	education	and	upbringing	in	the	Straits,	to	act	as	linguists	or	
clerks	in	British	consulates.		Consular	linguists	from	the	Straits	were	employed	at	
Xiamen	 in	 the	 1840s	 and	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 Danshui	 in	 the	 1860s.18		 They	 also	
worked	for	the	Customs	service	or	British	firms,	again	often	using	their	linguistic	
skills.	 	 Chen	 Qingzhen,	 who	 was	 beaten	 to	 death	 in	 Xiamen	 by	 the	 Chinese	
authorities	 in	 1851	 for	 allegedly	 leading	 the	 local	 Small	 Sword	 Society,	 had	
previously	 worked	 as	 an	 ‘English	 clerk’	 for	 M.	 C.	 Morrison	 (interpreter	 at	 the	
consulate)	and	was	at	the	time	of	his	death	employed	by	Jardine,	Matheson	&	Co.19		
Another	 example	 is	 Penang-born	 registered	 British	 subject	 Kum	 Allum	 who	






18	Chen	 Qingxing	 at	 Xiamen,	 whose	 father	 was	 a	 sago	 manufacturer	 in	 Singapore,	 see	 TNA	




Shanghai,	 as	an	 interpreter	and	also	engaged	 in	business	deals	of	his	own.20		His	
son	Y.	S.	Kumsoo	had	property,	 trading	and	manufacturing	 interests	 in	Shanghai,	
and	 was	 also	 a	 Shanghai	 ratepayer,	 eligible	 to	 vote	 in	 Council	 elections.21		 Gu	
Hongming	(referred	to	in	contemporary	reports	as	Kaw	Hong	Ping),	who	was	born	
in	Penang	to	a	family	long	established	in	the	Straits	and	would	later	become	a	well-
known	 Chinese	 intellectual,	 became,	 on	 return	 from	 his	 education	 in	 Britain,	
Minister	Thomas	Wade’s	private	secretary	in	1879.22		His	brother,	businessman	Gu	
Hongde	(known	at	the	time	as	Kaw	Hong	Take),	is	pictured	with	his	wife	in	one	of	






port	 settlers	 rather	 than	 simply	 returned	 migrants,	 or	 members	 of	 the	 Chinese	
treaty	 port	 elite,	 and	 they	 were	 interested	 in	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 British-
dominated	Shanghai	International	Settlement	along	with	the	white	British	settlers	
more	prominent	in	the	literature.		They	perhaps	represented	an	overseas	outpost	
of	 the	 ‘English-educated	 professional	 class’	 instrumental	 in	 founding	 the	 Straits	
Chinese	 British	 Association	 in	 the	 Straits	 Settlements.24		 It	 is	 clear	 from	 consuls’	





20	‘Chang	Van	Ho	and	others	v.	 the	C.	N.	Co.’	NCH,	13	April	1876,	p.	348.	 	 ‘Chien	Pao-Shan	v.	Kum	
Allum,’	NCH,	14	February	1879,	p.	153.	
21	TNA	FO	671/449:	S.	Houston	McKean	to	Consul-General	E.	Fraser,	17	September	1920;	TNA	FO	




accessed	6	November	2013;	 for	more	details	on	Gu	Hongming	and	his	 family	see	Lo	Hui-min,	 ‘Ku	
Hung-Ming:	Homecoming,’	East	Asian	History,	6	(1993),	163–82.	
24	Brenda	 S.A.	 Yeoh,	 Contesting	 Space	 in	 Global	 Singapore :	 Power	 Relations	 and	 the	 Urban	 Built	
Environment	(Singapore,	2003),	p.	76.	
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class	 Chinese	 of	 the	 old	 type,	 unable	 to	 read,	write	 or	 even	 speak	 a	word	of	 the	
English	language.’25	
	
Many	Chinese	British	 subjects	 in	China	were	engaged	 in	 commercial	 activities	of	
some	 sort,	 often	 based	 on	 long-standing	 patterns	 of	 trade	 between	 South	 China	
and	Southeast	Asia	which	predated	the	opening	of	the	treaty	ports.26		In	1878,	the	
Straits	 Chinese	 community	 of	 Shanghai	 compiled	 a	 list	 of	 the	 Chinese	 British	





one	 school	master.27		The	 range	of	 commercial	 activities	was	 fairly	broad.	 	 Some	
Chinese	British	subjects	invested	in	manufacturing	and	service	industries	in	China.		
In	1881	a	factory	making	iron	pans	for	export	was	established	by	registered	Straits	
Chinese	 British	 subject	 See	 Eng	 Wat	 at	 Xiamen.28		 Y.	 S.	 Kumsoo	 owned	 a	 cigar	
factory	 in	 the	1920s,	 among	other	business	 interests.29		Gu	Hongde	engaged	 in	 a	
range	 of	 business	 activities	 at	 Fuzhou	 and	 other	 ports,	 including	 shipping.30		
Among	 the	 most	 prominent	 Chinese	 businesses	 in	 early	 twentieth	 century	
Shanghai	were	the	four	companies	owned	by	Australian	Chinese	which	dominated	
Shanghai’s	 retail	 industry,	Wing	On,	 Sincere,	 Sun	 Sun,	 and	Dah	 Sun.31	Consuls	 at	
Guangzhou	 were	 concerned	 to	 control	 the	 use	 of	 the	 British	 flag	 on	 vessels	
operating	in	Guangdong,	owned	or	operated	by	Chinese	British	subjects	or	Chinese	
residents	 of	 Hong	 Kong,	 some	 of	 which	were	 believed	 to	 be	 smuggling	 salt	 and	
																																																								


















subjects	 in	 the	 activities	 of	 rebellious	 ‘secret	 societies’	 such	 as	 the	 Small	 Sword	
Society	in	China.	 	The	earliest	case	was	perhaps	that	of	Chen	Qingxi,	who	Xiamen	
consul	Layton	described	in	1850	as	‘one	of	the	heads	of	the	Triad	Society	in	Amoy	
…	 a	dangerous	 character	here.’34		 In	1853,	during	 the	Small	 Swords'	 takeover	of	
Shanghai,	 the	NCH	 reported	that	 the	 leaders	of	 the	rebels	were	 ‘surrounded	by	a	
number	of	young	men	from	Singapore,	who	speak	remarkably	good	English;	one	of	
whom	 stood	 up	 boldly	 before	 some	 foreign	 visitors,	 saying	 “I	 am	 a	 British	
subject.”’35		 In	 1866,	 as	 Minister	 Rutherford	 Alcock	 began	 to	 introduce	 the	 first	
concerted	effort	to	exercise	control	over	Chinese	British	subjects	by	warning	them	
that	 they	 would	 be	 punished	 if	 they	 domiciled	 themselves	 in	 the	 interior	 in	
violation	of	the	treaties,	one	of	the	objectionable	activities	he	referred	to	was	that	
they	 ‘conspire	 with	 secret	 societies	 against	 the	 Chinese	 government.’ 36	
Engagement	 in	 Chinese	 politics	 and	 power	 struggles	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 ‘secret	
societies’,	as	Chinese	from	British	colonies	provided	support	to	the	Tongmenghui	




There	 is	a	 little	evidence	of	self-organisation	by	Chinese	British	subjects	 in	China	
outside	 existing	 ‘secret	 societies’,	 descent	 groups	 or	 guilds.	 	 A	 group	 calling	
themselves	the	British	Chinese	Community	of	Swatow	[Shantou]	organised	a	party	









38	Involvement	 in	 Chinese	 politics	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 why	 Chen	
Hanming	 (discussed	 below)	 was	 refused	 registration	 as	 a	 British	 subject	 in	 1925,	 see	 TNA	 FO	
671/460:	Pratt	(Shanghai)	to	Peking,	20	January	1925.		
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which	 gave	 details	 of	 speeches,	 refreshments,	 and	 names	 of	 those	 participating.		
Sim	 Kye-Pang,	 for	 the	 British	 Chinese	 community,	 expressed	 to	 the	 departing	
consul	their	‘high	appreciation	for	all	your	good	and	becoming	acts	in	safeguarding	
our	interests	in	this	land	where	justice	is	considerably	at	a	discount.’39		In	this	way	





For	 most	 British	 subjects,	 claiming	 British	 recognition	 in	 China	 was	 a	 fairly	
straightforward	 matter.	 	 Most	 British	 subjects	 derived	 their	 status	 from	 the	
common	 law	doctrine	 that	 birth	 ‘within	 the	 dominions	 of	 the	 crown	of	 England’	
made	them	natural-born	British	subjects.40		Apart	 from	certain	minor	exceptions,	
any	 child,	 regardless	 of	 parentage,	 born	 in	 colonies	 such	 as	 Hong	 Kong	 or	 the	
Straits	Settlements	was	therefore	a	natural-born	British	subject.		Statute	law	had	in	





subjects,	 irrespective	 of	 race	 or	 ethnicity.	 	 In	 1914	 the	 law	 was	 altered	 so	 that	
unlimited	 generations	 born	 abroad	 in	 places	 where	 ‘His	 Majesty	 exercises	
jurisdiction	 over	 British	 subjects’	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 natural-born	 British	
subjects,	 and	 this	 applied	 to	 China	 under	 extraterritoriality. 42 	However,	
transmission	 of	 British	 nationality	 from	 parent	 to	 child	 was	 only	 ever	 possible	
																																																								
39	NCH,	27	December	1913,	p.	973.	











An	 individual	 could	 become	 a	 British	 subject	 through	 naturalization	 either	 in	
Britain	 or	 in	 a	 British	 colony	 or	 possession.	 	 The	 latter	was	 known	 as	 'local'	 or	
'colonial'	 naturalization	 and	 the	 status	 it	 conferred	was	 effective	only	within	 the	
territory	 where	 it	 had	 been	 granted.	 	 It	 was	 used	 extensively	 in	 many	 British	
colonies	 eager	 to	 attract	 settlers.44		Naturalization	was	granted	 to	Chinese	 in	 the	
Straits	 under	 the	 Indian	 Naturalization	 Act	 30	 of	 1852	 from	 at	 least	 as	 early	 as	
1864,	 and	 when	 the	 Straits	 became	 a	 crown	 colony	 in	 1867	 a	 naturalization	
ordinance	 was	 issued	 the	 same	 year.45		 Hong	 Kong	 did	 not	 naturalise	 foreign	
residents	until	 the	1880s,	and	 then	 (at	 least	 in	 the	case	of	Chinese)	 the	privilege	
was	 only	 granted	 to	 members	 of	 the	 elite	 who	 had	 been	 given	 roles	 in	 the	
administration.46		 Despite	 the	 clear	 position	 under	 English	 law	 at	 the	 time,	 that	
local	 naturalization	was	 only	 effective	 in	 the	 colony	 or	 possession	where	 it	 had	
been	 granted,	 naturalised	 Chinese	 from	 the	 Straits	 were	 frequently	 reported	 to	
arrive	 in	China	with	 letters	or	certificates	 from	Singapore,	stating	 that	 they	were	




It	was	possible	 for	an	entire	population	 to	become	British	subjects	 following	 the	
conquest	or	cession	to	Britain	of	the	territory	where	they	lived.		In	the	case	of	Hong	
Kong,	 it	was	confirmed	by	 the	British	government's	 law	officers	 in	1843	that	 the	
inhabitants	there	at	the	time	of	cession	became	British	subjects,	although	sources	















The	difficulty	 of	 establishing	who	 could	qualify	 for	British	 status	under	 this	 rule	
was	much	increased	by	the	transient	nature	of	the	population	of	Hong	Kong,	many	
of	 whom	 lived	 on	 boats.49	The	 British	 government’s	 law	 officers	 confirmed	 that	
when	the	colony	of	Hong	Kong	was	enlarged,	by	the	transfer	of	Kowloon	and	later	
the	 New	 Territories	 to	 British	 rule,	 the	 inhabitants	 at	 the	 time	 automatically	
became	British	subjects.50	
	
Dual	 nationality,	 or	 'double	 allegiance'	 as	 it	 was	 often	 termed	 in	 nineteenth-
century	 texts,	was	 a	 recognised	 concept	within	 the	 system	 of	 'international	 law'	
which	had	evolved	between	European	states,	and	it	was	a	key	complicating	factor	
for	Chinese	British	subjects	 in	China.51		 It	potentially	applied	 to	all	 those	Chinese	
British	 subjects	 (the	 vast	majority)	whose	 British	 nationality	 did	 not	 stem	 from	






Under	 international	 law	 as	 espoused	 by	 the	 British	 government,	 those	 having	 a	
double	allegiance,	arising	 for	example	through	being	born	to	 foreign	parents	 in	a	
country	where	 nationality	was	 bestowed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 birth	 (such	 as	 Britain),	
were	not	entitled	to	be	considered	as	nationals	of	the	country	of	their	birth	when	
in	 the	 country	 of	 which	 their	 parents	 were	 nationals,	 provided	 that	 under	 that	
country's	 laws	 they	 were	 considered	 to	 have	 inherited	 nationality	 from	 their	
																																																								
48		The	low	estimate	is	then	Hong	Kong	Attorney	General	Julian	Pauncefote's,	given	in	1866.		Elliot	
and	 Bremer	 had	 in	 1841	 claimed	 the	 larger	 figure.	 	 See	 Munn,	 Anglo-China:	 Chinese	 People	 and	
British	Rule	in	Hong	Kong,	1841-1880,	pp.	54-5.	
49	Munn,	Anglo-China:	Chinese	People	and	British	Rule	in	Hong	Kong,	1841-1880,	p.	73.	








parents.52		 It	was	understood	that	under	Chinese	 law,	even	before	 it	was	actually	
codified	 in	 the	 first	 Chinese	 nationality	 law	 in	 1909,	 Chinese	 nationality	 passed	
through	descent,	irrespective	of	where	the	child	was	born,	which	would	make	the	
children	 of	 Chinese	 emigrants	 to	 British	 territories	 Chinese	 subjects.53		 It	 is	
important	 to	 remember	 the	 legal	 point	 that	 if	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	were	 not	
protected	in	China	this	was	not	necessarily	a	denial	of	their	legal	status	as	British	
subjects	 –	 it	 was	 rather	 an	 assertion	 that	 their	 other	 nationality	 (or	 allegiance)	
took	 precedence	 within	 Chinese	 territory	 –	 but	 the	 practical	 result	 would	 be	 a	




international	 law	 in	 all	 cases	 of	 dual	 nationality.	 	He	 ruled	 that	 children	born	 in	
India	 (and	 thus	 British	 subjects	 by	 birth)	 whose	 parents	 were	 Persian	 subjects	
would	be	 eligible	 for	British	protection	 even	 if	 they	 took	up	 residence	 in	Persia,	
contrary	to	the	usual	rule	of	international	law:	
considering	 the	 different	 and	 peculiar	 habits	 and	 practices	 of	 Asia,	 it	
seems	to	me	that,	considering	that	all	persons	born	in	British	India,	of	
whatever	parents,	 are	 entitled	 to	be	 regarded	as	British	 subjects.	 .	 .	 it	
would	be	 fair	 and	 right	 to	 extend	 to	 such	persons,	 even	 in	Persia,	 the	
benefits	of	being	placed	under	British	protection.54				
The	 question	 of	 whether	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 should	 apply	 to	 British	
policy	on	Chinese	British	subjects	in	China	was	considered	by	the	Foreign	Office	on	
a	number	of	occasions.		At	the	level	of	principle,	it	was	fundamentally	a	question	of	
the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 Chinese	 government	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 ‘civilised’,	
reasonable	 counterpart,	 fit	 to	 join	 the	 ‘family	 of	 nations’.	 	 The	 FO’s	 conclusions,	
based	on	inconsistent	advice	from	the	law	officers,	varied	considerably	over	time.		
Other	considerations	which	came	into	play	in	determining	British	policy	included	




53	Chee-Beng	 Tan,	 Routledge	Handbook	 of	 the	 Chinese	Diaspora,	 Routledge	Handbooks	 (Abindgon,	
Oxon,	 2013),	 p.	 64;	 Fairbank,	Trade	and	Diplomacy	on	 the	China	Coast:	The	Opening	of	 the	Treaty	
Ports,	1842-1854,	p.	216.	








Hong	 Kong,	 who	 seems	 not	 to	 have	 felt	 it	 necessary	 to	 refer	 such	 matters	 to	
London,	indicating	that	they	were	perhaps	relatively	uncontroversial	at	that	time.		
Policies	were	 formulated	 in	 response	 to	 incidents	 reported	by	 the	consuls	at	 the	
open	 ports,	 who	 were	 simultaneously	 dealing	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 issues	 in	





given	 to	 dual	 nationals	 living	 outside	 the	 treaty	 ports.56		 Consuls	 at	 Ningbo	 and	
Xiamen	 in	 the	1840s	 intervened	with	 local	Chinese	officials	on	behalf	 of	Chinese	
British	 subjects	 and	 their	 interests,	 even	 when	 they	 were	 engaged	 in	 dubious	





(not	 a	 British	 subject)	 who	 had	 served	 the	 British	 during	 the	 war.58		 Chinese	
official	 complaints	 regarding	 jurisdiction	 over	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	were	 not	
very	seriously	considered.		When	the	superintendent	of	trade	did	concern	himself	
with	Chinese	British	subjects,	he	was	preoccupied	with	practicalities,	for	example	




56	TNA	 FO	 228/125:	 Bonham	 to	 Amoy,	 1	 May	 1849,	 quoted	 in	 Sullivan	 to	 Bonham	 No.	 16,	 25	
January	1851.			






King	Fairbank’s	 summary	of	 the	position	with	 regard	 to	Chinese	British	 subjects	
that	 ‘True	 to	 its	 legal	 principles	…	 the	 British	 government	 undertook	 to	 protect	
them’,	portrays	accurately	the	official	practices	adopted	by	the	superintendent	and	
consuls	 towards	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 in	 the	 first	 decade	 or	 so	 of	 the	 treaty	





An	 early	 consular	 voice	 raising	 questions	 about	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 as	 a	
problem	population	was	George	Sullivan	at	Xiamen	who,	in	1850,	advised	Bonham,	
in	 a	 despatch	 regarding	 the	 certificates	 issued	 to	 naturalised	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	by	the	Straits	Settlements	government,	that	‘It	is	by	no	means	desirable	to	
make	the	class	of	Anglo	Chinese	subjects	more	extensive	than	the	law	allows	it	to	
be.’61		 Sullivan	had	witnessed	 the	growth	of	 ‘secret	 society’	activity	 in	Xiamen,	 in	
which	 Chinese	 people	 from	 the	 Straits	 were	 deeply	 involved,	 which	 would	
culminate	 in	 the	 takeover	 of	 the	 city	 by	 the	 Small	 Sword	 Society	 in	1853.62		 The	
first	major	confrontation	between	Britain	and	China	over	Chinese	British	subjects	
arose	 through	 ‘secret	 society’	 activities	 in	 Xiamen,	 when	 Chen	 Qingzhen	 was	
beaten	 to	 death	 in	 1851	 by	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 there,	 who	 accused	 him	 of	
leading	the	Small	Sword	Society.63		The	case	was	escalated	to	Bonham,	who	took	it	
up	 fairly	 energetically	 with	 the	 Imperial	 Commissioner	 Xu	 Guangjin,	 even	
threatening	 deployment	 of	 a	 British	 navy	 steamer.64		 After	 several	 rounds	 of	













further.’65		This	was	only	one	year	 after	Palmerston’s	 famous	 intervention	 in	 the	
Don	Pacifico	case	in	Greece.66	
	
The	 story	 of	 Chen	 Qingzhen	 had	 a	 long	 afterlife	 in	 Foreign	 Office	 lore,	 being	
referred	 to	 time	 and	 again	 when	 officials	 considered	 the	 question	 of	 Chinese	
British	 subjects,	 and	 it	 served	 to	 illustrate	 the	 difficulty	 of	 the	 issue.	 	 There	 is	 a	
detail	of	the	story	which	was	sometimes	emphasised	in	its	retelling	and	which	may	
explain	 part	 of	 its	 continued	 resonance.	 	 Minister	 Alcock	 described	 the	 case	 in	
1869,	 saying	 that	 Chen	 was	 ‘bambooed	 to	 death	 in	 the	 same	 Yamen	 where	 the	
consul	was	kept	 in	parley	 for	several	hours	by	the	Chief	Magistrate	until	 the	end	
was	effected.	 	The	mangled	body	was	then	sent	after	the	consul	in	derision	of	his	
demand	for	the	man.’67		The	case	of	Chen	Qingzhen	was	not	just	a	story	of	Chinese	
cruelty,	 it	was	 also	 an	 example	 of	 Chinese	humiliation	of	 a	British	 consul,	 and	 it	
could	be	used	by	those	who	argued	against	protecting	Chinese	British	subjects	to	














Jew	 born	 in	 Gibraltar	 whose	 property	 had	 been	 damaged	 in	 a	 riot.	 	 Palmerston	 famously	
proclaimed	in	the	House	of	Commons	that	‘a	British	subject,	in	whatever	land	he	may	be,	shall	feel	
confident	 that	 the	watchful	 eye	and	 the	 strong	arm	of	England,	will	 protect	him	against	 injustice	
and	wrong.’		Quoted	in	Edward	Rhodes,	Presence,	Prevention,	and	Persuasion:	A	Historical	Analysis	of	
Military	Force	and	Political	Influence	(Oxford,	2004),	p.	33.	
67	TNA	FO	17/1258:	Alcock	 to	FO,	6	May	1869.	 	The	case	was	also	 retold	 in	a	dramatic	 style	and	






the	 chief	 judge	 in	 Shanghai	 as	 well	 as	 the	 superintendent	 of	 trade	 (by	 now	 the	
minister	 in	 Beijing)	 and	 the	 colonial	 governments	 of	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 Straits	
Settlements.		Alcock	while	superintendent	and	minister	found	himself	at	the	centre	
of	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 activity	 on	 the	 question	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 from	1865	




the	 treatment	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 until	 1904,	 when	 both	 were	 repealed.		
They	 are	 considered	 here	 in	 some	 detail,	 to	 show	 the	 divergent	 responses	 of	
British	 officials	 to	 problems	 of	 governance,	 which	 were	 based	 on	 a	 variety	 of	
factors:	 attitudes	 towards	 Chinese	 officials	 and	 people;	 the	 personal	 history	 of	
individual	 British	 officials;	 and	 the	 divergent	 priorities	 of	 British	 officials	 in	
different	roles	and	locations.	
	
Two	 separate	 matters	 had	 arisen	 almost	 simultaneously	 to	 bring	 the	 issue	 of	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 to	 the	 fore.	 	 In	 December	 1865	 Foreign	 Secretary	 Lord	
Clarendon	 instructed	 Alcock	 to	 inform	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 of	 the	 British	
position	 that	 Chinese	 resident	 in	Hong	Kong	 at	 the	 time	of	 its	 cession	 to	Britain	
were	British	 subjects,	 since	 it	was	not	known	whether	 the	Chinese	accepted	 this	
claim.71		 The	motive	 behind	 this	was	 the	wish	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 Chinese	would	
cooperate	in	the	extradition	of	alleged	criminals	who	had	absconded	to	China	from	
Hong	Kong.	 	Clarendon's	 instructions	 to	Alcock	also	contained	 the	Foreign	Office	
view	on	the	status	of	children	born	in	Hong	Kong	to	Chinese	who	had	moved	there	
after	its	cession	to	Britain:	the	usual	rule	of	international	law	with	regard	to	dual	
nationality	 was	 to	 be	 followed,	 so	 they	 would	 not	 be	 protected	 in	 China.	 	 The	
question	of	the	status	of	subsequent	generations	born	in	Hong	Kong	or	of	Chinese	
born	 in	 the	 Straits	 or	 other	 British	 territories	 was	 not	 discussed.	 	 The	 second	







(acting	 head	 of	 the	 Legation	 before	 Alcock’s	 arrival)	 had	written	 to	 the	 Foreign	
Office	reporting	a	despatch	from	Daniel	Brookes	Robertson,	consul	at	Guangzhou,	
about	 Chinese	 British	 subjects. 72 		 This	 despatch	 presumably	 crossed	 with	
Clarendon’s	to	Alcock	of	December.			
	
Wade	 reported	 two	 issues	 raised	 in	Robertson’s	despatch:	 the	 certificates	 issued	
by	 the	 Straits	 Government	 to	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 travelling	 to	 China	 (in	
particular	 the	 Chinese	 wording	 in	 the	 certificates,	 which	 referred	 to	 the	 British	
Consulate	using	a	slang	term	translated	literally	as	the	‘red	bristle	consulate’;	and	
Robertson’s	attitude	to	Chinese	British	subjects	seeking	to	register	themselves	at	
the	 Guangzhou	 consulate.	 	 Robertson	 described	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 as	 a	
‘mischievous	 class’	 and	 reported	 that	 he	 refused	 to	 register	 them	 as	 British	
subjects,	since	he	had	‘detected	them	in	handing	these	certificates	to	one	another,	





had	 protested,	 as	 they	 did	 at	 Xiamen	 in	 1866,	 that	 if	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
wished	to	be	treated	as	British	they	should	not	dress	as	Chinese;74	but	he	did	not	
justify	his	practice	on	those	grounds,	rather	he	stated:		
You	 may	 say	 there	 is	 no	 law	 to	 compel	 a	 British	 subject	 to	 wear	 a	
foreign	dress,	and	you	are	right	–	there	is	none	–	but	there	is	a	custom,	








74	TNA	 FO	 17/1258:	 Swinhoe	 to	 Alcock,	 21	 December	 1866,	 enclosed	 in	 Alcock	 to	 Stanley,	 7	
February	1867.	
75	TNA	 FO	 17/1258:	 Robertson	 to	 Wade,	 15	 September	 1865.	 	 Wearing	 Chinese	 clothes	 later	
became	a	 controversial	missionary	 strategy	 (see	 ‘Chinese	Etiquette’,	NCH,	 18	March	1892,	p.	335	
for	contemporary,	and	highly	negative,	comment	on	this	practice).		Chinese	dress	had	earlier	been	
adopted	by	plant	hunter	Robert	Fortune	on	his	journeys	in	the	interior,	see	Bickers,	The	Scramble	




deterred	 Chinese	 British	 applicants	 for	 passports	 for	 travel	 into	 the	 interior	 by	




thus	 caused	 to	 the	 consul,	 and	much	of	 his	 time,	which	might	be	 given	 far	more	
profitably	 to	 genuine	 British	 cases,	 uselessly	 expended.’	 	 He	 also	 suggested	 that	
Chinese	 officials	 assumed	 that	 consuls	 had	 been	 bribed	 to	 take	 up	 the	 cases	 of	
Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 which	 ‘tends	 to	 weaken	 his	 influence	 and	 prestige.’76		
Consul	 Arthur	 Davenport	 at	 Shanghai	 also	 argued	 against	 protecting	 Chinese	
British	subjects	in	1878:	
The	privileges	of	quasi-extraterritoriality	provided	by	 the	Treaties	 for	
British	 subjects	 require	 the	exercise	of	a	very	considerable	amount	of	
good	 feeling,	 tact,	 and	 self	 restraint,	 qualities	 for	 the	most	 part	 to	 be	




which	 contain	 numerous	 accounts	 of	 the	 frequent	 drunkenness,	 violence	 and	
commercial	 chicanery	 engaged	 in	 by	mostly	 non-Chinese	British	 subjects,	 shows	
that	Davenport’s	 assertion	 as	 to	 the	 inferior	 qualities	 of	 Chinese	British	 subjects	
was	not	a	fair	one.			
	
Many	 consuls	 complained	 of	 the	 trouble	 caused	 to	 them	 by	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	and	questioned	their	right	 to	protection,	but	 there	are	also	nevertheless	
numerous	examples	of	 consular	 intervention	on	 their	behalf.	 	A	notable	example	
occurred	in	1866	at	Xiamen,	when	Consul	William	Pedder,	fearing	a	repeat	of	the	






the	Coroner’s	 jury	 responsible	 for	 the	 inquest	 into	Chen’s	 death,	which	may	 explain	 his	 attitude.		
Pedder’s	 replacement	 Swinhoe	 on	 taking	 over	 at	 Xiamen	 raised	 doubts	 as	 to	 the	 correctness	 of	
Pedder’s	 intervention,	 since	 the	man	was	actually	 a	naturalised	British	 subject	 and	 therefore	not	
eligible	for	British	protection	in	China.		TNA	FO	228/405:	Swinhoe	to	Alcock,	15	May	1866.	
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considerably,	 as	 the	 above	 examples	 show,	 ranging	 from	 Robertson’s	 refusal	 to	
accept	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 for	 registration	 (a	 stance	 he	maintained	 into	 the	
1870s)	to	dramatic	interventions	such	as	Pedder’s	in	1866.79		What	is	clear	is	that	
consular	practice	was	not	based	on	rigid	adherence	 to	 law	or	 regulations.	 	From	
the	 1860s	 right	 through	 to	 the	 1920s	 it	 was	 highly	 variable,	 as	 consuls’	 past	
experiences	 and	 views	 of	 Britishness,	 or	 degree	 of	 feelings	 of	 moral	 duty	 or	
sympathy	 towards	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 often	 influenced	 their	 approach	
towards	 them,	 which	 could	 also	 be	 affected	 by	 ignorance	 or	 inadequate	
understanding	of	the	rules	consuls	were	supposed	to	apply.	
	
The	 attitude	 of	 Thomas	 Wade	 as	 chargé	 and	 then	 minister	 was	 far	 more	
sympathetic	 than	 most	 British	 consuls	 or	 diplomats	 towards	 Chinese	 British	
subjects.	 	 In	 Wade’s	 opinion,	 there	 were	 among	 them	 men	 ‘of	 great	 merit	 and	





Guangzhou	 with	 the	 more	 typically	 cynical	 comment	 that	 ‘these	 Singapore	 and	
Penang	 quasi-British	 subjects	……	 rather	 contravene	 the	 doctrine	 that	 the	moral	




a	 dispute	 which	 had	 initially	 arisen	 at	 Fuzhou	 over	 taxes	 involving	 Gu	 Hongde	
(brother	of	Gu	Hongming)	and	another	Chinese	British	subject	 in	business	 there,	
Wade	also	made	the	unusual,	but	no	doubt	truthful,	comment	to	the	Foreign	Office	









be	 sent	 to	 Fuzhou	 and	 Xiamen	 and	 threatened	 hostilities.	 	 Prince	 Gong	 was	
reported	 to	 be	 ‘seriously	 disconcerted’,	 and	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 in	 London	 were	
displeased.84		Wade’s	particularly	aggressive	stance	in	1872	reflected	the	change	in	
relations	 since	 the	Tianjin	massacre,	which	as	Wade	pointed	out	 to	Gong,	meant	
that	he	felt	he	could	not	‘mince	matters’.85		But	even	taking	this	into	account,	Wade	
was	 unusual	 among	 senior	 British	 officials	 in	 being	 consistently	 assertive	 of	 the	








subjects	were	 troublesome	 both	 for	 the	 Chinese	 and	 the	 British	 authorities.	 	 He	
spelled	 out	 his	 difference	 of	 opinion	 with	 Wade	 over	 the	 civilizing	 potential	 of	
Chinese	British	subjects:	
I	 have	 heard	 it	 contended	 that	 by	means	 of	 naturalized	 Chinese	who	




far	 as	my	own	experience	extends	 I	 confess	 that	 I	 am	 led	 to	adopt	an	
opposite	conclusion.87	
In	 1867,	 Alcock	 went	 as	 far	 as	 to	 recommend	 to	 the	 FO	 a	 scheme	 originally	







about	 the	 issue	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 gave	 the	 contrary	 opinion	 that	 ‘Her	 Majesty’s	
Government	 ought	 not	 to	 insist	 upon	 extending	British	protection	 to	persons	 of	 Chinese	descent	
whilst	they	are	within	Chinese	territory.’		This	opinion	was	not	forwarded	by	the	FO,	as	they	were	
waiting	 for	 a	 despatch	 from	 Wade	 which	 never	 materialised.	 	 Quoted	 in	 TNA	 FO	 405/256:	
memorandum	 of	 J.	 T.	 Pratt,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Anglo-Chinese	 in	 China,’	 4	 February	 1928,	
confidential	print,	p.	195.	
87	TNA	FO	17/1258:	Alcock	to	FO,	15	February	1867.	
88	MacDonnell’s	 harsh	 treatment	 of	 Chinese	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 is	 described	 in	 Munn,	 Anglo-China:	
Chinese	People	and	British	Rule	in	Hong	Kong,	1841-1880,	p.	330.	
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that	 Chinese	 resident	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 cession	were	 regarded	 as	
British	subjects	in	China.		If	it	were	not	deemed	acceptable	to	deny	them	protection	
as	 MacDonnell	 suggested,	 Alcock	 proposed	 requiring	 them	 to	 wear	 European	




The	 law	 officers’	 opinion	 on	 this	 occasion	was	 that	 it	was	 acceptable	 to	 require	
Chinese	British	subjects	 to	distinguish	themselves	 from	Chinese	subjects	 through	
their	 costume	 and	 Alcock	 was	 asked	 to	 prepare	 a	 draft.90		 After	 a	 number	 of	
versions	 had	 passed	 back	 and	 forth,	 the	 notification	 known	 as	 the	 ‘costume	
regulations’	was	issued	in	1868,	requiring	Chinese	British	subjects	to	‘discard	the	
Chinese	 costume	 and	 adopt	 some	 other	 dress	 or	 costume	 whereby	 they	 may	
readily	be	distinguished	from	the	native	population.’		Chinese	British	subjects	were	
also	required	to	‘pay	all	due	respect	……	according	to	the	custom	and	usage	of	the	

























example,	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 demonstration	 of	 opposition	 to	 the	Qing	 dynasty,	 a	
badge	of	modernity	and	allegiance	to	the	new	republic,	or	as	aping	foreign	ways.94		
Pär	Cassel	has	pointed	out	the	importance	of	style	of	dress	to	Chinese	officials,	who	
argued	 that	 missionaries	 wearing	 Chinese	 clothing	 should	 submit	 to	 Chinese	
jurisdiction	in	the	places	where	they	took	up	residence.95		
	
Alcock’s	 costume	 regulations	 stood	 out	 at	 the	 time	 they	were	 issued,	 and	 do	 so	
today,	 as	 rather	 peculiar	measures	 for	 the	 British	 authorities	 to	 take	 in	 dealing	
with	 Chinese	 British	 subjects.	 	 Alcock	 knew	 this	 and	 anticipated	 the	 backlash	
against	the	regulations	which	occurred	following	their	promulgation.96		For	some,	
it	 was	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 cherished	 ideals	 of	 Britain’s	 liberal	 government	 to	
require	 of	 its	 citizens	 particular	 clothing	 in	 return	 for	 recognition.	 	 It	 was	 also	
considered	grotesque	to	encourage	‘Chinamen’	to	become	that	most	distasteful	or	
even	dangerous	thing	–	the	cultural	hybrid.97		The	regulations	also	appear	strange	
when	 compared	 with	 British	 practice	 elsewhere:	 we	 are	 more	 familiar	 with	
contemporary	colonial	 situations	such	as	 India	where	efforts	were	made	 to	have	
Europeans	and	locals	keep	to	their	own	traditional	dress,	which	as	Bernard	Cohn	
states,	 ‘symbolized	 their	 separateness’. 98 		 Clare	 Anderson	 has	 described	 the	
revulsion	 and	 disgust	 expressed	 by	 British	 in	 India	 when	 Indians	 altered	 their	
traditional	 clothing	 styles	 and	 adopted	 hybrid	 styles	 influenced	 by	 European	
																																																								
94	Henrietta	 Harrison,	 The	 Making	 of	 the	 Republican	 Citizen:	 Political	 Ceremonies	 and	 Symbols	 in	
China	1911-1929	(Oxford,	2000),	pp.	30-8.	
95	Pär	Kristoffer	Cassel,	 ‘Extraterritoriality	in	China:	What	We	Know	and	What	We	Don’t	Know’,	in	




1868,	p.	611.	 	Extensive	 sumptuary	 laws	had	of	 course	existed	 in	Europe	 in	 the	past,	 but	by	 this	
time	they	had	long	since	been	repealed	in	Great	Britain	and	such	laws	would	have	seemed	archaic.		
See	Alan	Hunt,	Governance	of	the	Consuming	Passions:	A	History	of	Sumptuary	Law	(London,	1996).		





Straits	 governor	 complained	 about	 the	 ‘inconvenience	 and	 injury	 it	 is	 likely	 to	
cause	 to	a	number	of	our	population,	of	 a	 class	who	deserve	better	 treatment	at	
our	 hands,’	 and	 even	 feared	 ‘unpleasant,	 if	 not	 injurious,	 results	 throughout	 the	
Settlements.’100			The	question	of	Chinese	British	subjects	was	therefore	a	focus	of	
contention	in	which	attitudes	towards	China	as	a	nation,	Chinese	people	and	their	
inherent	 character,	 and	 identity	 and	 the	management	of	 difference	 all	 came	 into	
play	 and	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 have	 varied	 across	 different	 locations	 in	 which	 British	
officials	were	engaged	in	governance	over	Chinese	British	subjects. 
	
The	 government	 of	 the	 Straits	 Settlements	 generally	 displayed	 considerable	
concern	 for	 the	 rights	 of	 its	 Chinese	British	 subjects	who	went	 to	China.	 	 Straits	
Chinese	were	apparently	readily	granted	certificates	for	travel	to	China,	 intended	
to	provide	for	their	protection	as	British	subjects,	from	the	1840s,	a	practice	which	
continued	 with	 the	 transfer	 of	 authority	 over	 the	 colony	 from	 the	 East	 India	
Company	 to	 the	 Colonial	 Office.101		 The	 government	 of	 the	 Straits	 Settlements	
intervened	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 a	 number	 of	 Chinese	British	 subjects	 from	 the	 1860s,	
and	 its	 approach	 was	 generally	 supportive	 of	 their	 rights,	 often	 in	 cases	 where	
protection	had	been	refused	by	consuls	or	the	Legation.		While	interventions	were	
sometimes	 undertaken	 in	 direct	 response	 to	 pressure	 put	 on	 the	 Straits	
government	 by	 Chinese	 based	 there,	 there	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 the	 colonial	




100	TNA	 FO	 17/1258:	 Ord	 to	 Colonial	 Office,	 23	 December	 1868,	 enclosed	 in	 Colonial	 Office	 to	
Foreign	Office,	3	February	1869.	
101	An	official	notification	was	published	in	1844	which	declared	that	‘Authentic	intelligence	having	
been	 received	 that	 a	 naturalized	British	 Subject,	 but	 of	 Chinese	 origin	had	 incurred	 some	 risk	 of	
Siezure	[sic]	and	persecution	by	the	Chinese	Authorities	in	consequence	of	his	appearing	at	one	of	
the	Ports	 in	China…it	 is	hereby	notified	with	a	view	to	protect	persones	 [sic]	so	situated	 that	 the	
Resident	Councillors	at	Pinang,	Singapore	and	[sic]	will	be	prepared	to	 furnish	a	certificate	when	
required	 intimating	 that	 they	 are	 naturalized	 British	 Subjects.’	 Quoted	 in	 ‘The	 British	 Subject	 of	
Chinese	 Origin’,	 The	 Singapore	 Free	 Press	 and	 Mercantile	 Advertiser,	 2	 January	 1845,	 p.	 2.	 	 The	
reference	to	‘naturalized’	British	subjects	is	probably	erroneous	–	the	notification	was	prompted	by	
the	case	of	a	natural	born	Chinese	British	subject	who	was	detained	at	Ningbo.		Consuls	and	other	
officials	 frequently	 referred	 to	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 as	 ‘naturalized’	 when	 they	 were	 not,	




impulses	 of	 the	 ‘civilizing	mission,’	 in	 turn	 informed	 by	 assessments	 concerning	
the	 nature	 of	 Chinese	 people.	 	 In	 1883	Governor	Weld	wrote	 in	 this	 vein	 to	 the	
Colonial	 Office	 shortly	 after	 two	 Penang-born	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	
refused	registration	at	Shanghai:		
I	believe	that	whilst	we	should	 lessen	our	responsibilities	by	relieving	
ourselves	of	 the	 care	 in	China	of	men	who	are	 really	Chinese	 in	heart	












any	 ethnic	 Chinese,	 and	 even	 deported	 troublemakers	 to	 China,	 some	 of	 whom	
were	 presumably	 British	 subjects.103		 In	 1867	 Hong	 Kong	 Governor	MacDonnell	
expressed	 concern	 that	 disreputable	 characters	would	 take	 advantage	 of	 British	
protection	but	respectable	Chinese	would	misinterpret	British	edicts	on	the	status	
of	Chinese	British	subjects	as	meaning	that	by	settling	in	Hong	Kong	they	would	be	
forced	 to	 give	 up	 Chinese	 nationality.	 	 This	 he	 feared	 would	 deter	 them	 from	
moving	 to	 Hong	 Kong,	 and	 he	 argued	 that	 ‘any	 Chinese	 resident	 here	 would	 at	















all,	 consuls	 would	 still	 be	 able	 to	 differentiate	 between	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
and	‘white’	Britons	on	the	basis	of	physical	appearance	and	features	of	culture	and	
lifestyle	other	than	mode	of	dress.		Consuls	may	have	been	in	favour	because	it	was	
probably	widely	 known	 that,	 as	 Robertson	 had	 found,	 prohibiting	 Chinese	 dress	
was	an	effective	way	of	reducing	the	numbers	who	sought	to	register	themselves	
as	British	subjects.		This	possibility	was	suggested	by	the	wording	of	the	regulation	
itself,	which	 stated	 that	Chinese	British	 subjects	were	not	 required	 to	 follow	 the	
regulations,	but	if	they	failed	to	do	so	they	would	be	subject	to	Chinese	jurisdiction.		
The	reasons	why	consuls	might	wish	to	discourage	registration	of	Chinese	British	
subjects	 did	 not	 stem	 solely	 from	 beliefs	 which	 they	 may	 have	 held	 about	
Britishness,	 imperial	 citizenship,	 or	 the	 proper	 rights	 of	 colonial	 subjects.	 	 For	
those	 consuls	 based	 at	 ports	 with	 a	 significant	 population	 of	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	 (especially	 Xiamen,	 Shantou,	 and	 later	 Guangzhou),	 disputes	 involving	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 could	 take	 up	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 consular	 time.		
This	was	not	just	down	to	the	volume	of	disputes;	cases	involving	Chinese	British	
subjects	 and	 their	 Chinese	 associates	 were	 often	 very	 difficult	 for	 consuls	 to	
understand	 and	 apply	 English	 law	 to.	 	 The	 volume	 of	 correspondence	 with	 the	
Chinese	 authorities	 generated	by	 such	 cases	was	 certainly	high	at	Xiamen	 in	 the	
early	twentieth	century,	where,	according	to	a	report	prepared	by	Consul	Ambrose	




105	TNA	 FO	 17/1258:	 ‘The	 Dress	 Notification’,	 The	 China	 Mail,	 19	 December	 1868,	 enclosed	 in	
Alcock	to	Foreign	Office,	20	February	1869.	
106	Figures	from	Sundius’	report	show	that	from	1906-8,	matters	involving	Chinese	British	subjects	
generated	 368	 items	 of	 correspondence	 with	 the	 Chinese	 authorities,	 whereas	 those	 involving	
missionaries	 resulted	 in	 214.	 	 Over	 those	 years	 the	 average	 number	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
registered	at	Xiamen	was	47.		The	average	number	of	missionaries	was	34.		Figures	are	from	TNA	
FO	228/2157,	Sundius	to	Jordan,	7	January	1909,	quoted	in	Murakami	Ei,	‘The	Question	of	Chinese	




Alcock’s	 position	 on	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 at	 this	 time	 should	 be	 seen	 in	 the	




approach.	 	Measures	such	as	the	costume	regulations	were,	 it	seems,	 intended	to	
assist	in	that	goal—Alcock	argued	when	forwarding	his	draft	to	the	Foreign	Office	
that	they	would	‘get	rid	of	a	serious	practical	inconvenience	fraught	with	mischief,	




boats	 and	 villages. 108 		 Alcock’s	 views	 on	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 also	
probably	 influenced	 by	 his	 personal	 experiences	 as	 a	 consul,	 particularly	 at	
Xiamen,	 where	 the	 consul’s	 workload	 was	 most	 heavily	 burdened	 by	 matters	
involving	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 but	 unlike	 some	 officials,	 Alcock	 emphasised	
practical	justifications,	in	particular	the	aim	of	improved	relations	with	the	Chinese	
government,	 and	 tended	 not	 to	 stray	 into	 discourses	 on	 Britishness	 in	 general.		
That	 the	 costume	 regulations	were	primarily	 a	pragmatic	 attempt	on	 the	part	of	
Alcock	 to	 reduce	 friction	 between	 British	 and	 Chinese	 officials,	 rather	 than	 an	
attempt	at	social	engineering,	is	also	suggested	by	the	rather	contradictory	nature	
of	the	regulations:	at	the	same	time	as	pushing	Chinese	British	subjects	away	from	
Chinese	 habits	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 dress,	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 regulations,	 which	
required	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 to	 follow	 Chinese	 customs	 and	manners	when	
appearing	 before	 Chinese	 officials,	 was	 clearly	 pulling	 them	 in	 the	 opposite	





108	TNA	FO	17/1258:	Hornby	 to	Alcock,	17	December	1866,	enclosed	 in	Alcock	 to	FO,	17	 January	
1867.	
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Sir	Edmund	Hornby,	 the	British	 judge	based	at	Shanghai,	 although	having	a	very	
important	impact	on	the	practice	of	consuls	from	1867	onwards,	was	not	generally	
included	 in	 the	 frequent	 policy	 discussions	 between	 the	 Legation,	 Foreign	Office	
and	colonial	governments	over	Chinese	British	subjects.		He	was	not	involved	at	all	
in	discussions	on	the	costume	regulations.		In	1867	Hornby	issued	instructions	to	
consuls	 which	 contained	 the	 single	 most	 consistently	 applied	 rule	 on	 Chinese	
British	subjects	 in	 the	nineteenth	century—that	 those	born	 to	parents	who	were	
themselves	British	subjects	were	 to	be	protected,	but	 those	born	 to	parents	who	
were	not	British	subjects	were	ineligible—but	it	appears	that	he	did	not	clear	them	
with	the	minister	or	Foreign	Office	in	advance.		The	instructions,	which	dealt	with	
all	 aspects	 of	 consular	 judicial	 duties	 and	 amounted	 to	 over	 one	 hundred	 pages	
when	published	 in	 Shanghai,	were	 sent	on	after	 they	had	been	 issued,	 and	were	
eventually	approved	by	 the	 law	officers.109		 It	 is	 striking	however	 that	 at	 around	
the	same	time	that	detailed	despatches	were	passing	between	the	Foreign	Office,	
the	 minister	 and	 the	 colonial	 governments	 regarding	 protection	 and	 control	 of	
Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 Hornby’s	 rule	was	 issued	 buried	 among	 the	 detail	 of	 a	
handbook	on	 consular	 jurisdiction,	 apparently	without	 any	 consultation	with	his	
superiors	in	Beijing	or	London.110		Alcock	was	not	aware	of	Hornby’s	instructions	





Hornby	 had	 previously	 served	 as	 judge	 of	 the	 British	 court	 in	 the	 Levant,	 also	
exercising	extraterritorial	jurisdiction,	and	portions	of	the	instructions	he	issued	in	
China	were	adapted	from	those	he	had	issued	to	consuls	there.112		More	generally,	
as	 already	discussed	 in	 chapter	 two,	Hornby	did	not	 take	 a	 conciliatory	position	
towards	 the	Chinese	authorities,	and	 thus	was	prepared	 to	place	himself	at	odds	
with	 Alcock	 over	 the	 latter’s	 initiatives	 to	 remove	 sources	 of	 conflict	 and	move	
																																																								
109	Hornby,	Instructions.	









by	 the	 findings	 of	 his	 recent	 fact-finding	 tour	 of	 the	 consular	 courts	 under	 his	
supervision:113		
This	rule	has	been	wisely	laid	down	by	H.M.'s	Government	to	prevent	in	
China	 the	 abuse	 of	 the	 rules	 of	 English	 law	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 birth	
conferring	 citizenship,	which	would	 in	 all	 probability	 occur	 if	 Chinese	




Hornby	 did	 base	 it	 on	 a	 Foreign	 Office	 source,	 presumably	 Clarendon’s	 1865	
despatch	 to	Alcock	which	was	 summarised	 in	 a	 circular	 to	 consuls	 of	November	
1866.115		This	would	explain	why	children	born	in	British	colonies	to	parents	who	
were	 Chinese	 subjects	 and	 not	 also	 British	 subjects	 were	 not	 to	 be	 protected.		
However,	 Hornby	 seems	 to	 have	 assumed	 that	 the	 children	 of	 ethnic	 Chinese	
parents	 who	 were	 themselves	 born	 or	 naturalised	 in	 British	 colonies	 would	 be	
protected.	 	 This	 question	 had	 not	 been	 discussed	 in	 Clarendon’s	 despatch	 to	
Alcock,	but	Hornby’s	decision	was	contrary	 to	 the	 international	 law	approach	on	





The	 respective	 intentions	 of	 Hornby’s	 instructions	 and	 the	 costume	 regulations	
were	often	misunderstood.		According	to	Alcock,	his	regulations	were	intended	as	
a	means	of	controlling	Chinese	British	subjects	by	forcing	them	to	display	openly	







which	 the	 recognition	 of	 either	 would	 necessarily	 impose.’116		 They	 were	 not	
intended	to	determine	which	Chinese	British	subjects	were	prima	facie	eligible	for	
British	protection	 in	China—that	was	 the	purpose	of	Hornby’s	 instructions—but	
merely	provided	a	means	of	disqualifying	from	protection	eligible	British	subjects	




China)	 that	 these	 regulations	 were	 the	 only	 criteria	 which	 should	 be	 used	 to	
determine	which	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 eligible	 for	 British	 protection	 in	
China.117			
The	policy	change	of	1904	
Although	 the	Foreign	Office	attempted	 to	 instigate	negotiations	with	 the	Chinese	
government	in	the	1880s	and	90s	on	the	question	of	Chinese	British	subjects,	the	
policies	 made	 in	 the	 1860s	 remained	 broadly	 in	 place	 until	 1904,	 when	 the	
position	 was	 completely	 overhauled	 by	 Minister	 Ernest	 Satow,	 without	 any	
reference	 to	 the	 Chinese	 government,	with	 the	 effect	 that	Hornby’s	 rule	 and	 the	
costume	 regulations	 were	 repealed	 and	 all	 Chinese	 born	 on	 British	 soil	 were	
eligible	 for	 British	 protection	 in	 China	 if	 they	 met	 certain	 conditions.118		 The	
costume	 regulations	 had	 in	 fact	 rarely	 been	 enforced	 by	 consuls,	 who	 had	
generally	followed	Hornby’s	instructions	alone,	although	in	many	cases	these	were	
not	 followed	 either	 and	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 sometimes	 registered	
without	any	enquiry	as	 to	 their	parents’	nationality.119		A	Foreign	Office	ruling	 in	
																																																								
116	TNA	FO	17/1258:	Alcock	to	FO,	31	March	1868.	
117	TNA	 FO	 405/256:	 memorandum	 of	 J.	 T.	 Pratt,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Anglo-Chinese	 in	 China,’	 4	
February	1928,	confidential	print,	p.	193.	
118	Consuls	 were	 instructed	 to	 register	 and	 protect	 all	 Chinese	 holding	 certificates	 proving	 they	
were	 resident	 in	 the	new	 territories	of	Hong	Kong	at	 the	 time	of	 their	 cession	or	born	 in	British	
territory,	 including	 those	born	 to	non-British	parents,	provided	the	 latter’s	certificates	 from	their	
















Satow’s	major	 policy	 shift	 in	 1904	 to	 broaden	 the	 scope	 of	 British	 protection	 of	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	was	 prompted	 by	 an	 intervention	 from	 the	 governor	 of	
Hong	Kong.	 	 The	Hong	Kong	 government’s	 view	 of	 at	 least	 a	 part	 of	 its	 Chinese	
population	had	by	 that	 time	radically	altered	 from	 the	view	 that	was	held	 in	 the	
first	decades	of	the	colony's	existence.		In	a	sense,	it	had	‘caught	up’	with	thinking	
in	the	Straits.		The	change	is	described	by	John	Carroll:		









Chinese	 born	 in	 Hong	 Kong	whose	 parents	 were	 not	 British	 subjects	 to	 receive	
British	 protection	 in	 China,	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 consuls	 or	 the	 governor.	 	 He	




Blake’s	 assertion	 that	 no	 other	 European	 power	 with	 a	 population	 of	 ethnic	
Chinese	subjects	in	China	demanded	that	they	wear	European	clothes	in	return	for	
protection,	 reminds	 us	 that	 the	 competitive	 nature	 of	 relations	 between	 foreign	
																																																								








powers	 at	 this	 time	 could	 influence	 their	 respective	 approaches	 towards	 their	
colonial	subjects.		Of	all	the	foreign	powers	in	China,	the	practice	of	Japan	provides	
perhaps	the	most	appropriate	comparison	with	Britain	–	Japan	had	both	significant	
interests	 and	 ambitions	 in	 China,	 as	 well	 as	 numerous	 ethnic	 Chinese	 colonial	
subjects,	 in	a	way	which	none	of	 the	other	powers	apart	 from	Britain	did.	 	 Japan	
also	provides	a	stark	contrast,	since	Japanese	officials	unlike	British	ones	actively	
sought	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 ethnic	 Chinese	 Japanese	 subjects.124		 Barbara	
Brooks	 has	 described	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 Japanese	 government	 towards	 its	
colonial	 subjects:	 ‘Japanese	 policy	 …	 	 sought	 to	 use	 them	 and	 their	 numbers	 as	
important	 components	 of	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 social	 imperialism	 in	 China.’125		
The	British	officials	who	displayed	attitudes	closest	to	that	of	the	Japanese	position	
were	located	within	the	colonial	governments	of	the	Straits	Settlements	and	Hong	
Kong,	but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 their	enthusiasm	 for	protecting	Chinese	British	subjects	
was	 driven	 primarily	 by	 concerns	 about	 the	 governance	 of	 their	 respective	
colonies,	not	expansionist	policy	aims	in	China	itself.			
	
In	 a	minute	on	Chau’s	 case	by	 the	Hong	Kong	Attorney	General,	 an	 allusion	was	
made	 to	 Palmerston’s	 famous	 1850	 speech	 on	 the	 inviolability	 of	 the	 British	
subject	(sometimes	known	as	the	‘civis	Brittanicus	sum	speech’),	given	in	defence	
of	 his	 action	 in	Greece	on	behalf	 of	Don	Pacifico:	 ‘Chau	Ngau	Tsz,	 the	petitioner,	
was	born	in	Hong	Kong	in	1867	and	has	always	lived	here;	and	he	is	in	every	sense	
entitled	 to	 say	 of	 himself	 “civis	 Brittanicus	 sum”.’126		 This	 was	 an	 argument	
powerfully	made,	 invoking	 the	heroic	 imperial	 figure	of	Palmerston,	 in	 favour	of	
Chinese	British	subjects	enjoying	their	‘birthright’	of	British	protection.		This	kind	






Koreans	 and	Taiwanese	 in	 the	 Imperial	Order,’	 in	Robert	A.	 Bickers	 and	Christian	Henriot	 (eds),	
New	Frontiers:	Imperialism’s	New	Communities	in	East	Asia,	1842-1953	(Manchester,	2000),	109–24,	
p.	110.	
125	Brooks,	 ‘Japanese	 Colonial	 Citizenship	 in	 Treaty	 Port	 China:	 The	 Location	 of	 Koreans	 and	
Taiwanese	in	the	Imperial	Order’,	p.	111.	





the	end	of	 the	nineteenth	century	additional	 factors	would	weigh	 in	 favour	of	an	




the	Chinese	consulate	 in	the	Straits	 in	the	1890s.127		To	some	extent,	 the	colonial	




was	changing	 international	relations.	 	By	1903	after	the	defeat	of	 the	Boxers	and	
amidst	 the	 scramble	 for	 concessions,	 neither	 fostering	 good	 relations	 with	 the	
Chinese	government	nor	following	international	law	was	on	the	agenda.		Governor	
Blake	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 Chinese	 government	 has	 yielded	 to	 demands	 of	 other	
nations	 that	 are	 not	 sustainable	 by	 any	 academic	 interpretation	 of	 international	
law’	and	went	on	to	warn	that	the	lack	of	consular	intervention	in	the	case	of	Chau	
‘must	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 lowering	 our	 prestige	 which,	 in	 the	 East,	 is	 a	 valuable	
asset.’128		 Competition	with	 other	 powers	 (both	 for	 prestige	 and	material	 gains)	
had	 become	 more	 important	 and	 as	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 noted,	 the	 ‘gradual	
enfeeblement	of	China	and	the	encroachments	of	other	Powers’	meant	that	there	
was	no	need	to	negotiate	with	the	Chinese	government	on	the	change	of	policy.129		
The	 initial	 attitude	 of	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 had	 been	 to	 follow	 the	 rules	 of	
international	 law	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	 ruling	 of	 1894	 (which	 was	 wrongly	




127	E.	 Tang,	 ‘The	 Status	 in	 China	 of	 Chinese	 British	 Subjects	 From	 the	 Straits	 Settlements:	 1844-
1900,’	Papers	on	Far	Eastern	History	(1971),	189–209,	p.	199.	
128	TNA	 FO	 228/1446:	 Blake	 to	 Colonial	 Office,	 26	 August	 1903,	 enclosed	 in	 Colonial	 Office	 to	
Foreign	Office,	5	October	1903.	




The	 change	 of	 policy	 to	 offer	 protection	 to	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	 soon	 led	 to	 a	 backlash	 of	 complaints	 from	 consuls	 at	 Guangzhou	 and	
Shantou.	 	 The	 new	 rules	meant	 that	 consuls	were	 asked	 to	 extend	protection	 to	
Chinese	who,	 since	 their	 parents	 need	 not	 have	 been	 British	 subjects,	 often	 had	
closer	 ties,	 both	 social	 and	 economic,	 to	 non-British	 Chinese	 individuals,	




business	associates	and	 that	he	also	owned	property	 in	 the	 interior,	 the	 latter	 in	
contravention	of	the	treaty	provisions	which	prevented	British	subjects	from	doing	
so.	 	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 the	 other	 details	 of	 Li’s	 case	 which	 Scott	 thought	
relevant	 when	 reporting	 his	 refusal	 to	 register	 Li	 as	 a	 British	 subject	 –	 Li	 was	
‘dressed	 like	a	Chinese	and	unable	 to	speak	English,’	his	place	of	business	would	
‘have	 all	 the	 outward	 appearance	 of	 a	 Chinese	 bank’	 and	 he	 ‘admitted	 that	 his	
banking	business	would	be	solely	with	Chinese.’131		Scott	appeared	to	be	wishing	to	
exercise	 a	 discretion	 not	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 rules;	 following	 correspondence	






consuls	 in	 the	 ports	most	 affected.	 	 From	 Shantou	 he	was	 told	 by	 Consul	 Pierre	
Hausser	that	‘I	fail	to	see	that	our	championship	of	these	persons’	interests	in	any	
way	advances	our	influence	or	prestige	in	China.		On	the	contrary	it	is	on	the	whole	
I	 think	 distinctly	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 our	 genuine	 nationals.’133		 From	
Fuzhou,	Shanghai	and	Hankou	on	the	other	hand	Jordan	learned	that	the	numbers	
registered	were	either	insignificant,	or	in	the	case	of	Shanghai,	that	there	were	no	







with	 one	 exception,	 respectable	 and	 law-abiding	 citizens.’134		 Jordan	 asked	 Chief	
Judge	 Frederick	 Bourne	 while	 on	 circuit	 in	 Guangzhou	 to	 look	 into	 the	 issue	 of	
Chinese	British	subjects.		Bourne	advised	that	Chinese	British	subjects	who	bought	
land	 or	 held	 themselves	 out	 to	 be	 Chinese	 subjects	 should	 lose	 their	
extraterritorial	rights	–	consuls	in	such	cases	should	merely	see	that	the	person	in	
question	was	 fairly	dealt	with	under	Chinese	 law.135		 Jordan	minuted	 that	 it	was	
not	possible	to	ask	the	FO	to	alter	Satow’s	rule	so	soon	after	its	implementation.136		
Consuls	had	a	clear	set	of	 rules	 to	 follow	but	clearly	sometimes	 found	 that	 these	
conflicted	with	their	own	notions	of	who	should	qualify	for	the	privileges	attached	
to	British	status.	 	Scott	attempted	to	restrict	access	to	British	rights	by	importing	
everyday	 conceptions	 of	 Britishness,	 based	 around	 language,	 dress	 and	 social	




The	 Satow	 rules	 remained	 in	 place	 but	 complaints	 and	 calls	 for	 reversal	 of	 the	
policy	 continued,	 especially	 from	 the	 consuls	at	Guangzhou	and	Xiamen.	 	Doubts	
were	also	raised	in	1910	by	Hong	Kong	Governor	Francis	May,	but	subsequently,	
when	the	policy	was	again	criticised	in	1921	by	Guangzhou	Consul-General	James	
Jamieson,	 both	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 Straits	 governments	 supported	 its	
retention,	 seeking	 to	 preserve	 protection	 for	 their	 colonial	 subjects. 138 		 The	
position	adopted	by	the	Foreign	Office	by	this	time	was	that	a	change	in	policy	to	
reduce	 the	 scope	 of	 protection	 was	 desirable,	 but	 should	 be	 effected	 through	











138	TNA	 FO	 405/256:	 memorandum	 of	 J.	 T.	 Pratt,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Anglo-Chinese	 in	 China,’	 4	
February	1928,	confidential	print,	pp.	200-203.	
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retreat	 from	 protecting	 all	 Chinese	 British	 subjects,	 particularly	 from	 the	 1920s	
onwards.	 	 To	 some	 extent,	 this	 occurred	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 declining	 British	
power	 in	 China.	 	 At	 Guangzhou,	 Consul	 Jamieson	 reported	 that	 he	 registered	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 but	 warned	 them	 that	 he	 lacked	 the	 power	 to	 protect	
them.140		 In	 1923	 the	 Legation	 issued	 a	 circular	 which	 deprived	 Chinese	 British	
subjects	of	the	right	to	register	their	children	as	British	subjects.141		This	could	be	
justified	 on	 a	 narrow	 reading	 of	 the	 Satow	 rules,	 which	 specified	 birth	 within	
British	 territory	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 registration	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects.	 	 This	
change	 in	policy	 led	 to	 considerable	hardship	 in	 some	cases,	 for	 example	 that	of	
Yeap	Seng	Koon,	whose	registration	was	not	renewed	on	the	ground	that	he	was	
born	 in	 China	 (his	 father	 and	 grandfather	 were	 born	 in	 Penang),	 and	 who	 was	
subsequently	 prosecuted	 by	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 for	 passing	 himself	 off	 as	 a	




A	 further	 significant	 change	 was	 the	 instruction,	 issued	 in	 1925,	 that	 claims	 to	
protect	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 should	 not	 be	 ‘pressed	 beyond	 useful	 limits.’144		
This	clearly	allowed	considerable	flexibility	and	was	used	to	justify	the	declining	of	
recognition	 or	 protection	 in	 a	 number	 of	 cases.	 	 The	 position	 then	 adopted	 and	
advocated	 by	 Minister	 Ronald	 Macleay	 was	 that	 since	 British	 claims	 to	 protect	
Chinese	British	 subjects	 under	 the	 Satow	 rules	were	 ‘based	not	 so	much	 on	 any	
legal	 or	 Treaty	 foundation	 but	 rather	 on	 grounds	 of	 expediency	 and	 political	
																																																								
139	TNA	 FO	 405/256:	 memorandum	 of	 J.	 T.	 Pratt,	 ‘The	 Protection	 of	 Anglo-Chinese	 in	 China,’	 4	
February	1928,	confidential	print,	p.	203.	








considerations	 .	 .	 .	 exceptions	 can	 therefore	 properly	 be	made	when	 and	where	
justified	 by	 the	 special	 circumstances	 of	 particular	 cases.’145		 The	 Foreign	 Office	
agreed	 that	 the	Chinese	British	 subject	 in	 the	 case	 in	question,	Chen	Hanming,	 a	
journalist	with	political	 interests	who	had	 tried	 to	 renounce	his	British	 status	 in	
1917	fearing	conscription,	could	be	refused	recognition	in	China,	as	recommended	
by	 the	 Shanghai	 consul-general. 146 		 The	 same	 reasoning	 was	 used	 to	 deny	
registration	 to	 Stanley	 Chance,	 whose	 case	 was	 unusual	 in	 that	 he	 was	 born	 in	
London	to	a	Chinese	father	and	an	English	mother.		He	hoped	to	secure	registration	
in	order	 to	protect	 the	 family	hotel	business	 (the	Astor	House	Hotel,	Zhifu)	 from	
































British	 policy	 on	 the	 question	 of	 their	 treatment,	 asserted	 that	 British	 policy	 on	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 in	 China	 was	 based	 on	 ‘a	 long	 series	 of	
misunderstandings.’149		 This	 was	 true	 –	 misunderstanding	 and	 confusion	 were	
clear	 features	of	British	governance	demonstrated	by	 the	 case	of	Chinese	British	
subjects	–	but	only	up	to	a	point.		Pratt	had	an	agenda,	which	was	to	show	that	the	
British	government	had	never	really	intended	to	recognise	Chinese	British	subjects	
as	 qualifying	 for	 British	 protection	 and	 extraterritorial	 rights	 in	 China,	 thereby	
discrediting	 the	 past	 practice	 of	 affording	 them	 protection	 and	 preparing	 the	
ground	 for	 his	 preferred	 policy	 of	 refusing	 to	 accept	 any	 new	 registrations	 of	
Chinese	British	subjects.		This	interpretation	was	too	simplistic,	because	although	
there	 was	 considerable	 confusion	 caused	 by	 poor	 communication	 in	 the	 1860s	
when	 Alcock	 and	 Hornby	 laid	 down	 their	 rules,	 each	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 have	 been	






British	 policy	 and	 practices	 were	 inconsistent	 and	 changing,	 but	 they	 were	 not	
guided	merely	by	pragmatic	expediency	in	reaction	to	events,	or	simply	based	on	
misunderstandings;	 there	 were	 also	 clearly	 culturally-based	 motives	 behind	



















The	 case	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 was	 especially	 complicated	 and	 contested	
because	 it	 involved	multiple	 and	 different	 zones	 of	 imperial	 engagement	 –	 both	
China	 with	 its	 multiple	 and	 overlapping	 state	 sovereignties	 under	
extraterritoriality,	 and	 British	 colonies,	 such	 as	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 Straits	
Settlements,	 under	 direct	 colonial	 control.	 	 Even	 within	 China,	 the	 British	
establishment	was	made	up	of	more	than	one	power	centre	–	by	establishing	the	
SCC	 in	 Shanghai,	 the	 British	 had	 created	 a	 system	 where	 the	 judiciary	 and	 the	
executive	(in	this	case,	the	minister	in	Beijing)	were	separate.		A	variety	of	arms	of	
the	British	 state	were	 involved	 in	dealing	with	Chinese	British	 subjects,	 showing	
how	empire	in	the	British	case	was	a	multipolar	formation,	made	up	of	parts	which	
clashed	as	well	as	cooperated.		Policies	which	were	viewed	as	advantageous	in	the	
colonies	 –	 in	 which	 context	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 seen	 as	 increasingly	
valuable	members	of	society	–	could	be	seen	as	harmful	in	the	context	of	the	treaty	
system	and	vice	versa.		Measures	such	as	Alcock’s	costume	regulations	were	most	
unwelcome	 to	 the	 British	 colonial	 government	 of	 the	 Straits	 Settlements,	 which	
would	never	have	countenanced	such	a	move	within	the	colony	itself,	but	the	same	
measures	 were	 supported	 by	 British	 consuls	 in	 China.	 	 In	 different	 contexts,	
different	 readings	 of	 the	 character	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 took	 precedence.		
The	 mobility	 of	 colonial	 populations	 highlighted	 these	 differences	 and	 brought	
British	officials	into	conflict	with	each	other.	
	
The	 issue	 of	 prestige,	 raised	 repeatedly	 in	 discussions	 of	 the	 place	 of	 Chinese	
British	subjects,	could	similarly	be	viewed	differently	according	to	standpoint.		The	
danger	 of	 loss	 of	 British	 prestige	 was	 used	 to	 argue	 for	 and	 against	 protecting	
Chinese	 British	 subjects	 –	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 guaranteeing	 British	 protection	 to	
	 168	
colonial	 subjects	 maintained	 prestige	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 the	 Straits	 but	 it	 was	
equally	argued	by	consuls	that	they	lost	prestige	in	China	by	intervening	to	protect	
Chinese	 British	 subjects.	 	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
championed	and	had	hopes	pinned	on	them	by	the	colonial	governments,	but	were	
also	 criticised	 for	 ingratitude	 and	duplicity,	 particularly	 by	 the	 consuls.	 	 Chinese	
British	 subjects	 in	 the	 Straits	 seemed	 to	 recognise	 that	 they	 were	 expected	 to	
demonstrate	their	gratitude	and	loyalty	towards	Britain,	and	so	did	Chinese	British	
subjects	in	China,	in	their	more	precarious	position,	as	they	showed	at	Hankou	in	
their	 farewell	speech	to	 the	consul	reported	 in	 the	North-China	Herald.150		 In	 this	
way	 they	 participated	 in	 the	 discursive	 contest	 over	 inclusive	 and	 exclusive	
conceptions	 of	 Britishness	 in	 ways	 which	 dovetailed	 with	 the	 efforts	 of	 their	
colonial	governments	to	support	them.			
	
Despite	 Pratt’s	 claims	 in	 his	 memo	 referred	 to	 above,	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 in	
1904	 Satow	 had	 a	 clear	 understanding	 of	 the	 facts	 and	 that	 he	 deliberately	
maintained,	 backed	 up	 by	 arguments	 from	 Hong	 Kong,	 that	 Britain	 could	 and	
should	protect	more	Chinese	British	subjects	given	the	circumstances	in	China.		A	
consideration	of	 the	 case	of	 Chinese	British	 subjects	 can	 therefore	also	 add,	 in	 a	
small	way,	to	our	understanding	of	British	expansion	in	China,	and	can	show	how	
the	 interests	 of	 British	 colonial	 governments	 influenced	 British	 policy	 in	 China.		
Asserting	British	 jurisdiction	over	a	 larger	number	of	people	of	Chinese	ethnicity	
in	China	than	could	be	justified	under	international	law	represented	an	increase	in	
the	 degree	 to	 which	 Chinese	 sovereignty	 was	 infringed	 by	 the	 British	 state’s	
actions	 in	 China,	 and	 this	 policy	 further	 undermined	 the	 authority	 of	 Chinese	












In	1917	a	great	deal	of	debate	 took	place	 in	 the	Shanghai	British	press	about	 the	
place	 of	 certain	 groups	 in	 British	 armed	 forces,	 as	 the	 war	 in	 Europe	 brought	
questions	 of	 allegiance	 and	 identity	 to	 the	 fore	 among	 foreign	 communities	 in	
China.	 	 In	the	following	extract	 from	a	 letter	to	the	North-China	Herald,	 the	writer	
took	 exception	 to	 the	 suggestion,	 made	 in	 an	 earlier	 editorial,	 that	 allowing	
Eurasians	 to	 join	 British	 units	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Volunteer	 Corps	 would	 logically	
mean	that	‘Sikhs	or	Singalese’	should	also	be	admitted:		
Had	we	Eurasians	nothing	else	English	in	us	but	an	acquaintance	with	










essence	 and	 cultural	 orientation	 –	 described	 in	 the	 letter	 above	 also	 came	 to	 the	
fore.2			
	
This	 particular	 letter-writer	 could	 apparently	 feel	 perfectly	 secure	 in	 his	 being	
regarded	 (‘merely’)	 as	 a	 British	 subject,	 although	many	 Eurasians	 in	 treaty	 port	
China	could	not,	since	no	small	number	lacked	a	firm	legal	basis	for	their	claim	to	
British	nationality,	entitlement	to	which	generally	depended	on	a	person’s	place	of	
birth	 or	 parentage.	 	 	 But	 the	 letter-writer	 suggested	 that	 the	 legal	 conditions	 of	
nationality	were	not	 the	 only	 or	 even	 the	 crucial	 criteria	 for	 inclusion	 (or,	 in	 the	
words	of	the	letter,	entitlement	to	‘a	higher	estimation’).		Furthermore,	according	to	
the	 letter-writer’s	 viewpoint,	 the	 difference	 between	 Eurasian	 and	 Sikh	 or	
‘Singalee’	 British	 subjects	 did	 not	 end	 with	 the	 physical	 aspect	 in	 the	 form	 of	
‘blood’.	 	 Performance	 of	 Britishness	 through	 clothing,	 food	 and	 other	 aspects	 of	






as	 an	 ideology	 is	 not	 based	 on	 observable	 physical	 characteristics,	 but	 is	 in	 fact	
founded	 on	 ‘cultural	 attributions’	 which	 ‘provide	 the	 observable	 conduits,	 the	
indexes	 of	 psychological	 propensities	 and	 moral	 susceptibilities	 seen	 to	 shape	
which	individuals	are	suitable	for	inclusion	in	the	national	community	and	whether	
those	 of	 ambiguous	 racial	membership	 are	 to	 be	 classified	 as	 subject	 or	 citizens	





covered	 in	 chapter	 three	 on	Chinese	British	 subjects,	 it	will	 become	 clear	 that	 in	
fact	 British	 officials	 in	 London	 and	 China	 treated	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 the	 two	
groups	in	very	different	ways.		In	the	case	of	Chinese	British	subjects,	what	was	at	
stake	 was	 access	 to	 official	 recognition	 to	 the	 legal	 rights	 of	 British	 subjects	 in	
China	 –	 in	 short,	 to	 borrow	 our	 letter	writer’s	 terminology,	 it	 was	 a	 question	 of	
whether	 they	were	 ‘merely	British’.	 	Although	colonial	officials	 in	Hong	Kong	and	
the	 Straits	 Settlements	 sometimes	 talked	 in	 high-minded	ways	 of	 cultivating	 the	
Britishness	of	their	Chinese	colonial	subjects,	and	were	able	to	 influence	policy	 in	
China,	 there	was	 rarely,	 at	 least	 among	British	officials	 in	Beijing	or	at	 the	 treaty	
ports,	any	doubt	that	in	essence	Chinese	British	subjects	were	Chinese	and	would	
always	 remain	 so.	 	 When	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 were	 ordered	 by	 Minister	
Rutherford	Alcock	in	1868	to	wear	European	clothes	if	they	wished	to	be	registered	








3	Ann	 Laura	 Stoler,	 ‘Sexual	 Affronts	 and	 Racial	 Frontiers:	 European	 Identities	 and	 the	 Cultural	





understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 agents	 of	 the	 British	 state	 to	 British	 settler	
culture	and	society	in	the	treaty	ports.		Stoler,	drawing	on	Benedict	Anderson,	has	
stated	 that	 ‘colonial	 Europeans	 constructed	 “imagined	 communities”	 as	 deftly	 as	
the	nationalist	colonised	populations	to	whom	they	were	opposed’,	and	historians	
have	described,	in	the	same	analytical	frame	as	colonies	elsewhere,	the	cultures	of	
some	 of	 the	 foreign	 communities	 which	 grew	 up	 in	 the	 colonial	 spaces	 of	 the	
Chinese	 treaty	 ports.4		 Officials	 deployed	 by	 colonial	 states	 interacted	 with	 such	
‘imagined	 communities’	 in	 various	 ways,	 both	 as	 member-participants	 and	 as	
external	 agents	 implementing	 policies	 often	 generated	 in	 the	 metropole,	 where	
similar	 but	 certainly	 not	 identical	 conceptions	 of	 national-imperial	 identity	 held	
sway.	 	While	 the	 ‘politics	of	difference’	was	at	 the	heart	of	 imperial	projects,	 it	 is	
clear	that	just	as	scholars	of	colonialism	in	other	sites	have	found,	and	as	the	letter	
above	 seems	 also	 to	 confirm,	 the	 category	of	 the	 coloniser	was	 contested	 and	 its	
boundaries	were	 hazy	 in	 treaty	 port	 China.5		 A	major	 part	 of	 the	work	 of	 British	
consular	officials	 in	China	 involved	an	 issue	at	 the	heart	of	questions	of	 identities	
and	 boundaries	 –	 the	 decision	 as	 to	 who	 should	 be	 included	 under	 British	
jurisdiction	and	protection	 in	China.	 	Partha	Chatterjee	has	argued	 that	 'the	most	
reliable	definition	of	 an	 imperial	practice	 remains	 that	of	 the	privilege	 to	declare	
the	exception	to	the	norm.'6		Informed	by	their	views	of	Britishness,	British	officials	
made	 exceptions,	 ignored	 or	 overlooked	 rules,	 and	 laid	 down	 special	 policies	 in	
relation	 to	 Eurasians	 which	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 legality.	 	 When	 officials	
displayed	 attitudes	 and	 especially	 when	 they	 based	 their	 practices	 on	 these	




culture	 in	 the	 Chinese	 treaty	 ports,	 see	 Bickers,	Britain	 in	China,	 Goodman	 and	 Goodman	 (eds.),	
Twentieth	Century	Colonialism	and	China,	and	Bickers	and	Henriot	(eds.),	New	Frontiers.	
5 There	is	a	large	literature	on	‘colonisers	and	colonised’	and	‘colonial	difference’.		In	addition	to	the	
work	of	Ann	Laura	Stoler	 cited	above,	 see	 Jane	Burbank	and	Frederick	Cooper,	Empires	 in	World	
History:	Power	and	the	Politics	of	Difference,	Nicholas	Thomas,	Colonialism’s	Culture:	Anthropology,	
Travel	and	Government	(Cambridge,	1994),	Satoshi	Mizutani,	The	Meaning	of	White:	Race,	Class,	and	












to	 enculturate	 illegitimate	 children	 to	 an	 extent	 sufficient	 to	 secure	 a	 degree	 of	
British	state	recognition	of	them.			
	
Looking	 closely	 at	 official	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 will	 allow	 me	 to	 place	 under	
consideration	the	distinction	between	rhetoric	and	action	which	has	been	observed	
in	 connection	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 boundaries	 in	 other	 colonial	 contexts.	 Zine	
Magubane,	 writing	 on	 late	 nineteenth-century	 South	 Africa,	 has	 stated	 that	
‘Although	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 imperialism	 continually	 referenced	 the	 sanctity	 of	
imperial	 boundaries	 and	was	predicated	on	 the	 rigid	 separation	of	 races,	 classes,	
and	 genders,	 in	 actual	 fact,	 colonialism	was,	 at	 its	 core,	 an	 exercise	 in	 boundary	
transgression.’7		Harald	Fischer	Tiné	and	Susanne	Gehrmann	hold	this	assertion	to	
apply	 more	 generally.8		 Robert	 Bickers	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 clearly	
marked	 boundaries	 certainly	 applied	within	 British	 colonial	 culture	 in	 China,	 for	
example	in	the	popular	literature	it	spawned,	which	often	expressed	the	belief	that	








7	Zine	 Magubane,	 ‘The	 Boundaries	 of	 Blackness:	 African-American	 Culture	 and	 the	 Making	 of	 a	
Black	Public	Sphere	in	Colonial	South	Africa’,	in	Harald	Fischer-Tiné	and	Susanne	Gehrmann	(eds.),	
Empires	 and	Boundaries:	Rethinking	Race,	 Class,	 and	Gender	 in	Colonial	 Settings	 (Abingdon,	 Oxon,	
2009),	212–32.	






who	 were	 classed	 as	 Eurasian	 by	 British	 officials	 in	 China,	 and	 the	 social	 and	
cultural	context	in	which	they	lived	in	the	treaty	ports,	with	particular	attention	to	
some	of	 the	 specific	ways	 in	which	 that	 context	 affected	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	
Eurasian	individuals.	 	This	is	done	largely	by	means	of	analysis	of	issues	raised	in	
the	British	treaty	port	press,	which	British	officials	 in	China	would	have	read	and	
which	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 treaty	 port	 society	 and	 culture.	 	 This	 part	
therefore	provides	some	context	for	the	official	attitudes	and	practices	considered	
later	in	the	chapter.		I	then	go	on	to	discuss	two	areas	in	which	much	of	the	British	
official	 interaction	with	Eurasians	 took	place.	 	 First,	 requests	 for	 recognition	as	a	
British	subject	or	a	British	protected	person,	statuses	which	were	sought	by	many	
Eurasians,	and	with	regard	to	which	British	officials	deployed	specific	policies	and	
practices,	 especially	 in	 dealing	 with	 illegitimate	 Eurasians.	 	 Second,	 court	
proceedings	 in	 the	 British	 consular	 courts	 (including	 the	 SCC)	 and	 the	 Shanghai	





The	 term	Eurasian	 is	 deployed	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	 describe	 individuals	who	had	 a	
parent	who	was	European	and	a	parent	who	was	Chinese	or	Japanese,	or	who	were	
the	descendent	of	one	or	more	persons	who	were	Eurasian	by	that	definition.		They	
were	 referred	 to	 as	 Eurasians	 by	 British	 officials	 and	 also	 by	members	 of	 treaty	
port	society	more	generally,	including	Eurasians	themselves.	It	is	also	a	term	used	
in	the	small	but	growing	literature	on	the	subject	of	such	people	and	their	families,	
a	 literature	which	 has	mostly	 focussed	 on	 the	 identities	 and	 lived	 experiences	 of	
Eurasians	 in	 Hong	 Kong,	 China	 and	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	
twentieth	centuries.10		For	British	officials,	a	Eurasian	was	most	often	a	person	who	
																																																								
10	See	 for	 example,	Vicky	Lee,	Being	Eurasian:	Memories	Across	Racial	Divides	 (Hong	Kong,	2004);	




is	 somewhat	 complicated	 by	 the	 contemporary	 tendency	 to	 refer	 to	 individuals	
who	had	Portuguese	and	Chinese	ancestors	and	bore	Portuguese	names,	of	whom	
there	 were	 a	 considerable	 number	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 as	 simply	 ‘Portuguese’.12		
Some	of	 the	 latter	were	British,	or	 sometimes	 claimed	British	 status,	by	virtue	of	
having	 been	 born	 in	 Hong	 Kong.	 	 Such	 people	were	 not	 generally	 referred	 to	 as	
Eurasian	by	British	officials	and	might	also	self-identify	as	Portuguese.		This	was	a	
complicated	area,	as	shown	by	the	example	of	G.	Sequira,	who	was	brought	before	
the	 British	 Police	 Court	 in	 Shanghai	 in	 April	 1909	 on	 a	 charge	 of	 begging.	 	 The	
previous	 month	 he	 had	 been	 before	 the	 Portuguese	 consul-general,	 who	 had	
assumed	 jurisdiction	 and	 had	 cautioned	 Sequira,	 warning	 him	 that	 if	 he	 was	
charged	again,	he	would	not	be	recognised	as	a	Portuguese	subject.	 	It	was	said	in	




sitting	 as	 assessor	with	 the	 Chinese	magistrate.	 	 He	was	 deported	 to	 the	 British	
colony	of	Hong	Kong.13	
	




were	 born	 in	 China	 and	 had	 a	 British	 father	 who	 was	 married	 to	 their	 mother	
when	they	were	born,	they	were	also	generally	able	to	claim	British	nationality	as	
‘natural-born	 British	 subjects’	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 the	 children	 of	 two	 married	
British	parents.		There	were	many	Eurasians	with	British	fathers	who	were	born	in	
																																																								
11	A	definition	of	 the	 term	given	 in	 a	 contemporary	 reference	 source	written	by	 a	 former	British	
consul	 was	 ‘The	 offspring	 of	 a	 European	 father	 and	 an	 Asiatic	 mother.’	 Herbert	 Allen	 Giles,	 A	
Glossary	of	Reference	on	Subjects	Connected	with	the	Far	East	(Shanghai,	1900),	p.	83.	
12	Bickers,	Britain	in	China,	p.	73.	








in	 China	 of	 a	 Chinese	 father	 and	 a	 British	 mother	 were	 a	 small	 group,	 were	
considered	under	Chinese	 law	 to	be	Chinese	nationals,	 and	had	no	 legal	 claim	 to	
British	nationality	under	British	law	if	not	born	in	Britain	or	a	British	colony.		They	
were	 not	 generally	 included	 within	 the	 category	 ‘Eurasian’	 by	 British	 officials	





the	 British	 state	 of	 the	 number	 of	 Eurasian	 British	 subjects.	 	 The	 Shanghai	
Municipal	Council	collected	data	to	establish	the	numbers	of	foreigners	of	various	
nationalities	 living	 in	 the	 Shanghai	 International	 Settlement	 in	 its	 census,	 and	 in	
some	census	years	separate	figures	were	also	published	showing	the	total	number	
of	Eurasians	of	all	foreign	nationalities	in	the	settlement.15		Table	2	shows	the	SMC	
census	 data,	 together	 with	 inferred	 numbers	 of	 British	 Eurasians	 living	 in	 the	











15	The	 census	 actually	 counted	 foreigners	 living	 not	 only	within	 the	 Settlement	 limits,	 but	 also	 a	
number	 of	 nearby	 areas,	 such	 as	 the	 ‘outside	 roads’	 to	 the	west	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement,	





















1890	 3821	 1574	 41.2	 142	 59	
1895	 4684	 1936	 41.3	 260	 107	
1900	 6774	 2691	 39.7	 519	 206	
1905	 11497	 3713	 32.3	 323	 104	
1910	 13536	 4465	 32.9	 481	 158	
	
It	is	likely	that	the	number	of	Eurasians	was	actually	considerably	greater	than	the	
numbers	stated	 in	 the	census.	 	We	know	that	Hong	Kong	officials	were	aware	of	
substantial	under-reporting	of	Eurasians	in	the	colony’s	censuses.17		It	is	not	clear	
how	the	Shanghai	census	was	carried	out,	in	particular	how	the	national	status	of	
foreigners	 was	 established	 or	 how	 it	 was	 decided	 who	 would	 be	 classed	 as	
Eurasian.	 	The	national	 status	of	many	Eurasians	was	not	 secure,	 and	 that	 could	
mean	that	they	were	sometimes	counted	among	the	foreign	population,	sometimes	









intervene	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 such	 individuals,	 and	 they	 were	 therefore	 largely	
undocumented	 in	 official	 correspondence. 18 		 Details	 of	 a	 small	 number	 of	
																																																								
16	Census	 figures	 for	1895	–	1910	are	 from	Shanghai	Municipal	Archives:	U1-1-106X.	 	Figures	 for	
1890	are	from	NCH,	18	July	1890,	p.	80.	
17	Teng,	Eurasian,	p.	238.		
18	They	 are	 also	 largely	 absent	 from	 this	 study,	 primarily	 because	 this	 thesis	 examines	 official	




were	 able	 to	 substantiate	 their	 claims	 so	 that	 officials	 were	 unable	 to	 refuse	
recognition.	 	The	Whitfield	 family	based	 in	Xiamen	 fell	 into	 this	 category.	 	 James	
Whitfield	 was	 a	 tidewaiter	 in	 the	 Customs	 at	 Xiamen	 and	 married	 a	 Chinese	
woman	there	in	1863.19		They	had	three	children,	two	of	whom,	Charles	and	James	
Whitfield,	 each	married	Chinese	women	 in	Xiamen	 in	 the	1880s	and	 in	 turn	had	
children	by	them.20		The	family	were	subsequently	described	by	British	officials	as	
living	 as	 Chinese,	 but	 asserted	 their	 British	 nationality,	 and	 the	 cases	 of	 the	
Whitfield	 brothers’	 children	 and	 grandchildren	 were	 repeatedly	 brought	 up	 by	
officials	who	grappled	with	the	contradictions	they	saw	in	their	status.21	
	
It	 was	 not	 unusual	 for	 a	 young	 Eurasian	 to	 know	 only	 his	 or	 her	 Chinese	 or	
Japanese	mother,	 the	 British	 father	 having	 left	 or	 died,	 but	 to	 be	 educated	 in	 a	
foreign	 school	 in	 Shanghai,	 such	 as	 the	 Thomas	 Hanbury	 School,	 an	 institution	
founded	specifically	to	educate	Eurasian	children,	or	St	Francis	Xavier’s	College,	a	
school	run	by	a	Catholic	order.	 	Even	 in	 the	absence	of	 their	British	parent,	 such	




his	 twentieth	 birthday	 in	 1920	 to	 the	 consul-general,	 Everard	 Fraser,	 seeking	
registration.	 	 Davie’s	 father	was	British	 and	 his	mother	 Japanese,	 but	 both	were	
dead,	 the	 father	 having	 died	 in	 1905.	 	 Davie	 was	 born	 in	 Japan	 but	 grew	 up	 in	

















public	 sphere,	 although	 they	 may	 have	 spoken	 Chinese.	 	 They	 spoke	 English	
fluently	having	attended	foreign-run	schools	in	China,	or	having	been	educated	in	
Hong	Kong	or	even	Great	Britain.			As	already	shown,	there	were	Eurasians	in	the	
Shanghai	 Volunteer	 Corps	 (albeit	 with	 restricted	 choice	 as	 to	 the	 regiment	 they	
could	 join),	 and	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 some	Eurasians	 taking	part	 in	 other	 typical	
aspects	of	British	treaty	port	 life.24		 In	1893,	Consul	George	Jamieson	reported	to	
the	minister	 that	 there	were	 in	Shanghai	 ‘a	considerable	number	of	 the	Eurasian	
class,	 who	 by	 up-bringing,	 education,	 and	 association	 are	 in	 every	 sense	
European.’25		William	McBain,	a	Eurasian	member	of	a	very	wealthy	and	prominent	
Shanghai	family,	represented	the	most	prosperous	and	well-connected	end	of	the	
spectrum,	 listing	 his	 club	 membership	 in	 1933	 as	 including	 the	 prestigious	
Shanghai	 Club	 and	 also	 the	 Shanghai	 Race	 Club.26		 Another	 prominent	 Eurasian	
Shanghailander,	 Henry	 Monsel	 Cumine,	 architect	 and	 owner	 of	 the	 Shanghai	
Mercury	 newspaper,	 also	 had	 typical	 Shanghai	 British	 affiliations:	 as	well	 as	 the	
Race	 Club	 and	 freemasonry,	 he	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Paper	 Hunt	 and	 the	 St	

















their	patriotism	by	rushing	 to	enlist	along	with	other	Britons	 in	 the	 treaty	ports,	









pilot,	 rising	 to	 the	 rank	 of	 Major,	 and	 returning	 to	 Shanghai	 with	 decorations	





and	 others	 under	 the	 label	 ‘Eurasian’,	 rather	 than	 to	 recover	 and	 represent	 the	




that	 a	 Eurasian	 using	 a	 British-sounding	 name	 and	 educated	 in	 a	 British-style	
school	 self-identified	 as	 British	 (or	 exclusively	 so),	 or	 that	 a	 Eurasian	 using	 a	
Chinese	name,	as	was	true	of	many	from	Hong	Kong,	did	not	self-identify	as	British.		











their	 cultural	 identity	 in	 their	 dealings	 with	 British	 officials,	 or	 in	 letters	 to	 the	
English-language	treaty	port	press.			
	




around	 which	 that	 society	 was	 structured,	 many	 of	 which	 were	 probably	
somewhat	 freer	 from	 official	 influence	 than	 would	 have	 been	 the	 case	 in	 Great	
Britain	 and	 in	 some	 colonies.	 	 Robert	 Bickers	 has	 argued	 that	 race	 was	 an	
important	aspect	of	the	social	and	cultural	environment	of	the	treaty	ports	in	the	
twentieth	century:		 	
Communal	 identity	 and	 solidarity	 in	 Britain	 in	 China	 …	were	 located	
most	 visibly	 in	 questions	 of	 race,	 and	 the	 polarity	 between	 a	
constructed	 ‘white’	 British	 presence	 and	 the	 other	 ‘races’	 it	
encountered	 in	 China.	 	 British	 Asians	 or	 Eurasians	 muddied	 these	
waters	and	threatened	not	only	that	identity	but	that	very	presence.’34			
Concrete	 examples	of	 exclusionary	practices	 from	 the	unofficial	 life	 of	 the	 treaty	




In	1886	 the	Masonic	School	Council	 founded	a	 school	 in	Shanghai	which	did	not	
admit	 Eurasian	 pupils.35		 This	 policy	 was	 reversed	 a	 few	 years	 later	 when	 for	
















strong	opinions	 expressed	on	both	 sides	 at	 the	meeting	 and	 subsequently	 in	 the	
pages	of	the	NCH.		On	the	side	of	the	Eurasians,	a	solid	establishment	figure	in	the	
form	 of	 Commander	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Volunteer	 Corps	 and	 long-time	 Shanghai	
resident	Major	 Brodie	 Clarke	 spoke	 at	 the	meeting,	 voicing	 the	 opinion	 that	 the	
decision	 to	 exclude	 Eurasians	 was	 an	 unprecedented	 attack	 on	 the	 ‘privacy	 of	













Those	 Eurasians	 who	 obtained	 a	 western-style	 education	 in	 China	 or	 overseas	
might	encounter	discrimination	when	attempting	to	enter	the	job	market.	 	 It	was	
not	 unusual	 for	 Eurasians	 to	 find	 employment	 as	 clerks	 in	 foreign	 firms	 or	 in	
institutions	 such	 as	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs	 Service,	 where	 the	 linguistic	
skills	 of	 those	 with	 a	 command	 of	 both	 English	 and	 Chinese	 could	 be	 useful.		
However,	 Eurasians	 were	 clearly	 not	 welcome	 in	 some	 foreign-controlled	
organisations.	 	 In	 1919	 a	 correspondent	wrote	 to	 the	NCH	 to	 complain	 of	 a	 job	
advertisement	 in	 the	 newspaper	 which	 stated	 that	 applications	 from	 Eurasians	
and	Portuguese	would	not	be	considered.	 	The	writer	went	on	to	clarify	that	this	
was	 not	 an	 exceptional	 occurrence,	 and	 that	 British	 firms	 were	 generally	 the	














that	 basis,	 it	may	well	 be	 that	 discriminatory	 attitudes	 and	practices	were	more	
prevalent	in	the	treaty	ports	in	the	later	part	of	the	period	covered	by	this	study,	






encountered	 it.	 	 Certainly,	 some	 Eurasians	 were	 quick	 to	 see	 British	 wartime	
rhetoric	of	unity	and	 justice	as	an	opportunity	 to	argue	 for	 inclusion	and	against	
discrimination.		
	
The	 periodic	 outpouring	 of	 views	 both	 in	 support	 of	 and	 in	 opposition	 to	
discriminatory	or	exclusionary	measures	against	Eurasians	shows	that	Shanghai’s	
British	settler	society	was	deeply	divided	over	the	place	of	Eurasians,	in	particular	
the	 degree	 to	 which	 they	 should	 be	 accepted	 as	 members	 of	 Shanghai	 foreign	
society.		Although	many	of	those	who	spoke	out	against	discrimination	in	letters	to	
the	press	identified	themselves	as	Eurasians,	not	all	voices	raised	in	support	of	the	
latter	 group	 came	 from	 Eurasians	 themselves	 –	 there	 were	 influential	 non-














these	 public	 discourses	 voiced	 in	 the	 press	 and	 elsewhere,	 as	well	 as	 pressures	
from	individuals	who	approached	them	directly	over	the	issue	of	Eurasians.		They	
also	had	to	consider	the	likely	responses	of	their	superiors	in	Beijing	and	London	




Whereas	 the	 question	 of	 the	 national	 status	 in	 China	 of	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	
generated	hundreds	of	pages	of	official	documents	in	the	FO	and	other	institutions,	
the	 issue	 of	 the	 national	 status	 of	 Eurasians	was	 rarely	 discussed	 outside	 China.		
This	was	not	because	of	a	significant	difference	in	the	size	of	the	population	of	the	
two	groups	–	indeed,	it	may	well	be	that	there	were	more	British	Eurasians	in	China	
than	 there	were	 Chinese	British	 subjects.	 	 The	 reasons	why	 the	 FO	were	 neither	
proactive	in,	nor	very	deeply	concerned	with,	policy-making	regarding	the	status	of	
Eurasians	 in	China	were	twofold:	 	 there	was,	unlike	 in	the	case	of	Chinese	British	
subjects,	 no	 significant	 diplomatic	 dimension	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 Eurasians	
with	British	fathers	were	British	subjects	or	to	be	given	British	protection,	since	the	
Chinese	 government	 never	 claimed	 them	 as	 Chinese	 subjects	 or	 intervened	 in	
issues	involving	them;		and	furthermore	there	was,	again	by	contrast	with	the	case	
of	Chinese	British	subjects,	no	pressure	from	British	colonies	such	as	Hong	Kong	or	
the	 Straits	 Settlements	 to	 support	 or	 protect	 Eurasians	 in	 China.	 	 Eurasians	 had	
only	local	supporters	among	some	of	China’s	British	settler	community.	
																																																								
42	See	 for	 example	 a	 recent	 article	 published	 in	 China,	 which	 focusses	 entirely	 on	 attitudes	 and	
practices	 which	 served	 to	 exclude	 Eurasian	 families:	 Xiong	 Yuezhi,	 ‘The	 Question	 of	 Interracial	








No	 official	 guidance	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 given	 in	 instructions	 to	 consuls	 in	 the	
early	 decades	 of	 British	 expansion	 in	 China	 as	 to	 the	 status	 of	 Eurasians	 with	 a	
British	parent	in	China.		Therefore,	as	a	Eurasian	population	grew	up	in	the	treaty	
ports,	 local	 British	 consular	 officials	 responded	 to	 their	 presence	 in	 an	 ad	 hoc	
manner,	until	a	clear	policy	was	finally	created	and	disseminated	at	the	end	of	the	
nineteenth	 century.	 	 Judge	 Hornby’s	 instructions	 to	 consuls	 of	 1867,	 which	 laid	
down	 a	 ruling	 as	 to	 which	 Chinese	 British	 subjects	 would	 be	 eligible	 for	 British	
protection	when	 in	China,	 referring	 to	 the	 ‘children	of	Chinese	parents’,	made	no	





to	 recognise	 such	 persons	 as	 British	 subjects,	 and,	 though	 I	 know	 of	 no	 legal	
decision	on	the	point,	the	custom	has	never	been	questioned.’44		At	about	the	same	
time,	 the	 consul	 in	Shanghai	George	 Jamieson	contradicted	Gardner’s	 claim	when	
he	 indicated	 to	Minister	 Nicholas	 O’Conor	 that	 at	 that	 port	 a	 less	 consistent	 but	
apparently	 generally	more	 exclusionary	 approach	 had	 been	 taken	 to	 illegitimate	
Eurasians:	 ‘In	 a	 few	 cases	 they	 have	 succeeded	 in	 getting	 their	 names	 on	 the	
Consular	Register.’45	
	
The	 FO	 were	 first	 asked	 for	 instructions	 on	 the	 status	 of	 Eurasians	 in	 1894,	 by	
Minister	 O’Conor.46		 He	 was	 prompted	 to	 do	 so	 by	 despatches	 received	 almost	
simultaneously	 from	 the	 above-mentioned	 consuls	 at	 Xiamen	 and	 Shanghai,	











his	mother,	 a	Chinese,	after	W.’s	birth.’47		Mr	W’s	 case	was	 raised	 in	a	 long	 list	of	
‘cases	 of	 doubtful	 nationality’	 compiled	 by	 Consul	 Gardner.	 	 From	 Shanghai,	
O’Conor	 received	a	more	 focussed	enquiry	 centred	on	 the	 status	of	 two	Eurasian	
sons	of	James	E.	 	Cooke,	who	was	said	to	have	married	their	Chinese	mother	after	
their	births.		Jamieson	gave	further	details	in	support	of	the	Cookes’	claim	to	some	
degree	of	protection	in	his	despatch	to	Minister	O’Conor:	 	 they	were	 ‘in	each	case	
recognized	by	the	father,	they	have	been	given	a	European	education,	and	they	live	
and	 dress	 in	 European	 style’;	 the	 two	men	were	 ‘employed	 in	 foreign	 houses	 of	
business,	they	associate	with	foreigners,	and	except	for	the	fact	of	birth,	they	have	




argument	 by	 suggesting	 that	 if	 Britain	 refused	 to	 offer	 them	protection	 and	 take	
them	under	its	jurisdiction,	it	was	possible	that	they	might	be	tortured	by	Chinese	
officials	 should	 they	 break	 Chinese	 laws	 (although	 he	 also	 stated	 that	 Chinese	
officials	assumed	that	such	children	were	 in	 fact	 ‘English’).	 	He	proposed	 to	solve	
the	 problem	 by	 suggesting	 that	 illegitimate	 children	 of	 British	 fathers	 should	 be	
given	 the	 status	 of	 British	 protected	 persons,	 ‘provided	 that	 such	 children	 have	
been	 de	 facto	 recognized	 by	 the	 father	 as	 such,	 and	 that	 they	 have	 adopted	 the	
ordinary	European	 style	 of	 dress.’49		O’Conor	 forwarded	 Jamieson’s	 suggestion	 to	
the	FO	and	gave	it	his	support.			
	
The	 FO	 felt	 little	 difficulty	 in	 agreeing	 to	 Jamieson’s	 proposal,	 having	 already	 in	
1889	agreed	to	a	similar	policy	being	adopted	in	the	case	of	a	British	subject,	N.	P.	
Kingdom,	 who	 had	 an	 illegitimate	 son	 in	 Japan	 ‘by	 a	 Japanese	 woman’.	 	 It	 was	
stressed	 that	 the	Cookes	would,	 like	Kingdom’s	 son,	 only	be	 ‘British	 subjects	 for	
																																																								
47	It	was	 clear	 from	 the	 context	 that	 the	meaning	of	 the	 confusing	wording	used	by	Gardner	was	
that	Mr	W’s	parents	had	married	(each	other)	after	Mr	W	was	born,	but	one	anonymous	FO	reader	









they	were	not	British,	 since	 the	Chinese	did	not	 claim	 them	as	Chinese	 subjects.		
The	 FO	 made	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 stipulations	 regarding	 dress	 suggested	 by	
Jamieson	 in	 their	 reply.50		 It	 seems	 that	 the	 FO’s	 positive	 response	 in	 1894	 to	
Jamieson’s	 suggestion	 was	 not	 communicated	 as	 a	 general	 policy	 to	 all	 consuls,	
since	 Consul	 Gardner,	 still	 at	 Xiamen,	 once	 again	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 illegitimate	
Eurasians	with	the	minister	(by	then	Claude	MacDonald)	in	1898	and	the	issue	was	
passed	 on	 once	 more	 to	 the	 FO.	 	 In	 his	 despatch,	 MacDonald	 suggested	 that	
whether	or	not	they	were	‘brought	up	as	Europeans’	should	not	affect	the	claim	to	
protection	of	such	children.	 	This	was	an	unusual	view,	as	we	shall	see,	since	the	
question	 of	 whether	 to	 extend	 British	 protection	 to	 illegitimate	 Eurasians	 was	




by	their	 fathers’;	where	the	parents	had	 ‘subsequently	 inter-married’;	and	where	
they	 had	 ‘adopted	 the	 European	 mode	 of	 dress’.52		 The	 inclusion	 of	 the	 latter	








protected	persons	 if	 their	parents	had	gone	on	 to	marry	after	 their	birth.53		As	a	
result,	 some	 consuls	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 policy	 as	 laid	 down	 by	 the	 FO	 and	









Shanghai	 in	 1902	 presumably	 knew	 the	 correct	 FO	 policy,	 since	 he	 proposed	 to	
Minister	 Ernest	 Satow	 that	 approval	 should	 be	 sought	 from	 the	 FO	 for	 the	
extension	 of	 British	 protected	 person	 status	 to	 illegitimate	 Eurasians	 whose	




approval	 for	 a	 change	 of	 policy.	 	 It	 seems	 anyway	 that	 the	 1898	 policy	 –	which	
stated	 that	 only	 illegitimate	 Eurasians	 whose	 parents	 had	 married	 could	 be	
registered	 as	 British	 protected	 persons	 –	 was	 not	 altered,	 since	 consuls	 were	
informed	 in	 1920	 by	 a	 circular	 that	 the	 1898	 ruling	 still	 applied.	 	 This	 had	 the	
effect	 of	 tightening	 the	 practice	 of	 some	 consuls	 who	 had	 hitherto	 registered	
children	whose	parents	remained	unmarried.56		 	This	policy	remained	 in	 force	 in	
subsequent	years,	and	was	included	in	the	Compendium	of	Instructions	to	Consular	
Officers	provided	by	the	Legation	to	consuls	 in	1927,	but	even	 in	 the	1920s	after	
the	 FO	 policy	 had	 been	 reaffirmed	 by	 the	 1920	 circular,	 consuls	 retained	 a	
tendency	 to	 bend	 or	misapply	 the	 rules	 by	 adopting	 varying	 local	 practices,	 for	
example	 in	 renewing	 the	 registrations	 of	 those	 who	 had	 been	 incorrectly	
registered	as	British	protected	persons.		Such	a	situation	occurred	in	the	case	of	A.	
J.	Maitland,	who	had	been	registered	over	a	number	of	years	as	a	British	protected	
person,	 but	who	did	not	 strictly	qualify	 since	his	British	 father’s	marriage	 to	his	
Chinese	mother	was	not	valid	under	British	law.		His	registration	was	continued	in	
1923,	following	a	request	made	through	his	British	employer,	notwithstanding	the	





55 	Satow’s	 apparent	 concern	 for	 the	 welfare	 of	 illegitimate	 Eurasian	 children	 is	 perhaps		






The	 status	 of	 British	 protected	 person	 which	 was	 given	 to	 certain	 Eurasians	
deserves	some	analysis,	 since	 its	deployment	 in	 the	 treaty	ports	had	 implications	
for	the	nature	of	British	governance,	not	least	because	any	means	by	which	British	
protection	 was	 extended	 more	 widely	 over	 people	 or	 things	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports	
represented	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 British	 expansion	 in	 China.	 	 British	 protected	
person	was	a	category	with	unclear	origins	and	somewhat	lacking	definition,	since	
it	was	 a	 status	 granted	under	 royal	prerogative	 rather	 than	 statute	 law.	 	William	
Hall,	a	contemporary	 legal	scholar,	wrote	 in	his	1894	work	on	British	 jurisdiction	
overseas	that,	‘it	rests	indeed	upon	no	principle	whatever’.58		Often,	but	not	always,	
the	 extension	of	British	protection	 to	people	who	were	not	British	 subjects	went	
hand	 in	hand	with	 the	 institution	of	extraterritoriality,	and	the	British	had	by	 the	




Arabian	 Gulf,	 the	 granting	 of	 British	 protection	 to	 favoured	 individuals	 was	 an	
important	 tool,	 deployed	 by	 India’s	 Political	 Residents	 there	 in	 order	 to	 create	




basis	 of	 no	 legal	 principle,	 but	 unlike	 in	 the	Middle	 East,	 it	 does	 not	 appear	 that	
protection	was	ever	granted	in	a	consciously	goal-oriented	way.		Rather,	protection	
was	 generally	 extended	 in	 a	 somewhat	 ad	 hoc	 manner	 to	 some	 of	 those	 who	
																																																								
58	William	 Edward	 Hall,	 A	 Treatise	 on	 the	 Foreign	 Powers	 and	 Jurisdiction	 of	 the	 British	 Crown	
(London,	1894).	
59	For	 British	 protected	 persons	 in	 territories	 where	 there	 was	 no	 extraterritoriality,	 see	 James	
Onley,	The	Arabian	Frontier	of	the	British	Raj:	Merchants,	Rulers,	and	the	British	in	the	Nineteenth-
Century	 Gulf,	 (Oxford,	 2007),	 p.	 100;	 on	 Ionians	 see	 C.R.	 Pennell,	 ‘The	 Origins	 of	 the	 Foreign	
Jurisdiction	Act	and	the	Extension	of	British	Sovereignty’,	Historical	Research,	83,	221	(2009),	465–
85,	 p.	 473;	 for	 extension	 of	 British	 protection	 to	 British	 employees	 and	 Russian	 Jews,	 see	 Hall,	
Foreign	Powers	and	Jurisdiction	of	the	British	Crown	(London,	1894),		p.	137.		Later,	with	the	growth	





lobbied	 for	 it,	 sometimes	 without	 the	 sanction	 of	 the	 FO.61		 Chiara	 Betta	 has	
described	 how	many	 Jews	 of	 Baghdadi	 origin	 were	 granted	 the	 status	 of	 British	
protected	 persons	 or	 even	 registered	 as	 British	 subjects	 in	 Shanghai	 from	 the	
1860s	onwards,	 in	particular	 those	 employed	by	 the	 Sassoon	 firms	which	played	
important	 roles	 in	 trade	 between	 India	 and	 China	 and	 were	 influential	 in	
Shanghai.62		Up	to	1884,	the	OICs	were	silent	on	British	protected	persons,	but	from	
1884	 onwards,	 British	 protected	 persons	 were	 specifically	 included	 within	 the	
meaning	of	the	term	British	subject	in	the	OICs.63		
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 Eurasians,	 British	 protected	 person	 status	 seems	 to	 have	 been	
granted	through	a	sense	of	moral	obligation,	emotional	connection,	and	also	due	to	
a	 fear	 that	 unregistered	 Eurasians	 who	 lived	 as	 foreigners	 might	 otherwise	 be	
punished	as	Chinese	if	caught	up	in	serious	criminal	matters,	which	would	lead	to	
foreign	 public	 outrage,	 rather	 than	 because	 it	 was	 thought	 that	 patronage	 of	
Eurasians	 would	 be	 repaid	 through	 any	 direct	 benefit	 to	 British	 interests.	 	 As	
already	noted	above,	there	was	a	vocal	pro-Eurasian	lobby	in	Shanghai,	prepared	to	
speak	 out	 where	 injustices	 were	 perceived	 to	 have	 taken	 place.	 	 Although	 not	
expressly	 articulated	 in	 the	 archival	 sources,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 fears	 around	 loss	 of	
prestige,	 a	 perennial	 British	 concern,	were	 also	 a	motivation	 in	 the	 protection	 of	
Eurasians	who	might	 be	 viewed	 as	 British	 by	 Chinese	 authorities.	 	 Employees	 of	










43-44.	 	 See	 also	 Sarah	 Abrevaya	 Stein,	 ‘Protected	 Persons?	 The	 Baghdadi	 Jewish	 Diaspora,	 the	






subject	 to	 British	 consular	 jurisdiction,	meaning	 that	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 civil	 or	
criminal	 litigation	where	they	were	the	defendant,	 the	applicable	 forum	would	be	
the	 SCC	 at	 Shanghai,	 or	 elsewhere	 the	 local	British	provincial	 (consular)	 court	 in	
China,	and	any	sentence	passed	would	be	served	in	British	prisons.		As	with	British	
subjects,	when	a	British	protected	person	complained	in	a	civil	or	criminal	matter	
against	 a	 Chinese	 subject,	 the	 British	 consul	 would	 take	 up	 the	 case	 with	 the	
Chinese	authorities,	and	where	a	mixed	court	existed,	a	British	assessor	would	sit	
with	 the	Chinese	official	 to	hear	 the	case.	 	British	protected	persons	could	expect	
consuls	to	intercede	on	their	behalf	where	their	rights	or	interests	were	infringed	
or	 threatened	 by	 Chinese	 or	 other	 foreign	 parties,	 as	 many	 Baghdadi	 Jews	 with	
British	protection	did	in	matters	concerning	the	opium	trade.65		 	British	protected	
persons	 therefore	enjoyed	many	of	 the	privileges	of	British	subjects	 in	China,	but	
their	 status	was	not	 equal	 to	 that	of	British	 subjects	 in	 important	practical	ways.		
Those	 who	 were	 registered	 at	 consulates	 as	 British	 protected	 persons	 were	 not	
allowed	to	register	 land	at	 the	consulate,	which	was	a	serious	disability	 for	 those	
wealthy	 enough	 to	 own	 property.66		 Consuls	were	 also	 instructed	 that	 they	were	
neither	 to	 marry	 British	 protected	 persons	 nor	 to	 register	 their	 deaths	 at	 the	
consulate.67		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	status	of	British	protected	person	was	






of	 or	 follow	 the	 policies	 correctly,	 and	 they	 also	 encountered	 Eurasians	 in	
circumstances	where	their	national	status	was	in	issue	but	where	the	FO	policies	
were	not	applicable.		Leaving	aside	official	policy,	it	is	possible	to	generalise	about	









demonstrated	 blood	 ties	 with	 Britain,	 there	 were	 certain	 personal	 features,	 the	
presence	 or	 absence	 of	 which	 was	 emphasised	 in	 minutes,	 memoranda	 and	
despatches	 time	 and	 again	 as	 being	 material	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 rights	 of	
Eurasians	 to	 British	 status	 or	 protection.	 	 These	 were	 broadly	 the	 same	 details	











successive	 consuls	 at	Xiamen	and	Shanghai,	 even	 though	none	of	 the	 family	was	
illegitimate.	 	 The	 three	 sons	 of	 James	Whitfield	 were	 listed	 in	 Consul	 Gardner’s	
1893	 list	 of	 doubtful	 cases,	 apparently	 for	 no	 other	 reason	 than	 that	 they	were	
Eurasians	living	as	Chinese:	 	 ‘C.W.,	 J.W.,	and	L.W.	 	Father	British,	mother	Chinese,	
born	 in	 wedlock	 in	 China.	 	 Are	 now	 living	 as	 Chinese.	 	 I	 have	 decided	 they	 are	
British	 subjects	 until	 they	 renounce	 their	 allegiance.’68		 	 By	 questioning	 their	
status,	Gardner	seemed	to	be	suggesting	that	way	of	life	and	national	status	should	
be	aligned,	but	 the	FO	confirmed	that	 they	were	British	subjects.	 	The	Whitfields	
were	again	 the	 subject	of	official	discussion	when	 in	1907	Pierre	O’Brien	Butler,	
then	consul	at	Xiamen,	raised	doubts	as	to	the	status	of	the	wives	and	children	of	
James	 (the	 second)	 Whitfield	 and	 his	 brother	 Charles,	 who	 were	 registered	 as	
British	subjects,	on	the	basis	that	the	marriages	of	James	and	Charles	Whitfield	to	
their	Chinese	wives	might	not	be	valid,	since	they	were	made	‘in	the	same	way	as	
in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 marriage	 between	 two	 Chinese	 subjects’.69		 He	 concluded	 his	
																																																								
68	TNA	FO	17/1259:	Gardner	 to	O’Conor,	2	November	1893,	enclosure	3	 in	O’Conor	 to	Kimberley	
No	 16,	 19	 January	 1894.	 	 There	 can	 be	 very	 little	 doubt	 given	 the	 small	 size	 of	 the	 British	




despatch	with	 the	 statement	 that	 ‘all	 the	members	 of	 the	Whitfield	 family	 have	
from	 early	 years	 dressed	 and	 lived	 as	 Chinese	 and	 been	 practically	
undistinguishable	 from	 their	 Chinese	 neighbours.’70		 	 The	 crown	 advocate	 was	
asked	for	his	opinion,	which	was	that	the	marriages	were	valid	and	thus	the	wives	
and	 children	 were	 all	 British	 subjects.71		 A	 member	 of	 the	 third	 generation	 of	
Whitfields	 in	China,	Peter	 Siong	Whitfield,	 encountered	 suspicion	when	applying	
for	a	passport	 in	Shanghai	 in	1935,	not	 least	because	on	the	application	form	 ‘he	
did	 not	 fail	 to	 include	 the	 Chinese	 names	 of	 five	 children	 all	 born	 at	 Amoy	
[Xiamen]’. 72 		 Although	 consuls	 never	 made	 strenuous	 efforts	 to	 deny	 the	
Whitfields’	right	to	be	registered	as	British	subjects,	and	the	Whitfields	managed	to	
maintain	 their	 British	 status,	 they	 were	 nevertheless	 always	 under	 suspicion,	
because	of	their	way	of	life.	
	
Illegitimate	Eurasians	with	 less	 secure	claims	 to	British	nationality	or	protection	
than	the	Whitfields,	but	who	performed	their	Britishness	through	such	practices	as	
the	 clothing	 they	 wore,	 the	 people	 they	 associated	 with,	 and	 the	 language	 they	
spoke,	often	received	sympathetic	treatment	at	the	hands	of	consuls.		For	example,	
in	 1924	 registration	 at	 the	 Shanghai	 consulate	 as	 British	 protected	 persons	was	
sought	for	J.	J.	Maguire	and	his	sisters	L.	V.	Maguire	and	K.	Maguire,	who	were	the	
children	 of	 a	 lighthouse	 keeper	 and	 his	 Japanese	 wife,	 said	 to	 be	 ‘one	 of	 the	
necessary	 women	 regularly	 supplied	 by	 the	 Customs	 under	 the	 title	 of	
housekeeper	 to	 the	 foreign	 light-keepers’. 73 		 This	 was	 clearly	 a	 very	 lowly	
background	in	terms	of	social	status,	light-keepers	being	unskilled	and	the	lowest	
paid	foreign	employees	of	the	Customs.74		Their	claim	was	made	more	tenuous	by	
the	 facts	 that	 the	 parents	 had	 never	 married	 and	 that	 by	 1924	 the	 children’s	
British	father	was	long	dead.75		The	application	to	the	consulate	was	made	on	the	
children’s	behalf	by	Brother	Faust	of	St	Francis	Xavier’s	College,	where	J.	J.	Maguire	














as	British	 protected	 persons.	 	 A	 similar	 case	 presented	 itself	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 the	
application	for	registration	as	a	British	protected	person	of	Joseph	Henry	in	1925.		
Henry	was	a	pupil	of	the	Thomas	Hanbury	School,	the	illegitimate	son	of	a	British	
father	and	a	Chinese	mother.	 	His	 father	had	died	 in	1915,	and	although	specific	
details	of	Henry’s	way	of	 life	were	not	recorded	(his	degree	of	fluency	in	English,	
style	of	dress	and	other	cultural	markers	would	however	have	been	evident	when	
he	 had	 visited	 the	 consulate	 to	 be	 interviewed),	 it	 was	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	
memorandum	on	the	case	that	‘He	sees	his	mother	for	not	more	than	a	day	or	two	
each	 month,	 his	 permanent	 residence	 being	 the	 school.’ 77 		 That	 fact	 was	
presumably	noted	because	 it	 implied	a	good	deal	about	the	young	man’s	cultural	
orientation	 and	 the	 influences	 which	 shaped	 his	 outlook.	 	 He	 was	 provisionally	
registered	as	a	British	protected	person,	but	with	 the	proviso	 that	 this	would	be	
reviewed	when	he	reached	 the	age	of	 twenty-one,	 since	 there	was	 ‘no	guarantee	




As	 already	 noted,	 an	 important	 consequence	 of	 being	 registered	 in	 China	 as	 a	
British	 subject	 or	 a	 British	 protected	 person	 was	 that	 those	 so	 registered	 were	
subject	in	China	to	British	consular	legal	jurisdiction.		As	a	result,	there	are	records	
of	 the	 dealings	 of	 British	 officials	 with	 Eurasian	 individuals	 in	 the	 context	 of	
criminal	 and	 civil	 court	 cases	 in	 British	 courts	 which	 reveal	 a	 good	 deal	 about	
official	attitudes	and	practices	 towards	British	Eurasians.	 	 In	practice,	a	Eurasian	










neither	 a	 British	 subject	 nor	 a	 British	 protected	 person:	 whereas	 it	 could	 be	
difficult	to	prove	to	the	satisfaction	of	a	consul	that	one	had	a	right	to	registration	
and	 protection,	 British	 officials	 in	 China	 were	 sometimes	 prepared	 to	 assume	
jurisdiction	over	those	whose	status	was	questionable	when	it	was	expedient	to	do	
so.	 	Where	 British	 courts	 did	 not	 take	 jurisdiction	 but	where	 there	were	mixed	
courts,	British	officials	would	still	deal	judicially	with	Eurasians	who	were	neither	
British	subjects	nor	British	protected	persons	but	had	British	connections,	since	a	
British	 official	 would	 sit	 as	 the	 assessor	 in	 the	 case	 alongside	 the	 Chinese	
magistrate.	 	 	 In	 cases	heard	 in	 either	 type	of	 court,	 the	way	 that	British	 officials	
treated	 Eurasians	 demonstrated	 clear	 patterns	 of	 behaviour,	 which	 serve	 to	
indicate	 an	 implicit	 official	 view	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports	 as	 colonial	 spaces,	 and	 the	
status	 of	 their	 inhabitants	 as	 treaty	port	 ‘citizens’,	with	 certain	 (albeit	 limited	 in	
the	case	of	Eurasians)	rights	and	privileges.		In	the	following	section	I	will	illustrate	
this	 by	 focussing	 on	 the	 cases	 of	 two	 Eurasians	 in	 Shanghai,	William	 Cance	 and	
Thomas	 Crank,	 who	 were	 both	 tried	 at	 different	 times	 in	 the	 British	 consular	
courts	and	the	Shanghai	Mixed	Court.			
	
William	 Arthur	 Cance	 was	 an	 illegitimate	 Eurasian	 who	 was	 accused	 of	 using	
forged	‘chits’	(a	kind	of	note	regularly	used	at	the	treaty	ports	to	make	purchases	




Mixed	 Court	 before	 the	 Chinese	 magistrate	 and	 Shanghai	 Vice-Consul	 George	
Playfair,	 sitting	 as	 assessor.	 	 Cance’s	 sentence,	 decided	 in	 consultation	 with	 the	
British	assessor,	was	twelve	months’	imprisonment.		The	sentence	was	issued	with	
the	 request	 that	 it	 be	 served	 in	 the	 British	 consular	 gaol:	 	 in	 an	 explanatory	




compelled	 to	 associate	 with	 native	 criminals’.	 	 However,	 Playfair	 expressed	 his	





Hannen	 that	 ‘the	 natural	 children	 of	 British	 fathers	 whenever	 the	 father	 has	
recognised	 such	 children	 and	 brought	 them	 up	 as	 Europeans’	 should	 be	 given	
British	 protection	 to	 prevent	 them	 being	 subjected	 in	 future	 to	 Chinese	 legal	
process	 and	 especially	 Chinese	 punishment	 regimes.80		 In	 the	 case	 of	 Cance,	 we	
therefore	see	again	an	emphasis	on	cultural	competence	in	the	discussion	of	who	
should	be	included	under	British	protection.		Cance	was	accused	of	further	crimes	
of	 the	 same	 kind	 in	December	 1897,	 this	 time	 obtaining	 champagne	 under	 false	
pretences	from	the	tent	of	the	Club	Concordia	at	the	Shanghai	Races.		The	case	was	
heard	 this	 time	 by	 the	 SCC,	 before	 Chief	 Justice	 (formerly	 also	 Consul-General)	
Hannen	 and	 a	 jury,	 and	 Cance	 was	 found	 guilty	 and	 sentenced	 to	 two	 months’	
imprisonment	 with	 hard	 labour.81		 Almost	 immediately	 after	 his	 release	 from	
prison,	 Cance	 was	 again	 accused	 of	 a	 similar	 offence,	 this	 time	 obtaining	 goods	
from	a	Chinese	store	by	signing	chits	in	a	false	name.	 	He	pleaded	guilty	and	was	
sentenced	 to	 three	 months’	 hard	 labour,	 with	 the	 additional	 condition	 that	 on	
release	he	would	be	required	to	find	security	for	good	behaviour	of	one	thousand	
dollars,	 or	 be	 deported.82		 On	 release	 Cance	 could	 not	 find	 the	 security	 required	




discipline,	 including	 forcible	 removal	 through	 deportation.	 	 Protection	 therefore	





80	TNA	 FO	 671/204:	 Playfair	 to	 Hannen,	 13	 May	 1893.	 	 Clare	 Anderson	 has	 described	 similar	










Thomas	Hanbury	School.	 	His	 first	offence,	 the	 theft	of	a	watch	committed	at	 the	
age	of	eighteen,	was	tried	in	the	British	Police	Court	at	Shanghai	in	May	1908.		The	
court	 heard	 that	 Crank	 had	worked	 at	 the	 Shanghai-Nanking	 Railway	 Company,	
but	had	recently	been	dismissed.		It	was	said	by	a	witness	that	Crank’s	father	‘had	
done	his	best	for	the	lad	and	had	taken	a	lot	of	trouble	to	find	him	different	kinds	
of	 employment.’	 	 Police	Magistrate	Gilbert	King	 sentenced	Crank	 to	 a	 suspended	
sentence	of	one	year,	stating	that	he	was	treating	him	leniently	in	view	of	his	young	
age.85		Crank	appeared	in	a	British	court	again	in	January	1910,	this	time	the	SCC	




original	 marriage	 –	 an	 irregular	 marriage	 –	 had	 been	 followed	 by	 a	 second	
marriage	–	a	regular	marriage.’		It	was	also	revealed	that	Crank’s	father	had	cut	off	
relations	with	his	son.	 	A	strikingly	emotional	tone	was	displayed	in	the	language	
used	 by	 officials	 in	 the	 courtroom,	 suggesting	 that	 a	 lot	 was	 felt	 to	 be	 at	 stake,	
despite	 the	 lack	of	 any	diplomatic	or	hard	political	 significance	 to	 the	 case.	 	The	
crown	 advocate	 related:	 ‘It	was	 a	 pitiable	 case,	 but	 this	 young	man	 had	 been	 in	
trouble	before,	and	it	was	very	difficult	to	suggest	what	could	be	done	with	him.’		
Judge	 de	 Sausmarez	 appeared	 to	 demonstrate	 considerable	 sympathy	 for	 the	
defendant,	commenting	that	‘people	have	no	right	to	bring	children	into	this	world	
and	not	take	care	of	them.’		When	passing	sentence	de	Sausmarez	declared	himself	












In	1914	Crank	was	again	 in	court	before	 Judge	de	Sausmarez,	accused	of	 forging	





register,	 but	 asking	 that	 the	 consul-general	 be	 consulted	 as	 to	 whether	 Crank’s	
registration	 as	 a	 British	 subject	 should	 be	 renewed.88		 Crank	 was	 subsequently	
denied	registration	and	in	July	1917,	when	he	was	charged	with	fraud	once	more,	
the	 case	 was	 heard	 in	 the	 Mixed	 Court	 by	 the	 Chinese	 magistrate	 and	 British	
assessor	(and	consular	official)	Penrhyn	Grant	Jones.89		Crank	was	alleged	on	this	
occasion	to	have	obtained	a	significant	sum	of	money,	which	he	rapidly	spent,	by	
means	of	 false	pretences	and	 forgery.	 	His	past	record	was	read	to	 the	court	and	









possessor	 of	 British	 blood	 while	 having	 been	 denied	 registration	 at	 the	 British	
consulate	 and	while	 being	 sentenced	 in	 a	 court	which	was,	 nominally	 at	 least,	 a	
Chinese	 court,	 and	which	existed	primarily	 to	deal	with	Chinese	 criminals	 in	 the	
Shanghai	 International	Settlement.	 	Was	Crank	not	being	castigated	 for	 failing	 to	
shoulder	the	responsibilities	of	being	British	even	while	being	denied	enjoyment	of	
the	 rights?	 	 The	 situation	 was	 not	 in	 fact	 so	 straightforward,	 for	 despite	 the	
outraged	 tone	of	his	 remarks,	after	 the	proceedings	were	concluded,	Grant	 Jones	
demonstrated	that	Crank	was	not	entirely	disowned,	by	showing	concern	over	the	








Court,	 because	 the	 control	 and	management	 of	 the	 latter	 institution	 had	 by	 this	




the	 nature	 of	 the	 prison	 regime	 which	 would	 be	 applied	 to	 Crank,	 specifically	
asking	to	be	informed	of	‘the	nature	of	the	confinement,	routine,	diet,	dress,	work	
and	 exercise	 of	 the	 prisoner.’92		 It	 was	 clearly	 important	 to	 the	 consul	 that	 the	
prisoner’s	 sentence	 should	 be	 performed	 in	 a	 way	 appropriate	 to	 his	 cultural	
orientation,	irrespective	of	his	formal	national	status.		
	




get	 his	 sentence	 reduced	 and	 to	 achieve	 registration	 at	 the	 British	 consulate-
general.93		After	his	release	in	1920,	and	in	response	to	his	request	for	registration,	




Legal	 principle	 played	 very	 little	 part	 in	 determining	 how	Crank	 and	 others	 like	
him	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports	 were	 treated.	 	 The	 British	 state	 created	 categories	 of	
people,	 with	 ties	 to	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 	 and	 jointly	 managed	 the	
treatment	 of	 them	 in	 conjunction	 with	 employees	 of	 the	 SMC.	 	 Their	 status	 as	
																																																								
91 	John	 King	 Fairbank	 and	 Denis	 Crispin	 Twitchett	 (eds),	 The	 Cambridge	 History	 of	 China:	








British	protégés	within	 such	processes,	 and	 the	position	 it	 gave	 them	within	 the	




In	 the	 Chinese	 treaty	 ports,	 Eurasians	were	 sorted	 by	 British	 officials	 into	 those	
who	could	be	included,	and	those	to	be	excluded,	based	on	their	degree	of	cultural	
competence	in	British	ways.		This	evidence	supports	Stoler’s	assertion	that	colonial	
racial	 theories	 depended	 on	 more	 than	 just	 inherited	 physical	 properties:	
‘European	food,	dress,	housing,	and	morality	were	given	new	political	meanings	in	
the	particular	 social	order	of	 colonial	 rule.’96		 	Furthermore,	and	as	has	also	been	
put	 forward	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Stoler	 and	 other	 scholars,	 colonial	 categories	 were	
complicated	and	the	boundaries	defining	where	people	were	placed	in	relation	to	






the	 other	 hand,	 even	when	 denied	 any	 kind	 of	 registration,	 Eurasians	 like	 Cance	




a	 situation	 accords	 somewhat	 with	 the	 ‘unclarified	 sovereignties’	 discussed	 by	
Stoler	and	McGranahan,	writing	on	the	subject	of	more	recent	US	imperialism,	who	
assert	that	‘Uncertain	domains	of	jurisdiction	and	ad	hoc	exemptions	from	the	law	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 race	 and	 cultural	 difference	 are	 guiding	 and	 defining	 imperial	
principles.’97		 Despite	 the	 generally-held	 assumption	 that	 states	 and	 state	 actions	
tend	 towards	 the	 assertion	 of	 boundaries	 and	 the	 tightening	 of	 categories,	 the	
																																																								
96	Stoler,	‘Rethinking	Colonial	Categories’,	in	Dirks	(ed.),	Colonialism	and	Culture,	p.	321.	






The	 contents	 of	 this	 chapter	 support	 a	 conclusion	which	was	 also	 apparent	 from	
the	 findings	 of	 the	 earlier	 chapter	 on	 Chinese	 British	 subjects:	 	 legal	 definitions	
which	prescribed	who	qualified	as	a	British	subject	were	often	severely	misaligned	
with	 conceptions	of	British	 identity	held	by	British	officials.	 	 	 Lees,	writing	about	
late	nineteenth-	and	early	 twentieth-century	colonial	Malaya,	has	stated	that	 'The	




class,	 it	 would	 be	 misleading	 to	 translate	 this	 into	 a	 generalisation	 about	 the	
approach	taken	by	the	British	government	in	treaty	port	China	as	well,	perhaps,	as	
other	locations.	 	British	officials	in	the	FO	and	in	China	clearly	believed	that	there	




not	 made	 in	 practice	 (or	 indeed	 in	 policy).	 	 It	 was	 presumably	 because	 he	 had	
absorbed	such	 ideas	 that	 the	writer	of	 the	 letter	quoted	 from	at	 the	beginning	of	
this	 chapter	 appealed	 for	 entitlement	 to	 the	 ‘higher	 estimation’	 he	 believed	
Eurasians	deserved.		
	
There	was	 a	 de	 facto	 recognition	 that	 growing	 up	 enculturated	 as	 British	 in	 the	
colonial	spaces	of	 the	treaty	ports	created	some	entitlement	to	British	protection.		









through	 flexible,	 culturally-contingent	 responses,	 contributed	 to	 the	 shared	
understanding	of	 the	Britishness	of	 the	 International	Settlement	of	Shanghai,	 and	












In	1908,	 at	 the	British	Police	Court	 at	 Shanghai,	 Jawalla	 Singh	was	 charged	with	
assault	and	with	being	drunk	and	disorderly	in	the	gurdwara.1		He	was	found	guilty	
and	 Judge	 Frederick	 Bourne	 sentenced	 him	 to	 a	 month’s	 imprisonment	 and	






Judge	 Bourne’s	 comment	 is	 notable	 not	 only	 for	 the	 patronising	 manner,	
commonly	adopted	by	British	officials	in	China	when	lecturing	Indians,	in	which	he	
addressed	Jawalla	Singh.		It	is	also	noteworthy	because	he	raised	a	question	which	








not	 harmed	 by	 the	 presence	 and	 activities	 in	 China	 of	 British	 subjects	 such	 as	
Jawalla	Singh.	 	Although,	 in	contrast	with	Chinese	British	subjects	and	Eurasians,	
their	status	as	British	subjects	was	secure,	the	fitness	of	Indians	to	inhabit	British	
colonial	 spaces	 in	 China	 was	 constantly	 under	 scrutiny	 and	 the	 implications	 of	
their	 presence	 and	 actions	 there	 were	 the	 cause	 of	 much	 official	 anxiety	 and	
																																																								
1	A	gurdwara	is	a	Sikh	place	of	worship.	
2	‘R.	 (S.M.P.)	 and	Mishra	 Singh	 v.	 Jawalla	 Singh’,	NCH,	 6	 March	 1908,	 p.	 569.	 	 Jawalla	 Singh	 was	
deported	after	he	had	served	his	sentence	in	prison	(NCH,	3	April	1908,	p.	41).			
3	Martial	 race	 theory	 is	 discussed	 below.	 	Works	 on	martial	 race	 theory	 include	Heather	 Streets,	









in	 that	 official	 interest	 in	 them	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 their	 status	 as	 a	 problem	
population.		‘Good	Sikhs’	(and	‘Sikh’	was	often	used	as	a	shorthand	for	all	‘martial’	
Indians)	were	often	viewed	as	a	resource	which,	with	careful	handling,	could	give	
British	 interests	 a	 special	 advantage	 and	 could	 bolster	 British	 prestige	 in	 China,	
especially	 in	 Shanghai.	 	 	 Precisely	 because	 of	 their	 supposed	 qualities	 based	 on	
racialised	 thinking,	 ‘martial’	 Indians	could	be	both	a	resource	and	a	 threat	 in	 the	
eyes	of	British	officials	in	China,	and	for	that	reason	they	were	subjected	to	more	











India	as	a	 focal	point	 in	an	 interconnected	 imperial	web.5		Metcalf’s	book	gives	a	
good	 account	 of	 some	 aspects	 of	 official	 treatment	 of	 Indians,	 especially	 those	
recruited	for	police	forces	in	China	and	elsewhere,	within	the	overall	framework	of	
Indian	 ‘subempire’.	 	However,	 the	existing	 literature	on	 India	and	China	 includes	
																																																								




5	Robert	 Bickers,	 ‘Britain	 and	 China,	 and	 India,	 1830s-1947’,	 in	 Robert	 Bickers,	 and	 Jonathan	 J.	
Howlett	(eds.),	Britain	and	China,	1840-1970:	Empire,	Finance	and	War	(Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge,	
2016),	58–83;	Isabella	Jackson,	‘The	Raj	on	Nanjing	Road:	Sikh	Policemen	in	Treaty-Port	Shanghai’,	








as	 to	 how	 exactly	 those	 connections	 influenced	 specific	 aspects	 of	 the	 British	
presence	 in	 China.	 	 Jackson	 argues	 for	 the	 significance	 of	 ‘the	 impact	 of	 sub-
imperialism	on	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Police’,	which	seems	to	hint	at	the	exercise	
of	 power	 from	 India	 in	 some	 way,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 made	 clear	 whether	 Indian	
Government	 decisions	 had	 much	 direct	 impact	 on	 Shanghai,	 or	 whether	 this	
impact	was	more	indirect,	the	result	of	the	British	in	Shanghai	drawing	on	Indian	
colonial	 knowledge	 and	 practices. 6 		 In	 this	 chapter,	 one	 of	 my	 aims	 is	 to	
understand	 with	 more	 precision	 how	 India	 and	 Indians,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
‘networked’	 empire,	 affected	 the	 British	 presence	 in	 China	 through	 Indian	
















where	 the	 ‘European	 British	 subject’	 existed	 as	 a	 legal	 category	 with	 special	
																																																								
6	Jackson,	‘The	Raj	on	Nanjing	Road:	Sikh	Policemen	in	Treaty-Port	Shanghai’,	p.	1694.	
7	There	 is	 a	 huge	 literature	 which	 could	 be	 listed	 under	 this	 topic	 in	 relation	 to	 India.	 	 See	 for	
example,	 Partha	 Chatterjee,	 The	 Black	 Hole	 of	 Empire:	 History	 of	 a	 Global	 Practice	 of	 Power	
(Princeton,	N.J.,	2012);	Thomas	R.	Metcalf,	Ideologies	of	the	Raj	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	 1995);	 Elizabeth	 Kolsky,	 ‘Codification	 and	 the	 Rule	 of	 Colonial	 Difference:	 Criminal	
Procedure	in	British	India’,	Law	and	History	Review,	23,	3	(2005),	631–83.		For	Indonesia,	see	Ann	
Laura	 Stoler’s	work,	 including	 ‘Sexual	Affronts	 and	Racial	 Frontiers:	 European	 Identities	 and	 the	
Cultural	 Politics	 of	 Exclusion	 in	Colonial	 Southeast	Asia’,	 in	Cooper	 and	 Stoler,	 (eds.),	Tensions	of	
Empire,.	198–237.	
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rights.8		 Because	 the	 courts	 in	 China	 were	 not	 established	 under	 circumstances	
typical	 of	 colonial	 rule,	 British	 Indians	 in	 China	 used	 the	 same	 courts	 and	were	
dealt	with	under	the	same	laws	as	other	British	subjects.	 	This	chapter	will	argue	
that	 the	 politics	 of	 difference	 was	 nevertheless	 clearly	 evident	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	





China,	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 a	 closer	 cooperation	 with	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	
Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	which	was	a	key	employer	of	Indians	and	also	a	body	
engaged	in	the	policing	and	defence	of	Shanghai,	aims	which	local	British	officials	
continued	 to	 support	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.9		 By	 focussing	 on	 the	 way	 this	
relationship	worked	for	the	management	of	‘martial’	Indians	in	China,	this	chapter	
will	 strengthen	 the	 argument	 made	 earlier	 concerning	 the	 connection	 between	
British	 state	 governance	 and	 the	 SMC,	 and	 will	 show	 how	 that	 relationship	
remained	close	at	the	beginning	of	 the	twentieth	century.	 	A	consideration	of	 the	
management	of	Indians	in	China	therefore	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	the	
nature	 of	 the	 interconnections	 between	 the	 British	 state	 and	 other	 institutions	




In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 proceed	 as	 follows.	 	 First,	 I	 will	 describe	 the	 Indian	
community	 in	China,	paying	particular	attention	to	 ‘martial’	British	Indians	other	
than	those	serving	in	the	Indian	Army	stationed	in	China,	since	the	latter	were	not	
living	under	Britain’s	civil	extraterritorial	 jurisdiction	there.	 	Then	I	will	 focus	on	
the	 development	 by	 British	 officials	 from	 the	 1900s	 to	 the	 1920s	 of	 orders,	








specifically	to	manage	and	control	 Indians	 in	China.	 	 In	so	doing	I	will	argue	that	





civil	 cases,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 politics	 of	
difference	can	be	seen	to	have	driven	the	attitudes	and	practices	of	officials.	 	 	By	
drawing	 on	 individual	 court	 cases,	 I	will	 be	 able	 to	 illustrate	 the	ways	 in	which	





Punjab,	 and	 who	 often	 worked	 as	 police	 or	 watchmen	 in	 China.	 	 This	 was	 a	
category	 of	 Indian	 British	 subjects	who	 contemporary	 British	 officials	 tended	 to	
group	together	when	addressing	issues	connected	with	their	governance.		I	refer	to	
this	 group	 as	 ‘martial’	 Indians,	 since	 this	 is	 a	 succinct	 term	 which	 reflects	
contemporary	official	conceptions	of	 the	group’s	unifying	 feature,	 their	supposed	
fighting	 prowess,	 without	 specifying	 their	 religious	 affiliation,	 which	 was	 not	
always	 clear.11		 The	 theory	 of	 martial	 races	 which	 informed	 British	 imperial	
military	practices	 in	 India	and	elsewhere	has	been	well	documented	 in	historical	
works	which	examine	the	theory	as	an	example	of	race-based,	essentialist	thinking,	
which	 grew	 in	 significance	 in	 India	 and	 Great	 Britain	 following	 the	 Rebellion	 of	
1857.12		Martial	 race	 theory	was	widely	promoted	and	 justified	 in	 contemporary	
political,	 military	 and	 ethnological	 works	 on	 India.13		 In	 accordance	 with	 this	
																																																								











widely-espoused	 theory,	 British	 officials	 in	 China	 saw	 this	 category	 of	 men	 as	
having	 in	 common	 a	 particular	 essential	 nature	 which	 made	 them	 suitable	 for	
work	related	to	combat,	security	and	policing.14		
	









Muslims	 from	 the	 Punjab	 or	 North-west	 Frontier	 provinces,	 a	 situation	 which	
sometimes	 caused	 confusion	 between	 British	 officials.16		 The	 situation	 is	 further	
complicated	by	 the	suggestion	 that	 some	 Indians	claimed	 to	be	Sikhs	 in	order	 to	
enhance	 their	 employment	 prospects,	 what	 Ballantyne	 terms	 the	 ‘pragmatic	
embrace	 of	 Sikhism’.17		 It	 seems	 that	 British	 recruitment	 officers	 in	 India	 also	
created	 Sikhs	 when	 recruitment	 from	 existing	 followers	 of	 Sikhism	 proved	
difficult.18		 For	 the	 sake	of	 clarity,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	will	 only	 refer	 to	 Sikhs	when	
men	who	were	considered	to	be	followers	of	Sikhism	are	clearly	at	issue.			
	
There	 were	 also	 Parsis	 and	 Sindhis	 from	 India	 in	 China,	 most	 of	 whom	 were	
merchants	 or	 shopkeepers,	 but	 there	 were	 clear	 differences	 in	 the	 way	 these	
																																																								
14	The	history	of	 ‘martial	races’	played	an	important	part	 in	British	evaluations	of	their	suitability	
for	 combat-related	work.	 	 See	Gavin	Rand,	 ‘“Martial	Races”	and	 “Imperial	Subjects”:	Violence	and	
Governance	in	Colonial	India,	1857–1914’,	European	Review	of	History:	Revue	Européenne	D’histoire,	
13,	1	(2006),	1–20,	pp.	11–12.			
15	TNA	FO	228/2299:	 table	enclosed	 in	HK	Governor	 to	 Jordan,	22	December	1915.	 	For	more	on	
the	 supposed	 distinction	 between	 the	 Sikh	 sub-groups,	 see	 Ballantyne,	 Between	 Colonialism	 and	
Diaspora,	p.	75.	
16	TNA	FO	17/1765:	HK	to	CO	9	Dec	1902	–	‘I	would	first	ask	whether	the	term	“Sikh”	as	used	by	the	
Foreign	Office	might	 possibly	 be	 intended	 in	 its	 generic	 sense	 as	 comprising	 all	 Indians	 and	 not	
with	reference	to	the	special	caste	known	as	Sikhs.’	 	Metcalf,	 Imperial	Connections,	 (p.	127)	states	
that	in	Southeast	Asia	all	Indians	from	the	interior	of	the	subcontinent	might	be	called	Sikhs.	
17	Tony	 Ballantyne,	 Between	 Colonialism	 and	 Diaspora:	 Sikh	 Cultural	 Formations	 in	 an	 Imperial	




groups	were	 viewed	–	 for	 one,	 they	were	not	 ascribed	martial	 proclivities	 –	 and	
although	Parsis	and	Sindhis	made	use	of	British	courts,	for	example	to	resolve	civil	
disputes,	 they	 had	 far	 less	 interaction	 with	 the	 British	 authorities.19		 Moreover,	
they	were	not	on	the	whole	viewed	as	problem	populations,	since	they	generally	
worked	 alongside	 mainstream	 British	 trade	 in	 ways	 neither	 challenging	 to	
metropolitan	and	colonial	British	interests,	nor	controversial	in	terms	of	relations	
with	 the	 Chinese	 or	 other	 governments.	 	 Attitudes	 towards	 British	 Jews,	 many	
originally	 from	 Baghdad	 but	 often	 British	 subjects	 or	 protégés	 through	 a	
connection	with	India,	can	be	characterised	in	much	the	same	way.20		Finally,	aside	
from	‘martial’	Indians	and	merchants,	a	third	group	of	Indians	who	were	present	at	
the	 treaty	 ports,	was	 ‘lascars’,	who	were	 often	Bengalis	 employed	 as	 seamen	 on	
ships	trading	to	and	from	India.21		However,	these	men	rarely	seem	to	have	stayed	
at	the	ports	for	extended	periods	and		provoked	very	little	official	response	in	the	
form	of	 exceptional	measures	 to	 address	 them	as	 a	 population.	 	 Their	 discipline	




The	 growth	 of	 ‘martial’	 Indian	 communities	 on	 the	 China	 coast	 appears	 to	 have	
been	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	 deployment	 of	 Indian	 soldiers	 by	Britain	 in	 China	
from	the	first	Opium	War	onwards.	 	Britain	made	use	of	Indian	forces	in	China	in	
every	 significant	 subsequent	 British	military	 intervention.22		 Some	 of	 these	men	
left	 the	 military	 and	 found	 other	 employment	 in	 China.	 	 For	 example,	 Indian	
soldiers	garrisoned	in	Hong	Kong	were	recruited	for	police	duties	there	from	the	
1840s:	 probably	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	 cases	 of	 the	 use	 of	 Indians	 as	 police	 outside	
																																																								
19	Claude	 Markovits	 provides	 a	 good	 overview	 of	 the	 diverse	 Indian	 populations	 in	 China,	 see 
Claude	Markovits,	 ‘Indian	 Communities	 in	 China,	 c.	 1842-1949’,	 in	 Robert	 Bickers	 and	 Christian	
Henriot	(eds.),	New	Frontiers:	Imperialism’s	New	Communities	in	East	Asia,	1842-1953	(Manchester,	











Shanghai	 from	1860	 to	 1864,	 and	 although	no	 Indians	were	 recruited	 for	 police	




probably	 triggered	by	 the	deployment	of	 Indian	 troops	 in	Hong	Kong	and	on	 the	





were	 recruited	 locally;	 it	 was	 said	 that	 ‘no	 desirable	 Sikhs	 can	 be	 got	 from	
Hongkong	[sic]	at	present,’	but	recruiting	was	soon	being	done	at	Hong	Kong	(later	
in	the	same	year),	and	in	the	Punjab	from	1885.25		Shanghai	was	always	the	main	
centre	 of	 Indian	 settlement	 on	 the	 Chinese	 mainland,	 and	 the	 SMP	 the	 single	
largest	civilian	employer.		The	population	of	non-military	Indians	at	Shanghai,	and	
presumably	 therefore	also	other	parts	of	China,	 grew	only	 fairly	 slowly	until	 the	














































fighting	 against	 deportation	 in	 court	 proceedings.	 	 He	 left	 India	with	 the	 British	
Army	 in	 1900	 and	 served	 in	 Tianjin.	 	 He	 returned	 to	 India	 in	 1901	 but	 then	
travelled	 to	 Shanghai	 in	 1903,	 and	 found	work	 as	 a	 watchman	 in	 Shanghai	 and	
later	 with	 the	 Shanghai-Nanking	 [Nanjing]	 Railway.29		 Indians	 like	 Amar	 Singh	
were	 highly	 mobile,	 moving	 both	 within	 China	 between	 different	 locations	 and	
																																																								





employers,	 and	 also	 along	 imperial	 and	 other	 networks	 connecting	 India,	





was	 arguably	 Indians	 who	 played	 the	 greatest	 part	 in	 creating	 these	 linkages	
through	their	choice	to	seek	employment	outside	India.		
	
The	number	of	 Indians	 in	the	 ‘Sikh	Branch’	of	 the	SMP	is	shown	in	Table	3,	 from	
which	it	can	be	seen	that	the	proportion	of	the	total	recorded	Indian	population	of	
Shanghai	employed	by	the	SMP	was	generally	around	40-50%.			Table	4	shows	the	
geographic	 distribution	 in	 1915	 of	 Indians	 in	 China,	 from	which	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
‘martial’	Indians	(categorised	as	Sikhs,	Punjabi	Muslims	and	Pathans)	made	up	the	
majority	of	the	Indians	known	to	be	in	China,	and	it	is	also	apparent	that	following	
Shanghai,	 the	 cities	 of	 Hankou,	 Tianjin	 and	 Xiamen,	 where	 Indians	 were	 also	
employed	in	municipal	police	forces,	were	the	other	major	centres	of	population	of	
‘martial’	 Indians.30		 Indians	 classified	 as	 Sikhs	 always	 made	 up	 the	 majority	 of	
Indians	in	China.		In	Shanghai,	all	the	policemen	were	said	to	be	Sikhs,	but	the	SMC	
also	 employed	 a	 number	 of	Muslim	 Indians,	 particularly	 as	 gaol	warders.31		 The	
total	 number	 of	 Indians	 in	 China	 in	 1915,	 according	 to	 the	 data	 in	 Table	 4,	was	
1,755,	but	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	correspondence	with	which	this	table	was	
sent,	 it	 was	 	 pointed	 out	 that	 this	was	 likely	 to	 be	 lower	 than	 the	 true	 figure.32		
Indeed	 all	 the	 numbers	 in	 each	 of	 these	 tables,	 other	 than	 those	which	 refer	 to	
police	 forces,	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 underestimates,	 since	 many	 Indians,	 like	 other	






































Most	 ‘martial’	 Indian	 migrants	 to	 China	 came	 from	 villages	 in	 rural	 parts	 of	
northern	 India,	 where	 it	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 that	 there	 was	 a	 long-standing	
tradition	of	men	from	farming	families	entering	military	service.33		 Jackson	states	
that	 Indians	 in	 the	 SMP	 were	 ‘almost	 without	 exception	 ex-Sepoys	 from	 rural	
families’.34		While	 this	was	 undoubtedly	 the	 SMC’s	 ideal	 type	 of	 recruit,	 there	 is	
however	evidence	that	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	men	who	worked	in	China	








be	 gleaned	 from	 newspaper	 reports	 of	 court	 cases	 and	 inquests.	 	 When	
unemployed	Sundra	 Singh	died	of	 an	opium	overdose	 in	1905,	 the	 inquest	went	
into	some	detail	as	 to	his	 living	quarters	 in	 the	city:	 	he	shared	a	room	with	 five	
other	Indians,	three	watchmen	and	two	others	who	were	unemployed.		It	appears	
that	 there	were	not,	however,	 six	beds	 in	 the	room,	as	one	of	 the	men	explained	
that	 he	 slept	 on	 the	 floor.37		 Many	 watchmen	 lived	 in	 one-room	 ‘huts’	 at	 their	
places	of	work.		Lists	of	belongings	of	deceased	Indians	in	consular	reports	reveal	
that	many	left	little	cash	and	had	few	possessions.38		Indians	also	lived	in	rooms	in	
shared	 houses	 where	 other	 members	 of	 Shanghai’s	 urban	 poor	 lived,	 including	


















to	any	 level	of	 fluency,	and	 thus	most	could	only	communicate	on	a	deeper	 level	
with	other	Indians.		This	affected	their	relations	with	Chinese,	their	opportunities	
in	China	for	work,	and	it	also	affected	their	relationship	with	the	British	state	and	
its	 agents.	 	 Relations	with	 the	 Chinese	were	 notoriously	 bad.	 	 This	 cannot	 have	
been	 helped	 by	 the	 linguistic	 divide,	 which	 meant	 that	 Indian	 policemen	 often	
communicated	 through	 actions	 –	 often	 violent	 –	 rather	 than	 words,	 with	 the	
Chinese,	 such	 as	 rickshaw	pullers,	who	 crossed	 their	 paths.	 	 British	 officials	 and	
employers	relied	to	a	large	extent	on	a	small	number	of	men	with	some	linguistic	




dependent	 on	 a	 not	 very	 reliable	 sergeant-major.’42		 European	 Britons	 were	 at	
once	in	close	and	regular	contact	with	Indians	but	also	cut	off	from	them,	because	
communication	of	a	more	complex	kind	was	impossible	between	most	Europeans	




















linguistic	 aspect	 of	 this	 marginality	 was	 not	 always	 viewed	 as	 a	 disadvantage,	
because	a	 reason	 that	 Indians	were	valued	 in	policing	and	as	watchmen	was	 the	
distance	they	tended	to	maintain	from	Chinese	residents.	 	In	addition,	inability	to	
speak	English	was	not	seen	to	be	the	problem	one	might	think	it	would	be,	since	
there	 was	 never	 any	 desire	 to	 give	 Indians	 work	 which	 required	 subtlety	 or	
intelligence	–	they	were	wanted	primarily	for	their	physical	abilities	and	resilience.		
However,	 the	marginal	and	 inward-facing	nature	of	 Indian	communities	 in	China	
presented	 difficulties	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 governance.	 	 Without	 channels	 for	
obtaining	 intelligence	 and	 communicating	 effectively,	 British	 élites	 struggled	 to	
control	 ‘martial’	 Indians,	 and	 their	 fears	 around	 this	 issue	 were	 frequently	
expressed	 in	official	 correspondence.	 	The	SMC	attempted	 to	 resolve	part	of	 this	
problem	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Sikhs,	 the	 backbone	 of	 their	 security	 force,	 through	 the	
gurdwaras,	 which	 they	 attempted	 to	 maintain	 influence	 over	 as	 a	 tool	 in	 their	
repertoire	 of	 control.	 	 As	 I	 will	 show	 later,	 the	 British	 state	 also	 co-opted	 the	
gurdwaras	into	official	systems	of	governance	over	Sikhs,	through	practices	of	the	
courts,	which	made	the	gurdwara	into	an	alternative	forum	for	dispute	resolution.		







Indians	 employed	 in	 British	 or	 British-dominated	 concessions	 or	 settlements,	
especially	those	in	police	forces;	and	to	counter	‘seditious’	Indian	nationalism	and	
anti-British	movements.	 	 As	 they	 began	 to	 do	 so,	 they	 were	 working	 through	 a	
system	of	 governance	 created	 in	 the	 1840s	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 allowing	British	
merchants	to	trade	with	China	more	freely	and	conveniently,	and	which	had	been	
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revised	 in	 the	1860s	to	deal	with	the	crime	and	violence	of	 the	 largely	European	




and	 colonial	 law,	 and	 in	 particular	 from	 1860	 through	 the	 Indian	 Penal	 Code,	




All	 these	men	are	removed	from	the	restraints	which	 life	 in	their	own	
community	 imposes	 on	 them,	 and	 the	 organization	 of	 extraterritorial	
jurisdiction	is	ill	fitted	to	deal	with	so	numerous	a	body	of	this	nature.45	
In	this	section	I	will	consider	how	this	question	was	addressed	through	alterations	























From	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	 large	 numbers	 of	 Indians	 from	 the	 Punjab	
travelled	as	 independent	–	 	 that	 is,	not	 indentured	–	migrants	to	 locations	across	
the	 British	 empire	 and	 beyond,	 and	 to	 settler	 colonies	 and	 North	 America	 in	
particular.	 	It	was	such	migrants	who	travelled	to	and	through	the	Chinese	treaty	
ports	 in	 increasing	 numbers.47		 British	 and	 other	 state	 authorities	 in	 China	 and	
elsewhere	reacted	in	various	ways,	including	in	some	cases	attempting	to	restrict	
the	 flow	 of	 migrants.	 	 This	 occurred	 most	 famously	 in	 1914	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
Komagata	Maru,	 a	 ship	 chartered	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 restrictions	 to	 take	 Indian	
migrants	 to	 Canada,	 where	 it	 was	 refused	 permission	 to	 disembark	 its	
passengers.48		 The	 development	 of	 Indian	 revolutionary	 politics	 was	 strongly	
influenced	 by	 the	 experiences	 of	 Indian	 migrants	 outside	 India	 and	 by	 the	
perceived	 injustice	 of	 this	 restrictive	 response	 to	 migration.	 	 A	 particular	
development	 was	 the	 genesis	 of	 the	 secularist	 pro-independence	 organisation	
known	 as	 the	 Ghadar	 Party.	 	 This	 group	 was	 founded	 in	 California	 in	 1913	 by	
Indians	there	whose	reactions	to	the	ideas	and	practices	they	encountered	fed	into	
their	 activism	 aimed	 at	 terminating	 British	 rule	 over	 India.	49		The	 considerable	
mobility	of	Indians,	especially	Sikhs	from	the	Punjab,	would	help	to	spread	Ghadar	
ideas	and	organisational	structures	across	the	British	Empire	and	also	to	Indians	in	
China	 and	 Japan.	 	 When	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 suppressed	 an	 attempted	
rebellion	by	Ghadar	supporters	centred	on	Lahore	in	1915,	it	was	discovered	that	
several	 of	 the	 alleged	 participants	were	 former	 residents	 of	 Shanghai,	 and	 some	
were	former	employees	of	the	SMP.50		
	
In	 1906,	 once	 the	 SMP	 refused	 to	 accept	 the	 resignations	 of	 those	 Indians	 who	
wished	 to	 move	 on	 in	 search	 of	 better	 opportunities,	 Indian	 policemen	 tried	 to	
procure	 their	dismissal	 in	various	ways,	but	 instead	of	dismissing	 them	 the	SMP	
disciplined	 them	 through	 fines.	 	 The	men	 then	asked	 for	 an	 increase	 in	pay,	 and	
																																																								




49	Seema	 Sohi,	 Echoes	 of	 Mutiny:	 Race,	 Surveillance,	 and	 Indian	 Anticolonialism	 in	 North	 America	
(Oxford,	2014).	
50	SMC,	Annual	Report	 for	1915,	 p.	 24A;	 ‘Lahore	Conspiracy	Case,	The	Times	of	 India,	 4	November	
1915,	p.	8.	
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had	 a	 petition	 calling	 for	 an	 increase	 drawn	 up	 by	 a	 British	 lawyer.	 	 The	 SMC	
refused	 the	 request	 and	 on	 30	 September	 1906,	 103	 out	 of	 172	men	decided	 to	
strike.51		The	 strikers’	 leaders	were	escorted	by	a	 squad	of	British	bluejackets	 to	
the	 British	 court,	 where	 the	 men	 were	 persuaded	 to	 return	 to	 work	 by	 Judge	
Havilland	de	Sausmarez.52		The	new	king’s	regulation	was	issued	within	weeks	of	





the	 service	 of	 the	 SMP,	 and	 to	 persuade	 or	 procure	 another	 to	 desert.54		 In	
December	 1906,	 ten	 men	 were	 deported	 to	 India,	 having	 been	 identified	 as	




In	 1906,	 at	 around	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 strike	 occurred,	 British	 officials	 had	
already	 been	 planning	 various	 measures	 to	 assist	 the	 SMP	 in	 the	 disciplinary	
problems	 caused	by	 Indians	who	wished	 to	 leave	 their	 employment.	 	 The	 acting	
crown	 advocate	 had	 in	 1906	 drafted	 a	 regulation	 intended	 to	 prevent	 breach	 of	
contract	by	existing	members	of	the	force,	in	response	to	the	events	in	the	months	











56	TNA	 FO	 656/83:	 Fraser	 to	 Jordan,	 21	 November	 1906	 enclosed	 in	 Jordan	 to	 de	 Sausmarez,	 4	






under	 a	 court	 martial,	 but	 it	 was	 feared	 that	 this	 proposal	 revealed	 a	
misunderstanding	 in	 India	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement	 at	
Shanghai	 –	 namely	 that	 it	 was	 not	 British	 territory	 and	 that	 its	 council	 was	
constituted	as	an	 international	body	–	and	while	 it	was	accepted	by	 the	Minister	
Jordan	and	Judge	de	Sausmarez	that	greater	powers	of	discipline	would	be	needed	
given	 the	 substantial	 increase	 in	 men	 contemplated,	 the	 minister	 and	 judge	
insisted	 that	 discipline	would	need	 to	be	 enforced	 in	 a	way	 compatible	with	 the	
existing	judicial	regime.59			
	
Eventually,	 due	 to	 doubts	 raised	 by	 the	 strike	 and	 in	 particular	 because	 of	 the	
concerns	of	Ministers	Satow	and	Jordan	(the	latter	took	over	as	minister	in	1906),	
far	 fewer	 than	 1000	men	were	 recruited.	 	 Satow’s	 view	was	 that	 ‘the	Municipal	
Council	are	not	to	be	trusted	with	an	army	for	defence	of	the	Settlements	against	
attack’,	 and	 Jordan	 maintained	 the	 same	 position.60		 	 The	 number	 of	 Indians	
nevertheless	 increased	 substantially	 and	 accordingly,	 additional	 disciplinary	
powers	over	the	force	were	still	sought	by	the	SMC.61		British	officials	agreed	that	
they	were	indeed	needed	and	the	basis	for	these	powers	was	provided	in	1909	and	
1910	 by	 OICs,	 which	 allowed	 for	 a	 regime	 closer	 to	 military-style	 discipline	 by	
giving	the	minister	the	power	to	confer	a	warrant	on	the	commander	of	a	foreign	
concession	 or	 settlement	 police	 force.	 	 This	 warrant	 would	 enable	 the	 latter	 to	
inflict	 summary	 punishment,	 including	 imprisonment	 with	 hard	 labour,	 on	




King’s	 regulations	 under	 the	 1909	 and	 1910	 OICs,	 providing	 the	 power	 of	 the	
commander	 of	 a	 police	 force	 to	 inflict	 summary	 punishment,	 	 were	 only	 ever	
																																																								











SMP	Clarence	Bruce	 the	 right	 to	 fine	British	members	of	 the	 force,	 and	 to	 inflict	
other	disciplinary	measures,	including	imprisonment,	without	needing	to	apply	to	
the	 courts.	 	 In	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 Council	 accompanying	 the	 regulations,	 which	 was	
published	 in	 the	Municipal	 Gazette,	 it	 was	 made	 clear	 that	 the	 measures	 were	
above	all	designed	to	allow	the	SMP’s	commander	to	control	Indians	in	Shanghai,	
and	 that	 the	 SMC	 had	 been	 fully	 consulted	 on	 its	 requirements,	 since	 ‘all	 the	
amendments	 desired	 by	 the	 Council	 have	 been	 inserted.’63		When	 de	 Sausmarez	
reported	 to	 Jordan	he	explained	 that	he	had	however	been	careful	 to	ensure	 the	
‘proper	subordination’	of	the	captain	superintendent	to	the	court.64		
	
The	 outbreak	 of	 war	 in	 1914	 led	 to	 heightened	 concerns	 over	 the	 loyalty	 of	
Indians,	and	so	further	regulations	were	created,	again	triggered	by	the	situation	
in	Shanghai	and	also,	at	least	to	some	extent,	the	SMC’s	requirements.		These	were	
regulations	 which	 would	 make	 it	 illegal	 to	 work	 in	 enemy	 employment,	 and	
although	 no	 mention	 of	 it	 appeared	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	 regulations	 which	 were	
issued,	the	regulations	were	aimed	specifically	at	Indians	in	Shanghai	working	for	
German	firms.	 	 In	August	1915,	Fraser	wrote	to	 Jordan	stating	that	there	were	 ‘a	
great	many	Indians	still	in	enemy	employ	but	practically	no	other	British	subjects.’		
Fraser	 reported	 that	 together	 with	 SMP	 Assistant	 Superintendent	 Edward	 I.	 M.	
Barrett	and	leading	figures	in	the	gurdwara,	he	was	trying	to	ensure	that	the	men	
were	registered	and	were	watched.65		He	called	for	British	subjects	to	be	barred	by	
law	 from	 employment	 by	 the	 enemy,	 ending	 his	 letter	 in	 dramatic	 fashion	 (it	 is	
clear	 from	Fraser’s	considerable	wartime	correspondence	 that	he	was	excited	by	
the	 dramas	 of	 the	 war):	 ‘the	 danger	 of	 murderous	 assault	 and	 the	 like	 is	 not	




65	Edward	 Ivo	 Medhurst	 Barrett	 was	 recruited	 in	 1907	 to	 the	 SMP	 specifically	 to	 lead	 the	 Sikh	
Branch	of	 the	 force,	 on	 the	 strength	of	 previous	 experience	 in	 the	Malay	 State	Guides,	 a	military	
force	which	also	depended	on	‘martial’	Indians.		SMC,	Report	for	1907,	p.	229.	
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scrupulous.’66		 In	1916,	Fraser	wrote	 to	 Jordan	again	 following	receipt	of	a	 letter	
containing	 intelligence,	 collected	 by	 Barrett,	which	 contained	 a	 list	 of	 Indians	 in	
German	employment,	and	explaining	 that	 the	majority	were	 ‘known	seditionists’.		
Fraser	strengthened	his	argument	by	saying	that	‘Captain	Barrett’s	representation	
is	 in	 my	 opinion	 well-founded	 in	 that	 loyal	 Indians	 must	 wonder	 at	 our	 letting	




Although	 state	 officials	 in	 general	 worked	 closely	 together	 and	 in	 collaboration	
with	 the	 SMC,	 there	 were	 differences	 over	 the	 best	 approach.	 	 Havilland	 de	
Sausmarez	was	 judge	of	the	SCC	at	Shanghai	 from	1905	to	1921,	a	crucial	period	
for	British	governance	of	 Indians	 in	China,	when	major	 regulatory	 changes	were	
effected,	and	also	a	time	when	a	great	deal	of	activity	by	Indians	provoked	British	
officials	 into	 action,	 particularly	 during	 the	 1914-18	 war.	 	 During	 this	 time,	
although	 he	 often	 acted	 to	 assist	 the	 SMC	 in	 exercising	 control	 over	 Indians	 in	
Shanghai,	de	Sausmarez	repeatedly	asserted	the	 independence	of	 the	 judiciary	 in	
the	face	of	calls	for	more	executive	powers	to	be	given	to	officials	to	deport	Indians	
under	 suspicion	 of	 anti-British	 activities	 or	 other	 disruptive	 behaviour.	 	 De	
Sausmarez	took	a	different	approach	to	Shanghai	Consul-General	Everard	Fraser,	
who	 in	 1915	 called	 for	 deportation	 to	 be	 made	 possible	 ‘in	 all	 cases	 of	 proved	
disloyalty	 in	 speech,	 writing	 or	 act	 during	 the	 period	 of	 the	 War’,	 and	 even	
proposed	 to	 take	 ‘executive	 action’	 against	Tehl	 Singh,	 thought	 to	be	 the	Ghadar	
leader	 in	Shanghai,	by	effectively	kidnapping	him	with	 the	assistance	of	 the	SMP	
and	 placing	 him	 on	 a	 British	 ship	 bound	 for	 Singapore.	69		 Fraser	 claimed	 that	 it	
would	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 deport	 him	 through	 the	 existing	 procedure,	 but	 de	
Sausmarez	did	not	 agree	 and	nor	did	 Jordan,	 and	 indeed	Tehl	 Singh	was	 shortly	
																																																								
66	TNA	 FO	 228/2299:	 Fraser	 to	 Jordan,	 17	 August	 1915;	 for	more	 on	 Fraser’s	wartime	 role,	 see	
Robert	A.	Bickers,	Getting	Stuck	in	For	Shanghai:	Putting	the	Kibosh	on	the	Kaiser	from	the	Bund:	The	
British	at	Shanghai	and	the	Great	War	 (London,	2014);	note	Fraser’s	use	of	 the	Anglo-Indian	term	
budmash,	more	usually	 rendered	 as	badmash,	 ‘a	 hooligan,	 bad	 character,	 hoodlum’,	 as	 defined	 in	










the	 dilemma	 of	 enacting	 a	 politics	 of	 difference	within	 the	 constraints	 of	 British	
law	 in	 China:	 	 ‘the	 very	 doubtful	 alternative	 of	 the	 exclusion	 of	 Europeans	 from	
their	action,	is	an	assertion,	that	an	Indian	subject	of	His	Majesty	is	not	entitled	to	
the	protection	granted	by	Magna	Charter	 to	an	Englishman.’71		British	officials	 in	




section.	 	Despite	de	 Sausmarez’s	 opposition,	 in	 the	 face	 of	mounting	pressure	 to	
allow	more	decisive	 action	 to	be	 taken	against	 seditious	 Indians	during	 the	war,	








transfer	 of	 personnel,	 guidance	 or	 regulatory	 models	 directly	 from	 India	 in	
connection	with	 the	management	 by	 the	British	 state	 of	 Indians	 in	 China.73		 The	
British	apparatus	of	 governance	 in	China	was	not	much	 shaped	by	direct	official	
Indian	 involvement,	 except	 perhaps	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 intelligence,	 and	 then	 only	
from	 the	 arrival	 of	 Petrie	 in	 Shanghai.	 	 In	 1894,	 the	 India	 Office	 showed	 a	
reluctance	 for	 Indian	 personnel	 to	 become	 involved	 in	 Shanghai	 affairs	 when	 it	
																																																								




73	Cao	Yin	argues	 that	 the	SMC	modeled	 its	management	of	 Indian	police	on	Hong	Kong:	Cao	Yin,	




take	 a	 position	 serving	 the	 SMC,	 since	 it	 would	 mean	 his	 position,	 ‘outside	 the	
control	 both	 of	 the	 Indian	 and	 British	 Governments,	 would	 be	 altogether	
anomalous	 and	 inconvenient.’74		 It	 is	 true	 that	 India	 made	 a	 substantial	 annual	
contribution	 to	 the	 funding	 of	 the	 British	 consular	 service	 in	 China,	 but	 this	
payment	was	paid	less	than	willingly	and	seems	not	to	have	brought	with	it	much	
power	to	 influence	actions	 in	China,	 if	 indeed	such	 influence	was	even	sought	by	
the	 Indian	 government.75		 On	 the	 whole	 it	 appears	 that	 there	 was	 generally	 no	




to	British	officials	 in	China	and	India	 the	potential	 threat	posed	by	 Indians	 living	




















78	For	 a	 detailed	description	 of	 Petrie’s	 activities	within	 the	 context	 of	 British	 Indian	 intelligence	
efforts	against	subversion	see	Richard	James	Popplewell,	Intelligence	and	Imperial	Defence:	British	








large	 numbers	 of	 Indians	 suspected	 of	 sedition.	 	 The	 order	 meant	 that	 it	 was	
possible	 for	 the	 minister	 to	 certify	 that	 an	 individual	 should	 be	 immediately	
deported,	without	 the	 chance	 to	 give	 security,	 if	 there	were	 ‘reasonable	 grounds	
for	 believing	 that	 any	 British	 subject	 has	 acted,	 is	 acting,	 or	 is	 about	 to	 act	 in	 a	
manner	prejudicial	to	the	public	safety,	or	to	the	defence,	peace,	or	security	of	His	
Majesty’s	Dominions	or	 of	 any	part	 of	 them.’80		 It	 also	provided	 for	 other	 lighter	
punishments,	 but	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 was	 the	 more	 extreme	 power	 of	 deportation	
which	 was	 most	 used.	 	 Petrie	 drew	 on	 information	 from	 Barrett	 of	 the	 SMP	 in	
particular	 in	 compiling	 lists	of	men	who	should	be	deported,	 sometimes	on	very	
flimsy	evidence,	which	 in	some	cases	showed	 little	or	no	revolutionary	activity	–	
the	 chance	 to	 clear	 out	 some	 of	 Shanghai’s	 Indian	 ‘bad	 characters’	 was	 clearly	
seized	by	Barrett.	 	 	For	example,	details	such	as	 ‘very	quarrelsome	and	truculent’	
were	included	to	try	to	stiffen	the	report	on	Santa	Singh,	a	former	member	of	the	
SMP	and	 ‘station	Granthi’	 (priest)	dismissed	 in	1914.81		The	 lists	were	sent,	with	
details	of	the	reasons	for	deportation,	to	the	minister,	who	then	issued	certificates	
to	 the	 judge,	 who	 was	 not	 expected	 to	 look	 beyond	 the	 certificates	 and	 was	
supposed	to	merely	give	effect	 to	 the	minister’s	decision.	 	On	occasion,	 the	 judge	
did	 express	 doubts	 as	 to	 the	 justice	 of	 deportations	 under	 the	 OIC,	 but	 Petrie’s	
arguments,	 which	 included	 in	 one	 telegram	 the	 statement	 that	 ‘we	 regard	 new	
order	 as	 preventive	 as	 well	 as	 punitive’,	 tended	 to	 prevail.82		 British	 officials	 in	
China	had	in	much	earlier	times,	faced	with	different	challenges,	sought	the	power	
to	 deport	 as	 an	 executive	 act.	 	 As	 described	 in	 chapter	 two,	 in	 1860,	 faced	with	











to	 deport	 British	 subjects	 at	 his	 own	 discretion,	 but	 had	 been	 denied	 them	









No	 further	 king’s	 regulations	 or	OICs	were	 issued	 after	 1920	 to	 deal	 specifically	
with	Indians	in	China.		The	SMC	and	the	British	state	remained	bound	together	in	a	
particularly	close	relationship	through	the	policing	and	control	of	Indians,	perhaps	
more	 so	 than	 in	 any	 other	 area.	 	 This	was	 particularly	 evident	 in	 steps	 taken	 to	
deport	 Indians,	and	this	continued	after	the	war.	 	When	Mit	Singh	returned	from	
deportation	in	1924,	Consul-General	Sidney	Barton	reported	that	he	had	‘advised	




in	 practice	 the	 line	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 SMP	was	 blurred	 and	 the	 latter’s	
interconnections	with	the	British	state	were	very	strong.		Intelligence	activities	of	









86	TNA	 FO	 228/3100:	 Barton	 to	 Macleay,	 14	 August	 1924;	 ‘Indian	 Deportee’s	 Return’,	 NCH,	 30	
August	1924,	p.	345.	




The	 Indian	 government	 retreated	 from	an	 active	 role	 for	 a	 time	 and	 indeed	was	
criticised	for	not	doing	enough	to	prevent	Indians	returning	from	deportation	after	
the	war.		As	one	Legation	official	put	it,	‘This	is	typical	of	India	who	are	apt	to	wash	
their	 hands	 of	 these	 Indian	 undesirables	 in	 China,	 though	 they	 can	 of	 course	 be	





when	 an	 officer	 from	 the	Punjab	Police,	 Colonel	G.	H.	R.	Halland,	was	 sent	 to	 be	
attached	 to	 the	 Shanghai	 Defence	 Force	 as	 tensions	 built	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	
Guomindang	 in	China	and	 Indians	were	suspected	of	 linking	up	with	Communist	




under	 the	 circumstances	 described	 above,	 Indians	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 legal	
proceedings	 in	 China	were	 still	 in	 principle	 dealt	with	 under	 the	 same	 laws	 and	
regulations	which	applied	to	all	British	subjects,	and	in	the	same	courts.	 	Another	
response	to	the	question	of	how	to	exercise	control	over	 ‘martial’	British	Indians	
can	 be	 discovered	 in	 the	 everyday	 practices	 of	 the	 British	 courts,	 especially	 the	
Police	 and	 Supreme	 Courts	 at	 Shanghai.	 	 Indians	 appeared	 frequently	 in	 British	
courts	in	China	in	cases	involving	a	range	of	criminal	and	civil	matters.		A	detailed	
reading	 of	 the	 case	 reports,	 together	 with	 archival	 records	 which	 exist	 in	





89	IOR	 L/PJ/6/1806:	 telegram	 from	 Viceroy,	 Simla	 to	 India	 Office,	 7	 June	 1922,	 and	 FO	 to	 India	
Office,	 8	 May	 1922;	 Keith	 Jeffery,	MI6:	 The	 History	 of	 the	 Secret	 Intelligence	 Service,	 1909-1949,	
(London,	2010),	p.	257.	





the	practice	of	 law	 in	particular	played	a	key	 role	 in	keeping	 ‘martial’	 Indians	 in	
their	place	within	colonial	hierarchies	in	China.	
	
As	 has	 been	 shown	 in	 earlier	 chapters,	 British	 officials	 held	 race-based	 ideas	 of	
group	 membership	 which	 resulted	 in	 unevenness	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 British	
subjects.	 	 Judges’	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 towards	 ‘martial’	 Indians	 were	
undoubtedly	 influenced	 by	 ideas	 –	 in	 particular	 based	 on	 racial	 and	 cultural	
essences	–	concerning	the	supposed	nature	of	 Indians.	 	The	positive	attributes	of	
‘martial’	 Indians	 and	 the	ways	 in	 which	 they	were	 thus	 thought	 to	 be	 useful	 to	
British	 rule	 have	 been	 well	 documented	 in	 the	 works	 on	 martial	 race	 theory	
referred	 to	 above,	 but	 negative	 cultural	 and	 racial	 characteristics	 were	 also	
ascribed	 to	 this	 group	 and	 were	 discernible	 in	 official	 discourse	 on	 Indians	 in	
China.	 	 ‘Experts’	 brought	 in	 from	 India	 from	 time	 to	 time,	were	 always	 ready	 to	
share	 their	 knowledge	 with	 British	 officials	 and	 employers	 of	 Indians	 in	 China.		
Major	Davidson,	of	the	Indian	Army,	hired	by	the	SMC	in	1910	to	enquire	into	the	
reasons	for	disaffection	in	the	Sikh	Branch	of	the	SMP,	reported	that	‘The	Sikh	is	a	




their	 outlook	 and	 their	 mode	 of	 thinking’.92		 The	 perceived	 capabilities	 of	 Sikh	
policemen	were	publicly	described	by	the	captain	superintendent	of	the	SMP	in	the	
SMC’s	Annual	Report	 	 for	1906:	 ‘their	 lack	of	 intelligence	does	not	permit	of	their	
being	utilized	in	the	finer	spheres	of	police	work.’93		
	
Certain	aspects	of	 the	way	 that	 judges	dealt	with	 Indians	who	came	before	 them	
show	 that	 a	 particular	 politics	 of	 difference,	most	 likely	 informed	 in	 part	 by	 the	
‘experts’	referred	to	above,	was	clearly	at	work	in	the	handling	of	‘martial’	Indians	
in	 legal	 cases.	 	 Judges	 frequently	 adopted	 a	 lecturing	 tone,	 addressing	 the	
																																																								







good	 Sikhs’	 –	 suggests	 that	 Sikhs	 were	 viewed	 by	 judges	 as	 a	 group	 whose	
presence	in	China	was	contingent	on	the	permission	of	their	British	rulers.		Part	of	
the	 act	 of	 essentialising	 inherent	 in	 the	politics	 of	 difference	was	 a	 denial	 of	 the	
individuality	 of	 the	 subject,	 as	 judges	 showed	 when	 trying	 individuals	 or	 small	
numbers	of	Indians.		In	such	cases,	judges	often	spoke	as	if	Sikhs	or	Indians	were	
on	trial	as	a	group,	and	they	frequently	addressed	the	Sikh	or	Indian	community	as	
a	whole	when	 castigating	 behaviour	 they	 disapproved	 of.	 	 For	 example	 in	 1909,	
Police	Magistrate	Gilbert	King	dealt	with	a	fight	between	Indians	which	took	place	
in	the	very	public	surroundings	of	the	Shanghai	Bund.		It	was	reported	in	the	NCH	
that	 he	 told	 the	 interpreter	 ‘to	 tell	 all	 the	 men	 in	 Court	 –	 and	 the	 room	 was	
crowded	with	Sikhs	–	that	if	that	sort	of	thing	went	on,	the	Sikhs	of	Shanghai	would	
have	 to	 be	 confined	 to	 a	 certain	 part	 of	 Shanghai.’94		 	 Harsh	 criticism	 from	 the	
bench	was	common,	for	example	Acting	Police	Magistrate	W.	R.	Strickland	told	the	
Indians	 in	 court	 in	 a	 case	 of	 assault	 in	 1914,	 ‘It	 is	 disgraceful	 that	 you	 people	
should	 come	 here	 and	waste	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Court	 by	 little	 lies	 of	 your	 own.’95		









in	 their	 work.96		 After	 court	 proceedings	 dealing	 with	 the	 alleged	 ringleaders	
ended,	de	Sausmarez	addressed	a	group	of	about	150	strikers	from	the	verandah	
of	the	consulate,	and	according	to	the	press	report,	lectured	them	on	camaraderie	

















noted	 in	 the	 press	 report	 that	 de	 Sausmarez	 wore	 ‘the	 full	 robes	 of	 a	 judge	
presiding	 at	 a	 criminal	 trial’,	 presumably	 to	 try	 to	 endow	 him	 with	 greater	
authority.		Near	the	end	of	the	hearing,	a	lecture	was	delivered	to	all	Sikhs	in	court,	
who	were	ordered	to	stand	up	to	hear	it.			The	judge	deployed	stereotypes	of	Sikh	





















court	 as	 an	 official	 within	 the	 state	 legal	 hierarchy;	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	
Indians	 in	 court,	 there	 can	 have	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 little	 difference	 between	
their	employers	(the	SMC)	and	the	British	state.		
	
A	 consideration	 of	 the	 exercise	 in	 practice	 of	 deportation	 laws	 gives	 further	
evidence	of	the	way	in	which	differentiation	between	British	subjects	was	effected,	
within	an	ostensibly	universal	legal	framework,	in	ways	which	highlight	the	need	
to	 view	 law	 as	 a	 performative	 resource	 rather	 than	 a	 collection	 of	 rules	 and	
principles.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	many	more	 Indians	were	deported	 from	China	 than	
other	British	subjects.	 	Until	 the	1916	China	 (War	Powers)	Order	 in	Council	was	
passed,	 the	 deportation	 provisions	 (except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 serious	 offences)	
provided	 that	 a	 person	 before	 the	 court	 had	 the	 option	 to	 provide	 adequate	
security	 to	ensure	 their	 future	good	behaviour;	only	 if	 that	was	not	 found	would	


















102	A	 survey	of	 FO	archive	 files	 between	1905	and	1915	 suggests	 that	 in	 that	period,	 four	 Indian	
British	subjects	were	executed.		Only	one	non-Indian	British	subject	was	executed.	
	 231	
officials.	 	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 over	 the	 years	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 Indians	
killed	other	people,	usually	also	Indians,	 in	China,	often	in	the	course	of	personal	
disagreements,	what	was	described	as	‘factional’	infighting,	and	especially	disputes	
over	 Indian	 nationalist	 causes.	 	 But	 Indians	 were	 sometimes	 found	 guilty	 and	
punished	for	serious	crimes	on	very	thin	evidence	indeed.		In	1905,	early	on	in	his	
role	 as	 judge	 of	 the	 SCC,	 de	 Sausmarez	 sat	 in	 a	 case	 involving	 the	 murder	 of	 a	
watchman	in	which	three	Indians	were	jointly	accused	of	the	crime.		The	men	were	
all	 found	guilty	by	 the	 jury,	based	on	evidence	described	by	 the	 judge	as	 ‘almost	
entirely	 circumstantial’,	 and	 all	 three	 were	 sentenced	 to	 death.103		 However,	 as	
with	all	capital	sentences,	under	the	OIC,	the	sentence	had	to	be	confirmed	by	the	
minister	before	it	could	be	carried	out.		It	was	de	Sausmarez’s	duty	to	write	to	the	
minister,	 giving	 some	 advice	 or	 comment	 which	 might	 assist	 in	 making	 the	
decision.	 	This	the	judge	did	on	14	July	1905,	writing	that	he	could	see	no	reason	
for	mitigation	 of	 the	 sentence	 of	 death	 in	 the	 case	 of	 any	 of	 the	men.	 	 Later	 the	
same	day,	however,	de	Sausmarez	wrote	a	second	letter	to	the	minister,	containing	
different	 advice.	 	 He	 explained	 that	 both	 the	 crown	 advocate	 and	 the	 defending	
lawyer	had	written	notes	 to	him	suggesting	 that	 the	 jury	had	wrongly	 convicted	
one	of	 the	men,	Verdava	Singh.	 	 	De	Sausmarez	now	declared	himself	persuaded	
that	the	verdict	in	that	case	was	‘not	strictly	justified	by	the	evidence’,	and	that	the	
verdict	 of	 guilt	 against	 Verdava	 had	 in	 fact	 surprised	 him.	 	 He	 therefore	









were	 thought	 to	know	the	 identity	of	 the	murderers	and	because	 ‘the	attitude	of	






Captain	 Superintendent	 Boisragon	 had	 impressed	 on	 Douglas	 the	 importance	 of	
going	though	with	the	sentence	on	all	three	men	and	that	it	was	believed	that	the	
Indian	 community	 were	 ‘perfectly	 satisfied	 with	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 verdict’.		
Douglas	stated	that	 ‘the	value	of	 the	conviction	will	be	seriously	 impaired	by	 the	
one	man	having	his	sentence	commuted.’105		The	sentences	of	all	three	men	were	
confirmed	 and	 they	 were	 hanged	 in	 the	 Shanghai	 Gaol.106		 The	 judges	 and	 the	
minister	were	prepared	to	hang	a	man	in	the	absence	of	evidence	proving	his	guilt,	









applied	 in	 cases	 involving	 other	 British	 subjects,	 because	 the	 gurdwara	 was	
frequently	 given	 a	 quasi-official	 role	 in	 British	 legal	 proceedings	 between	 Sikhs.		
The	 first	gurdwara	 in	Shanghai	was	opened	 in	1903	 in	 the	Hongkou	district	 in	a	
temporary	 building.107		 Subsequently,	 the	 SMC	 contributed	 land	 and	 part	 of	 the	





officials	 and	 senior	 representatives	of	 the	SMC	 took	a	 close	 interest	 in	gurdwara	
affairs,	 and	 at	 times	promoted,	 supported	 and	 collaborated	with	 the	 committees	









was	 on	 the	 payroll	 of	 the	 SMC,	 and	 later	 that	 year	 it	 was	 reported	 that	 ‘his	
influence	for	good	is	already	making	itself	felt.’110		However,	the	following	year,	the	








provision	 in	 the	 OICs	 or	 any	 regulation	 for	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 gurdwara	 in	
deciding	 legal	hearings,	 so	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 judges	adjusted	 their	practice	of	 the	
law	 on	 their	 own	 initiative.	 	 In	 1908,	 Assistant	 Judge	 Frederick	 Bourne	 heard	 a	
debt	case	involving	Man	Singh	and	Bela	Singh,	in	which	each	party	claimed	that	the	
other	owed	him	money.114		Bourne	‘ordered	the	parties	to	refer	the	matter	to	the	






the	 judge	was	 not	 satisfied	with	 the	 standard	 of	 justice	which	was	 on	 offer.	 	 He	
explained	why	he	had	asked	the	gurdwara	to	intervene:	
When	 I	heard	 this	case,	and	after	hearing	 the	evidence,	 I	made	up	my	
mind	that	I	ought	to	give	judgement	for	the	defendant,	but	it	seemed	to	
me	that	I	might	not	understand	Indian	custom	sufficiently	to	do	justice	










where	I	understand	that	matters	 in	 litigation	are	tried	by	 juries	of	 the	
men’s	own	country,	who	understand	the	customs	better	than	I.116	
In	this	case,	the	parties	were	said	to	have	agreed	to	the	gurdwara	being	asked	to	
settle	 the	matter,	 but	 the	 judge	 explained	why	 this	 solution	was	 in	 the	 end	 not	
satisfactory	 to	 him:	 ‘Some	 time	 passed	 and	 I	 inquired	 from	 the	 Captain	
Superintendent	what	conclusion	the	gurdwara	had	come	to,	and	it	appears	that	all	
they	did	was	to	draw	lots	as	to	which	of	the	parties	was	in	the	right.’117		It	might	be	
expected	 that	 such	 a	 revelation	 would	 put	 a	 stop	 to	 farming	 out	 part	 of	 the	
administration	of	justice	to	the	gurdwara,	but	it	seems	that	it	did	not.		
	




done	so,	 the	granthi	 told	the	 judge	that	 the	complainant	was	 lying	and	asked	the	
judge	 to	 punish	 Jawalla	 for	 taking	 a	 false	 oath.	 	 Jawalla’s	 response	was	 to	 try	 to	
assert	 his	 rights	 to	 British	 justice	 as	 a	 British	 subject,	 as	 the	 NCH	 reported:	
‘Complainant	stated	 that	 the	Granthi	had	nothing	 to	do	with	 the	consulate	and	 it	
would	be	better	for	his	Worship	to	decide	the	case.’	It	was	reported	that	the	judge	
responded	that	‘he	did	not	want	complainant	to	tell	him	how	to	do	his	duty.’		The	
judge	 found	 against	 Jawalla,	 and	 said	 he	 would	 refer	 the	 case	 to	 the	 crown	
advocate	 for	 a	 possible	 perjury	 prosecution.	 	 Among	 his	 final	 comments	 was	
reportedly	the	statement	that	‘The	Sikh	community	had	decided	the	matter	and	he	
















of	 action	 involved	 the	 SMP	 officer	 responsible	 for	 the	 Sikh	 Branch,	 is	 also	
significant,	 showing	 how	 the	 court	worked	 closely	with	 the	 SMP.	 	 In	 1926,	 King	
officiated	 in	 a	 debt	 case	 between	 two	 Sikhs,	 in	which	 the	 ‘Sikh	 community’	 had	
already	 given	 its	 judgment.	 	 It	 was	 reported	 that	 the	 judge	 upheld	 the	 decision	
exactly	 as	 it	 had	 been	 made	 by	 the	 two	 parties’	 ‘fellow-countrymen’	 at	 the	
gurdwara.120		It	is	not	certain	why	some	cases	and	not	others	were	referred	to	the	
gurdwara.	 	 It	 does	 seem	 that	 frequently	 this	 course	of	 action	was	 taken	 in	 cases	
where	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	 parties	was	 conflicting	 and	 it	 appeared	 that	 one	was	
committing	 perjury.	 	 Passing	 the	 case	 to	 the	 gurdwara	 must	 have	 been	 an	
appealing	course	of	action	in	such	circumstances,	where	the	frustration	of	 judges	
was	 sometimes	 evident.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 nearly	 all	 cases	 involving	 Indians	 would	
have	 required	 interpreters	must	 also	 have	made	 the	 cases	more	 tiresome.	 	 The	
involvement	of	the	gurdwara	may	also	have	been	connected	with	a	wish	to	remain	
aloof	 from	 Indians	 and	 their	 disputes,	 a	 phenomenon	 which	 Jonathan	 Saha	 has	
described	among	British	officials	in	Burma.121		The	way	the	gurdwara	was	resorted	
to	by	British	judges	is	clear	evidence	that	judges	based	their	approach	to	Sikhs	in	
their	 courts	 on	 general	 understandings	 of	 the	 proper	 means	 to	 govern	 non-
European	colonial	subjects	elsewhere	in	the	world,	 incorporating	the	widespread	
view	that	British	law	could	not	be	universally	applied	in	view	of	the	importance	of	
maintaining	 the	customs	and	traditions	of	 the	colonised.	 	Their	approach	was	no	
doubt	also	heavily	influenced	by	the	understanding	that	SMC	control	over	Sikhs	in	
Shanghai	was,	 in	 line	with	practices	 in	 the	 Indian	Army,	 in	part	effected	 through	
the	gurdwara	and	its	officials.				
	
Metcalf	 and	 others	 have	 described	 how	 the	 British	 in	 India	 grappled	 with	










and	 maintain	 a	 judiciary	 independent	 of	 the	 executive	 against	 calls	 for	 greater	
deportation	powers.		But,	judging	from	his	handling	of	the	murder	case	referred	to	
above,	 and	 the	 practices	 of	 his	 junior	 colleagues	while	 he	was	 chief	 judge,	 these	
British	 officials	 in	 China	were	 not	 attached	 to	 universal	 principles	which	would	
give	Indians	as	individual	British	subjects	the	same	treatment	as	European	Britons.		
When	 the	 judges	 intervened	 in	 the	 governance	of	 ‘martial’	 Indians	 in	China,	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 ascertain	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	were	 deliberately	 importing	 their	
understanding	of	specifically	Indian	legal	procedures	into	their	courtrooms,	but	it	
seems	 likely	 that,	 although	 none	 had	 professional	 experience	 of	 law	 in	 India,	 at	
least	vague	notions	of	the	Indian	legal	system	would	have	been	known	to	them.		At	
times,	 judges	 attempted	 to	 follow	 procedures	 and	 courtroom	 etiquette	 as	 they	
were	 understood	 to	 be	 practised	 in	 India.	 	 In	 a	 murder	 case	 in	 1907,	 Judge	 de	
Sausmarez	ordered	that	Indians	watching	the	trial	should	not	bring	sticks	into	the	
courtroom,	since	this	‘was	looked	upon	in	India	as	a	mark	of	disrespect	and	should	




on	 a	 particular	 model	 of	 legal	 practice	 from	 India	 or	 elsewhere,	 and	 more	 on	
general	ideas	about	governing	colonial	subjects	and	in	particular	the	importance	of	
religion	 in	 structuring	 the	 lives	 of	 Sikhs,	 and	 especially	 ‘good	 Sikhs’.	 	 Religious	
observance	was	thought	to	be	an	essential	component	of	the	ideal	Sikh,	so	it	is	not	
surprising	 that	 officials	 should	 support	 the	 gurdwaras	 and	 acknowledge	 and	
underpin	 their	 authority.	 	 As	 stated	 earlier,	 the	 SMC	 supported	 gurdwaras	 in	
Shanghai	and	incorporated	these	bodies	into	their	structures	in	order	to	use	them	
in	the	control	and	discipline	of	the	Sikh	policemen	they	employed.		British	judges’	












its	 management	 of	 its	 employees	 and	 in	 policing	 the	 Shanghai	 International	
Settlement,	 and	 this	was	 therefore	 another	 key	way	 in	which	 British	 officials	 in	




My	 chief	 aim	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	 been	 to	 try	 to	 explain	 in	 more	 detail	 how	 –	
through	what	processes	and	with	what	results	–	the	migration	of	Indians,	and	the	
state’s	response	thereto,	influenced	British	expansion	and	the	development	of	the	
treaty	 ports.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 were	 two	main	 consequences	 for	 the	 British	
state’s	presence	in	China.		First,	the	main	institutions	involved	in	the	state’s	project	
of	 governance	 over	 British	 subjects	 in	 China,	 the	 minister,	 consuls	 and	 courts,	
worked	 together	 to	 supplement	 their	 regulatory	 repertoire	 in	 order	 to	meet	 the	
challenges	they	believed	Indians	created	for	British	governance.		Second,	they	did	




at	 least	 thought	 it	 needed	 them,	 because	 of	 its	 peculiar	 status	 as	 the	 British-
dominated	 governing	 authority	 of	 a	 large	 and	 commercially-important	 city,	
inhabited	by	several	thousand	foreigners	and	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Chinese	by	
the	 early	 twentieth-century.	 	 The	 SMC’s	 decision	 to	 employ	 large	 numbers	 of	
Indians	clearly	led	to	an	increased	level	of	activity	and	deployment	of	resources	on	
the	 part	 of	 the	 British	 state	 in	 China,	 and	 thus	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	
British	governance	in	China.			
	
The	 presence	 of	 Indians	 in	 large	 numbers	 in	 the	 SMP,	 and	 the	 way	 they	 were	
jointly	managed	 by	 the	 SMC	 and	British	 state	 institutions,	 clearly	 influenced	 the	
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implementation	of	policing	at	the	International	Settlement	at	Shanghai.	 	This	had	
implications	 both	 for	 the	 institutions	 built	 at	 that	 place	 and	 also	 the	 lived	
experience	of	Shanghai	residents	who	encountered	Indian	police	in	their	everyday	
lives,	 much	 as	 British	 colonial	 subjects	 in	 Britain’s	 colonies	 at	 Hong	 Kong	 and	
elsewhere	 in	 Southeast	 Asia	 did.	 	 The	 actions	 of	 the	 British	 state	 therefore	
contributed	in	a	significant	way	to	the	creation	of	Shanghai,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	
other	 British	 concessions	 where	 Indian	 police	 were	 deployed,	 as	 sites	 where	
colonial	relations	were	enacted	and	experienced.		
	
The	migration	of	 Indians	 to	China	 led	also	 to	 increased,	but	 surprisingly	 limited,	




assistance	 and	 only	 because	 the	 Government	 of	 India	 was	 concerned	 about	 the	
ultimate	 effects	 in	 India	 of	 rebellious	 activities	 taking	 place	 in	 China	 and	
elsewhere.	 	 Rather	 than	 being	 a	 projection	 of	 power	 outwards	 from	 India,	 their	
presence	was	very	much	the	continuation	of	 the	pattern	 in	other	areas,	whereby	
demands	for	resources	were	made	on	India,	to	pay,	to	provide	guidance,	to	provide	
personnel.	 	 	 Given	 this	 picture,	 if	 we	 are	 to	 use	 China	 as	 an	 example	 of	 Indian	
‘subempire’,	we	cannot	understand	 the	 latter	 term	as	suggesting	an	expansionist	
impulse	 emanating	 from	 the	 Government	 of	 India,	 at	 least	 if	 our	 focus	 is	 the	
migration	of	Indians	to	China.		
	
We	 can	 however	 see	 that	 when	 Indians	 migrated	 to	 China,	 and	 as	 a	 result	
sometimes	appeared	in	British	courts	in	China,	certain	ideas	and	practices	seemed	
to	 accompany	 them.	 	 Indians	 in	 China	 were	 not	 freed	 from	 the	 experience	 of	
colonial	 difference	 which	 was	 a	 feature	 of	 Indian	 everyday	 experience	 in	 India.		
They	found	themselves	in	a	milieu	in	which	the	essentialist	views	described	in	this	
chapter,	 in	 particular	 in	 connection	 with	 Sikhs,	 determined	 the	 way	 those	 in	
authority	 treated	 them.	 	 It	 would	 be	 more	 precise	 to	 say	 that	 the	 ideas	 and	
practices	 travelled	 to	China	 separately	 from	 Indians	 themselves	of	 course	–	 they	
came	 with	 British	 officials	 in	 their	 thoughts	 and	 convictions,	 whether	 those	
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officials	 came	direct	 from	Great	Britain,	 or	 after	 colonial	 experience	 elsewhere	–	
but	these	ideas	and	practices	were	clearly	activated	when,	for	example,	an	Indian	
stood	 before	 a	 British	 judge	 in	 the	 dock	 at	 the	 Shanghai	 British	 court,	 and	was	
sentenced	to	death	based	on	circumstantial	evidence.	 	Contrary	to	the	rhetoric	of	
officials	 and	 despite	 the	 constraints	 of	 its	 basis	 in	 domestic	 rather	 than	 Indian	
colonial	 law,	 British	 law	 as	 practised	 in	 Shanghai	 was	 constitutive	 of	 a	 hybrid	








At	 the	 most	 fundamental	 level,	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 an	 exercise	 in	 writing	
institutions,	processes	and	practices	of	the	British	state	into	the	internationalised	
history	of	China.	The	British	state	created	substantial	structures	and	engaged	in	a	









as	 ‘nearly	 invisible’	 or	 ‘restricted’,	 apparently	 based	 on	 a	 binary	 understanding	
which	 contrasts	 areas	 classed	 as	 ‘formal’	 and	 ‘informal’	 empire,	 reflect	
assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports	 which	 do	 not	 accord	with	 the	







in	 practice,	 did	 the	 state	 extend	 its	 governance	 in	 China?	 	 Overall,	 taking	 the	
findings	 of	 the	 thesis	 together,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 state	 project	 of	
governance	unfolded	in	response	to	the	challenge	of	managing	the	diverse	British	





1	Darwin,	Unfinished	Empire,	 pp.	 391-2;	 Goodman	 and	 Goodman,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in	 Goodman	 and	
Goodman	(eds.),	Twentieth	Century	Colonialism	and	China,	p.	2.	
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governance	 described	 in	 this	 thesis,	 can	 provide	 examples	 of	 both	 kinds	 of	
processes.	 	 It	was	 founded	 in	 the	1860s	through	a	mostly	London-led	procedure,	
described	in	chapter	one,	in	which	the	law	officers	were	consulted,	and	experience	
in	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	heavily	drawn	upon.	 	But	it	developed	in	response	to	




Municipal	Council	 (SMC)	 in	ways	which	did	not	 align	with	 the	policy	of	 the	 then	
minister,	 Rutherford	 Alcock.	 	 In	 chapter	 five	 I	 then	 showed	 how,	 in	 the	 early	
twentieth	century,	after	the	SMC	had	recruited	‘martial’	Indians	to	form	a	key	part	
of	 its	 security	 apparatus,	 the	 British	 court	 responded	 to	 deal	 with	 these	 new	
circumstances.	 	 	 Some	 of	 the	 key	means	 by	which	 the	 court	moved	 to	meet	 the	
specific	 local	 conditions	 were	 informal	 adaptations	 of	 procedures	 and	
interventions	which	had	no	basis	in	law.			
	
The	 key	means	 by	which	 I	 have	 illuminated	 the	 state’s	 role	 has	 been	 through	 a	
focus	 on	 the	 governance	 of	 marginal	 British	 subjects	 in	 China.	 	 This	 thesis	 has	
shown	that	the	development	of	the	British	state’s	structures	and	practices	in	China	
was	 influenced	 to	a	considerable	extent	by	 the	perceived	need	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
presence	and	activities	of	marginal	groups.		In	chapter	two	I	showed	that	the	need	
to	discipline	and	control	British	seafarers	was	recognised	from	the	opening	of	the	
first	 five	ports	 in	 the	1840s,	 but	 further	 challenges	presented	by	 groups	 such	 as	
‘the	 rowdy	 class’	 led	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 most	 important	 institution	 for	
governance,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 for	 China	 (SCC)	 at	 Shanghai.	 	 Chapter	 three	
described	 how	 specific	 policies	 and	 practices	 were	 also	 deployed	 in	 relation	 to	
Chinese	 British	 subjects,	with	 clear	 implications	 for	 relations	with	 Chinese	 state	
authorities	 as	 well	 as	 British	 colonial	 governments	 elsewhere.	 	 Chapter	 four	
showed	 that	 the	 treatment	 of	 Eurasians	 represented	 an	 acknowledgment	 by	 the	
British	 state	of	 the	 status	of	 the	 treaty	ports	 as	 sites	of	 settler	 colonialism.	 	This	




China	 led	 to	 significant	 additions	 and	 reforms	 to	 the	 British	 machinery	 of	
governance,	 described	 in	 chapter	 five,	 again	 including	methods	 not	 provided	 for	
under	legal	statutes	or	established	principles.	 	The	chapters	on	marginal	subjects	
at	the	treaty	ports	have	all	allowed	for	a	sustained	focus	on	the	everyday	practices	
of	 the	 state,	 in	 particular	 the	 role	 of	 the	 courts.	 	 They	 have	 shown	how	 colonial	






conjunction	 with	 certain	 other	 formations,	 some	 of	 which	 have	 been	 more	
thoroughly	 researched,	 for	 example	 the	 SMC	and	 the	 customs.	 	My	 findings	 thus	
complement	 work	 by	 others	 who	 have	 examined	 the	 history	 of	 foreign	
involvement	 in	 nineteenth-	 and	 early	 twentieth-century	 China	 within	 a	 wider	
colonial	 context,	 including	 the	 extensive	 work	 of	 Robert	 Bickers	 on	 the	 treaty	
ports,	James	Hevia’s	English	Lessons,	Jackson’s	work	on	the	SMC,	Catherine	Ladds’	
research	 on	 the	 customs,	 and	 Pär	 Cassel’s	 writing	 on	 extraterritoriality.2		 This	








sufficiently	 recognised	 or	 described.	 	 This	 thesis	 has	 therefore	 made	 a	 specific	
contribution	 to	 our	 knowledge	 about	 the	 development	 and	 operation	 of	




Lessons;	 Jackson,	 Shaping	 Modern	 Shanghai:	 Colonialism	 in	 China’s	 Global	 City,	 Ladds,	 Empire	
Careers;	Cassel,	Grounds	of	Judgment.	
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the	 SMC,	 states	 that	 'from	 the	 days	 of	 the	 Taiping	 Rebellion	 (1850-1864),	 the	




that	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 was	 in	 effect	 a	 hybrid	 colonial	 state	 which	 governed	 the	
Shanghai	 International	 Settlement;	 an	 assemblage	 in	 which	 SMC	 personnel	 and	
British	state	agents	and	institutions	were	the	primary	actors.4		Although	there	was	
no	 name	 for	 this	 assemblage,	 so	 that	 its	 outlines	 are	 difficult	 to	 trace	 and	 its	
influence	is	not	always	in	plain	view,	its	agency	cannot	be	doubted.		The	SMC	could	
not	govern	Shanghai’s	International	Settlement	alone	and	any	attempt	to	account	
fully	 for	 the	governance	of	 the	Settlement	must	 incorporate	a	role	 for	 the	British	
state.	 	 British	 state	 institutions	 based	 in	 Shanghai	 supported	 the	 work	 of	 the	
Council	 from	the	very	 first	years	of	 the	existence	of	 the	 International	Settlement,	
often	 in	ways	which	 did	 not	 ultimately	 align	well	with	 the	 official	 British	 policy	




SMC	 was	 grappling	 with	 the	 problem	 of	 disciplining	 its	 Indian	 workforce,	 the	




they	 were	 part	 of	 a	 single	 authority.	 	 The	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 enjoyed	 by	 the	
British	 court	 facilitated	 its	 assistance	 of	 the	 SMC,	 and	 allowed	 the	 Council	 to	
develop	 its	 own	 apparently	 autonomous	 status.	 	 However,	 while	 the	 SMC	 was	
autonomous	 to	 a	 degree,	 it	 was	 not	 independent:	 it	 relied	 on	 the	 British	 state,	
especially	 the	 latter’s	 local	 institutions,	 as	well	 as	military	 back-up,	 in	 key	ways	
related	to	 its	essential	 functions	 in	connection	with	the	management	of	 law,	 land	
																																																								
3	Isabella	Jackson,	Shaping	Modern	Shanghai,	pp.	28-9.	
4	The	description	of	 the	modern	 state	 as	 an	 assemblage	 is	 taken	 from	Patrick	 Joyce	 and	Chandra	







The	 British	 state’s	 role	 in	 China	 is	 best	 considered	 alongside	 existing	 work	 on	
imperial	networks	and	the	circulation	of	 ideas	and	practices,	and	throughout	this	
thesis	 I	 have	brought	 to	 attention	 the	 existence	 and	nature	of	 connections	 along	
such	networks	which	have	not	generally	been	visible	in	previous	work.			Chapters	
one,	two,	three	and	five	all	clarified	the	way	in	which	imperial	networks	connected	
the	 treaty	ports	with	Hong	Kong,	 the	 Straits	 Settlements,	 India	 and	 the	Ottoman	
Empire.	 	 Such	 connections	 developed	 through	 various	 transfers	 of	 people,	 ideas	
and	 practices,	 sometimes	 in	 unexpected	ways,	 and	with	 effects	 on	 China-Britain	
relations	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports.	 	 Connections	were	made	 and	
unmade	in	the	course	of	the	development	of	the	British	project	of	governance.		The	
colony	of	Hong	Kong	was	initially	envisaged	as	a	territorial	foothold	which	would	
service	 the	 needs	 of	 British	 interests	 in	 the	 newly-opened	 ports,	 and	 for	 that	
reason	shared	a	government	and	legal	system	with	the	treaty	ports.		However,	this	
arrangement	was	found	to	be	inadequate	to	the	task	of	delivering	British	aims	for	




the	 colony	 of	 Hong	 Kong’s	 interference	 in	 treaty	 port	 governance	 on	 behalf	 of	




Imperial	 connections	 with	 British	 India	 have	 already	 been	 described	 in	 the	
literature,	and	connections	of	certain	kinds	are	 indeed	confirmed	 in	 the	research	
																																																								





presented	 in	 this	 thesis,	 in	 particular	 in	 chapter	 five	 on	 ‘martial’	 Indians.	 7			
However,	 the	 case	 of	 British	 governance	 in	 China	 which	 I	 have	 presented	 here	
shows	with	greater	clarity	the	nuances	of	those	connections,	which	were	strong	in	
some	 areas	 but	 surprisingly	 weak	 in	 others.	 	 	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 area	 of	
institutional	ties,	neither	the	Government	of	India	nor	its	court	system	were	closely	





state	 projected	 itself	 very	 little	 into	 the	 treaty	 ports	 and	 had	 limited	 influence	
there.		There	was	a	transfer	of	ideas	about	Indians	and	of	certain	practices	towards	
them	 from	 India	 to	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 but	 this	 was	 largely	 done	 outside	 formal	
structures	 –	 the	 Indian	 legal	 system	 was	 not	 drawn	 on	 to	 create	 the	 formal	
structures	 of	 British	 systems	 of	 governance	 in	 China,	 but	 instead	 more	 general	
ideas	and	practices	were	adopted.		We	may	call	this	Indian	influence	subimperial,	
as	some	historians	have	done,	but	we	should	clarify	what	we	mean	by	that	term	–	
specifically	 whether	 influence	 was	 ‘pushed’	 outwards	 from	 an	 Indian	 centre,	
whether	 it	 was	 extracted	 by	 actors	 based	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports	 seeking	 to	 take	
advantage	 of	 what	 they	 saw	 as	 India’s	 useful	 resources,	 both	 physical	 and	




the	 empire.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 chapter	 three	 I	 showed	 how	 the	 small	 colonies	 of	
Hong	Kong	and	the	Straits	Settlements	both	sought	to	influence	policy	at	the	treaty	





8	James	Onley,	 ‘The	Raj	Reconsidered:	British	India’s	 Informal	Empire	and	Spheres	of	 Influence	 in	
Asia	and	Africa’,	Asian	Affairs,	40,	1	(2009),	44–62.	









varied	and	was	applied	differently	 in	response	 to	 the	problems	of	governance	as	




of	 locations,	 connected	 in	 ways	 which	 did	 not	 always	 make	 up	 a	 coherent	
framework,	and	capable	of	holding	multiple	viewpoints	and	priorities.		In	this	way	
divergent	views	even	on	 such	 fundamental	 issues	as	 the	question	of	who	 should	
qualify	 as	 British	 and	 deserving	 of	 the	 full	 range	 of	 British	 rights	 were	 held	 at	
different	places.		
	
The	 analysis	 of	 state	 practices	 towards	marginal	 groups	has	 provided	 an	 insight	
into	the	nature	of	the	treaty	ports	as	colonial	spaces.		The	British	Eurasians	in	the	
treaty	ports	who	were	the	focus	of	chapter	four,	by	contrast	with	Chinese	British	
subjects,	 had	 no	 colonial	 government	 to	 present	 arguments	 for	 or	 against	 their	
rights	 as	 British	 subjects	 in	 China.	 	 The	 closest	 thing	 that	 they	 had	 to	 such	
patronage	 was	 in	 fact	 parts	 of	 the	 British	 treaty	 port	 community	 itself,	 within	
which	British	consular	officials	and	judges	themselves	also	lived	and	worked.		The	
recognition	of	Eurasians	as	British	protected	persons,	even	in	cases	where	no	legal	
claim	 to	 British	 status	 could	 be	 justified,	 but	 where	 the	 person	 in	 question	 had	
demonstrated	enculturation	as	British	at	 the	 treaty	ports,	was	a	 recognition	 that	
the	latter	were	sites	in	which	it	was	possible	to	grow	up	as	British.		Moreover,	the	
creation	of	a	group	of	people	whose	ties	 to	Britain	depended	on	enculturation	at	
treaty	 ports	 such	 as	 Shanghai	 represented	 an	 action	 taken	 by	 the	 British	 state	
which	 contributed	 towards	 the	 imagining	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports	 as	 colonial	 spaces	
distinct	 from	Chinese	 territory.	 	 These	 seemingly	 trivial	 interventions	 by	 British	






Although	 primarily	 focussed	 here	 on	 the	 British	 state’s	 relationships	 to	 its	 own	
marginal	subjects,	my	analysis	of	British	governance,	especially	in	chapter	two,	has	
also	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 way	 that	 consular	 jurisdiction	 was	 implemented	 by	
Britain	in	China	affected	the	lived	experiences	of	Chinese	people	at	the	treaty	ports.		
The	 institution	 of	 the	 British	 court	 at	 Shanghai	 was	 a	 setting	 in	 which	 Chinese	
participants	 and	witnesses	 in	 trials,	 and	also	 readers	of	 the	Chinese	press,	 could	
clearly	 experience	 the	 asymmetrical	 relations	 characteristic	 of	 colonialism,	 and	
cases	 which	 were	 controversial	 could	 have	 a	 significant	 impact,	 even	 beyond	
Shanghai.	 	Similar	effects	to	those	highlighted	by	James	Hevia,	who	has	described	
the	‘pedagogy	of	imperialism’	in	China,	can	be	seen	to	have	been	produced,	albeit	
through	 different	 processes.10		 The	 use	 of	 Indians	 in	municipal	 police	 forces	 has	
also	 been	 pointed	 to	 by	 earlier	 writers	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 colonial	 trappings	 of	
everyday	treaty	port	 life,	a	state	of	affairs	deliberately	promoted	by	the	SMC	and	
clearly	 affecting	 the	 experience	 of	 residents	 of	 the	 treaty	 ports,	 foreign	 and	
Chinese.11		Chinese	at	 the	 treaty	ports	 frequently	experienced	harsh	 treatment	at	
the	hands	of	Indian	policemen	and	watchmen,	who	were	chosen	by	imperial	élites	
specifically	 for	 their	 suitability	 in	 meting	 out	 such	 treatment	 to	 the	 Chinese	
populations.	 	 This	 research	 has	 made	 clear	 that	 the	 British	 state	 played	 an	
important	 role	 in	 facilitating	 this	 state	 of	 affairs,	 and	 the	 effects	 it	 produced,	
especially	in	the	way	that	the	disciplining	of	Indians	working	in	security	roles	was	
enabled	 through	 the	 specific	 policies	 and	 practices	 which	 were	 adopted	 to	 deal	
with	them.	
	
With	 the	 occasional	 exception,	 mostly	 in	 relation	 to	 marginal	 Europeans,	 the	
existing	literature	on	foreign	settlers	and	sojourners	in	China	has	done	little	more	






other	 colonial	 sites	 across	 the	British	 empire.	 	 The	 chapters	 in	 this	 thesis	which	
deal	with	the	different	marginal	groups	have	served	to	bring	into	greater	focus	the	
existence	of	these	groups,	as	well	as	some	details	as	to	their	nature	and	activities.		
In	 addition	 to	 this	 general	 contribution	 to	 historical	 knowledge,	 the	 thesis	 has	
further	demonstrated	that	cultural	factors,	together	with	challenges	inherent	in	the	
context	of	 the	 treaty	ports	and	British	colonies,	 fed	 into	 the	politics	of	difference	
which	determined	how	these	groups	were	handled	by	state	actors.		The	state	did	a	
good	deal	of	 the	work	of	managing	difference	which	was	an	essential	part	of	 the	
maintenance	 of	 colonial	 space.	 	 That	 these	 processes,	 involving	 attempts	 at	




the	 importance	 of	 the	 management	 of	 difference	 in	 empires	 more	 generally.	 	 It	
shows	 that	 the	management	 of	 difference	 affected	 official	 practices	 in	 important	
ways,	 influenced	by	the	specific	circumstances	of	 the	treaty	ports	and	their	place	
within	 imperial	networks,	 to	produce	 the	British	official	 stance	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
different	 groups	 of	 colonial	 subjects	 and	British	marginal	 groups	 covered	 in	 this	
research.	 	 In	 short,	 the	 groups	 were	 managed	 in	 specific	 ways	 tied	 to	 cultural	






policies	 and	 practices	 through	 the	 consulates	 and	 courts	 in	 supporting	 and	
facilitating	 the	expansion	of	British	 commercial	 activities	 in	China	might	provide	
further	evidence	for	the	 importance	of	 the	state	 in	the	development	of	 the	treaty	
ports,	which	were	 all	 of	 course	 primarily	 intended	 as	 centres	 of	 trade.	 	 Such	 an	





Further	 valuable	 work	 could	 also	 be	 conducted	 by	 investigating	 connections	
between	consular	officials	(both	British	and	other	foreign	officials),	the	SMC,	other	








areas	where	Britain	 implemented	consular	 jurisdiction,	 for	example	 the	Ottoman	
Empire.	 	 Although	 Turan	 Kayaoglu	 has	 compared	 British	 ‘legal	 imperialism’	 in	
China,	 Japan	 and	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 his	 work	 is	 focussed	 on	 the	 principle	 of	
extraterritoriality	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 relations	 at	 the	 state	 to	 state	
level.12		 It	does	not	 investigate	 the	 implementation	of	consular	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	
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this	 thesis	 has	 shown,	 such	 an	 approach	 can	 reveal	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 colonial	
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